序言
“要想富先修路”。人们可以用这句中国谚语三言两语解释中国在过去三十年中令人目眩的
经济增长。事实上，遵循这句谚语，中国政府就动用大量的公共投资来建设公路、铁路、桥、
别的大型基础设施，以提高国内生产总值并创造新的经济机会。但北京的张略肯定没有停留
在国家层面的举措上，因为 2013 年中国政府正式提出世界上最大的国际经济项目之一。这
一项目也被纳入了中国宪法，被称为 “一带一路”倡议。一带一路将于 2040年完成，旨在
将整个地球包裹在一个密集的基础设施网络中，使新丝绸之路上的贸易更快、更有效。
本论文拟从意大利港口体系的作用和北京对其的重视两个方面，分析意大利参与“一带一路”
建设战略的全过程。
第一章专门介绍中国项目。一带一路大致可分为两条路径：海路和陆路。从这两条航线上延
伸出一系列小的分支，涉及几个国家，有时连接在一起，连接海上和陆地走廊。尽管这一重
大项目的主要目的是促进中国与世界之间的贸易，但本节还探讨发起这一倡议背后的其他原
因。这些原因涉及地缘政治的、金融的和国家稳定的问题。中国政府的希望是这大倡议能带
动国内经济，打入新的市场机会，并使中国靠近关键的能源（石油、天然气、锂矿、等）。
解决产能过剩的问题也是中国通过这个项目想要解决的另一问题。
由于本文的目的是从海洋的角度分析一带一路项目，因此更多的空间用于深化这个中国倡议
海事部分，被称为“二十一世纪海上丝绸之路”。
具体而言，本文将考虑从中国延伸至地中海中心的主要商业海运航线。中国对这条航线上的
港口投资确保了中国港口和物流运营商对港口码头和后港运营管理的控制。这显然是为了更
快、更有效地分配中国货物，同时也是为了控制能源供应线，从而建设新的能源传输基础设
施。
对中国来说，经营一个外国港口意味着什么？投资这个行业会有什么好处？这些都是本章将
要回答的问题，本章还将考虑到中国港口公司在中东和北非国家（所谓“MENA”国家）的存
在，特别是巴基斯坦、吉布提、埃及、以色列、土耳其、阿尔及利亚和摩洛哥港口的中国港
口公司的存在。事实上，中国利用港口企业的业务优势，开始了向地中海和港口码头渗透的
战略，以两种不同的方式进入市场：第一方式是通过定向投资，旨在收购港口基础设施的整
体股份（如欧洲比雷埃夫斯港）、第二方式是通过收购某些港口码头管理公司（如收购苏伊
士运河码头 20%的股份）。
本章最后简要提及欧盟对这一新举措的反应。所有的这些北京举措和行动很快地引起欧盟机
构的关注。中国和一些欧盟国家的亲和力、违反欧盟环境保护和产品质量条例的中国行动、
不符合欧盟标准的中国融资模式，这些都是导致欧盟委员会提出中欧互联互通平台（Eu-
China Connectivity Platform)备忘录的驱动因素。这些平台旨在改善一带一路与欧盟互联
互通倡议之间的协同作用，并协调基础设施计划的实施。
第二章论述了意大利参与“一带一路”倡议，分为两个部分。
第一部分介绍意大利与中国伙伴关系的整个过程。中国与意大利的“求爱”发生在 2019 年
谅解备忘录签署前几年，两国签署了一份关于共同努力“一带一路”的正式合作协议。过去
10年来，意大利政府接连上台，各自都为加强中意外交关系做出了贡献，使未来与这个亚洲
国家在港口领域的谈判浮出水面。
出于历史延续性的考虑，但最重要的是由于意大利处于地中海中心和南欧心脏地带的战略地
理位置，意大利及其港口体系为中国物流战略带来了附加值。因此，第二章回顾依赖意大利
港口体系的优势，强调其物流效率和专业化，以及其局限性。
此外，上述备忘录的签署使中国交通建设公司（CCCC）与意大利两个港口管理局达成了两项
合作协议。这两个港口管理局正式称为“西利古里亚港口网络管理局”（Port System
Authority of Western Ligurian Sea）和“东亚得里亚海港口网络管理局“（Port System
Authority of Eastern Adriatic Sea）。
本章的任务是查明中国在与港口管理局签署的其中一项协议中的利益，即关于热那亚港口系
统的协议；以及中远海运港口公司（COSCO）进入瓦多利古雷港（Vado Ligure)的码头管理。
另一方面，本章第二节详细阐述意大利有关港口系统的立法。本部分的主要目的是对港口协
定签署后的批评作出全面回应。事实上，在与中国签署协议之后，舆论、一些政党和欧盟机
构的一些人士都发出了严厉的批评。批评是针对向中国“出售”意大利港口的愿望，但是如
果我们参考一下意大利的法律，意大利港口管理局的公共性质不允许这种可能性。1994年第
84号改革法生效后，意大利港口不再被简单地理解为属于国家资产，而是其活动委托给私营
企业的公共资产。
此外，港口管理局是一种公共机构，它的任务是把国家控制与私营企业的积极性结合起来，
以维护社区的利益。正是这些机构的性质，以及赋予其主任的角色和权力，对中国在意大利
港口体系中的渗透战略产生了重大影响。
这些意大利港口立法的特殊性使中国无法采用在不同法律制度国家采用的相同做法。因此，
意大利和中国私营部门和公共部门之间的合作必须建立在一个不仅完全符合意大利法律框架，
而且也符合欧洲法律框架的背景下。
第三章详述与的里雅斯特港进入一带一路轨道有关的事件。
在过去几年里，的里雅斯特港经历了一个新的繁荣时期，在其交通量大幅增长和从港口本身
延伸出来的多式联运物流网络扩张之后，的里雅斯特港得以在国际舞台上重新定位。的里雅
斯特港的优势很多，包括它的战略地理位置、深水区、密集的铁路网络、靠近中欧和东欧市
场。但最重要的特色是它是一个自由港。自由港的好处主要有两个：过境自由和不征税。这
意味着从任何其他国家抵达的里雅斯特港的货物完全免除关税和其他税收。
不言而喻，所有这些优势将使的里雅斯特成为中国在新丝绸之路框架沿线与欧盟国家贸易的
特权门户。
