1
Preface
The aim of this thesis was to analyze, from a legal point of view, the evolution and the history
of NATO since the 90's up to the Strategic Concept of 2010. This topic was covered in the
first two parts of this work, where the starting point was identified in the Strategic Concept of
1991. The many events that occurred over the 90 years have given way to have a practical
confirmation of those that have been the difficulties faced, both legally and practically, by this
important organization of collective defense.
This because if it is true that NATO has emerged victorious from the Cold War years, it is
also true that been failing an objective, due to its achievement, the organization had to
reorganize, giving itself new purposes. It is to the latter that it took part in missions in the
Balkans and in Kosovo, however, giving rise to many problems in the case of the latter, given
the way the intervention. With the document of Washington of 1999, have been legitimized
the so-called non-Article 5 missions, with which was made official the willingness of the
organization to undertake missions out of the area, for international security reasons.
Following the September 11 attacks on the WTC, for the first time since the sign of the North
Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, came to be applied the Article 5, which provides for mutual
assistance to one or more member countries attacked, by the other. The analysis and events
involving NATO, both in the defense of the United States, up to the front-line role it has
assumed putting itself at the head of the ISAF mission, will certainly be interesting to see how
NATO's role has truly changed in the international arena. To these must then be added the
transformation processes that have accompanied the NATO over the past few years, starting
from the Prague summit, which marked the entry into NATO of 9 other countries, during the
fifth and sixth enlargement, up to arrive at the summit in Riga.
The last part of this work has been devoted, instead, to Italy. Starting from the value of peace,
universally recognized and affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations, the path taken has
allowed the retracing of the steps that led from the affirmation of this principle, to the role that
NATO has sewn on to work towards this goal. Obviously, being Italy part of this
organization, it is clear that over the years it has had the opportunity to participate in missions
of different nature. The point that was extremely interesting the treating of, is the way this
active role by Italy has been possible, in the light of Article 11 of its constitution, of which a
careful analysis was conducted, with particular reference to the rejection of war. The final
chapter was finally dedicated to the reasons why Italy decides to conduct missions abroad, the
methods of implementation and a point on the current missions.
2
PART I
NATO AND THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE 90s
Chapter 1
TOWARDS THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF 1991
1.1 A new phase begins: The “London Declaration”.
A new phase in the history of NATO begins after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, but most of
all after the end of the bipolar world. The beginning of the 90s can be considered a real
turning point for the organization, though the time had come to design a completely new
international security system, the only problem to face was, however, how?
1
NATO felt immediately the need to prove its dynamism and its ability to readapt itself to a
new world. Obviously the fundamental objectives of the Alliance remained unchanged: as
required by the Treaty of Washington of 1949, NATO continued to be a defensive alliance
however, in the new context acquired greater importance the “non-military Articles” of the
North Atlantic Treaty, such as Article 2, which states that:
“The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly
international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a
better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and