中国企业与的里雅斯特私营部门企业的谈判始于 2016 年，随后东亚得里亚海港口网络管理
局在机构层面举行了一次对话。此外，2019年3月，在意中谅解备忘录签署仪式上，东亚得
里亚海港口网络管理局主任 森娜·达古斯蒂诺(Zeno D’Agostino)通过签署合作协议，使
与中交的合作关系正式化。这一合作协议的签署引发了诸多争议。在对港口管理局工作提出
的许多批评中，有人指称其主任达古斯蒂诺在与中国的 CCCC 进行谈判时非法。然而，事实
表明，的里雅斯港口管理局的行动严格遵循了欧盟为这种合作制定的体制框架。
本论文的目的是分析所有这些方面，试图对发生的事情提供一个批判性和公正的看法。
最后，本文将讨论一家德国物流企业（所谓汉堡 HHLA 公司）收购的里雅斯特港新建物流平
台运营公司的多数股权。值得注意的是，这一基础设施长期以来一直是中国物流企业梦寐以
求的。
鉴于发生了什么，中国对该港口的投资是否只是被推迟，还是有逆转方向，将特里斯特和意
大利从与龙的伙伴关系中带走？
8
Introduction
“If you want to get rich, build a road first”, 要想富先修路 (yao xiang fu xian xiu lu). One could use
this proverb to explain in a few words the dizzying economic growth experienced by China over the
last thirty years. As a matter of fact, the assimilation of Keynesian concepts has led the Chinese
government authorities to resort to a massive dose of public investment to build roads, highways,
railways and large infrastructure to boost GDP, which has been growing steadily since the late 1980s.
But Beijing’s strategies have certainly not stopped at national level initiatives, as in 2013 Chinese
government have lunched one of the largest economic development projects in the world history,
among other things included in the Chinese Constitution, called “One Belt One Road”, 一带一路 (yi
dai yi lu). This China-led international project, due to be completed in 2040, aims to envelop the
entire planet in a dense network of infrastructures that will make trade on the New Silk Road faster
and more functional.
This paper proposes to analyse the whole story of Italy’s involvement in one of the two strategic plans
regarding the Initiative, the one relating to infrastructure (which is called “Belt and Road Initiative”),
with particular reference to the role of Italian port system and the attention that Beijing has paid to it.
The first chapter is devoted exclusively to the presentation of the Chinese project. The Belt and Road
can be roughly divided into two paths: the sea path, and the land path. From these two main routes
arise a series of small offshoots, involving several countries and sometimes linking up together,
joining sea and land corridors. Although the primary intention of this major project is to boost trade
between China and the world, this section will also look at the other reasons behind the launch of the
initiative, which relate to geopolitical, financial and national stability issues. It will also be crucial to
shed light on which financial institution are making this project a reality.
As this paper aims to analyse the OBOR project from a maritime point of view, more space will be
devoted to the deepening of the BRI maritime section, known as 21st Century Maritime Silk Road 二
十一世纪海上丝绸之路 (ershiyi shiji haishang sichou zhilu). A mention will also be made of
international maritime transport, which over time has undergone numerous changes that have
revolutionised transport logics, in which China is set to become an absolute protagonist. Specifically,
we will consider the main commercial maritime route stretching from China and leading to the heart
of Mediterranean Sea, highlighting the investments and acquisitions that have ensured Chinese port
and logistic operators a strong presence in harbours management along this lane. What does it mean
for China to operate a foreign port, and what would be the benefits of investing in this sector? These
are all questions that will be answered in this chapter, which will take into consideration Chinese
presence in the ports of MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries, and in particular those of
Pakistan, Djibouti, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Algeria and Morocco. The chapter will then close with a
brief mention of the EU response to this new initiative.
The second chapter deals with Italy's involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative, and is divided into
two sections.
The first section reconstructs the whole story of Italy's approach to the partnership with its Chinese
counterpart. The Chinese “courtship” took place several years before the signing of the 2019
Memorandum of Understanding, with which the two countries signed a formal cooperation agreement
9
for joint efforts on the BRI. Italian governments coming in succession over the past 10 years have
each contributed to tightening the bolts of Sino-Italian diplomacy, bringing to surface the hypothetical
future negotiations with the Asian country on the port sector.
For reasons of historical continuity, but above all thanks to its strategic geographical position at the
centre of the Mediterranean and in the heart of southern Europe, Italy and its port system represent
an added value for Chinese logistics strategies. This second chapter will therefore review the
advantages of relying on Italian harbours, highlighting their logistical effectiveness and specialisation,
as well as their limitations.
What is more, the signing of the aforementioned Memorandum with China brought with it the
conclusion of two cooperation agreements between the China Communication Construction
Company (CCCC) and two Italian port authorities, the Port System Authority of Western Ligurian
Sea (AdSPMLO) and Port System Authority of Eastern Adriatic Sea (AdSPMAO). The task of this
chapter will be to detect Chinese interests in one of the agreements signed with port authorities, that
concerning the Genoese harbour system; and the entry of the Chinese company COSCO in the
terminals management of Vado Ligure port.
On the other hand, the second section of the chapter sets out in detail the Italian legislation relating
to the harbour system, in an attempt to provide a comprehensive response to criticism that have
followed the signinig of port agreements. Criticism was levelled at the desire to “sell-off” Italian ports,
even though, as we shall see, the public nature of port authorities in Italy does not allow for this
possibility.
After the entry into force of the 1994 reform law No. 84, Italian ports are no longer simply understood
as assets belonging to State property, but as public assets whose activity is entrusted to private actors.
A survey will also be conducted on the role of Port System Authorities, public administration bodies
whose task is to combine State control with the concept of private initiative, in the interest of the
community. It is precisely the nature of these bodies, as well as the role and powers entrusted to their
President, that has a significant impact on Chinese penetration strategies in the Italian port system, a
discussion that needs to be explored in depth before moving on to the third and final chapter of the
essay, concerning the case of the port of Trieste.
The third chapter dwells on the affair linked to the entry of the port of Trieste into the BRI orbit, an
entry which, as we shall see, never took place formally.
Over the last few years, Trieste port has experienced a period of new flowering, having been able to
reposition itself on the international scene, following a powerful increase in its traffic and the
expansion of the intermodal logistic network branching off from the port itself. After all, the Triestine
harbour can count on numerous strengths: its strategic geographical position, its deep waters, its dense
network of rail links, the proximity to the markets of Central and Easter Europe, and above all its
characteristic of being a free port, would make Trieste the privileged gateway for Chinese trade with
the European Union nations, along the New Silk Road framework.
Negotiations between Chinese companies and private sector operators from Trieste began in 2016,
echoed by the opening of a dialogue held at institutional level by the Port System Authority of Eastern
Adriatic Sea, which President signed a cooperation agreement with CCCC in 2019. Among the many
criticisms that have been levelled at the work of the Port Authority is the alleged illegitimacy of its
President Zeno D’Agostino in conducting the negotiations with CCCC. The aim of this paper is to
analyse all of these aspects, in an attempt to offer a critical and impartial view of what happened.
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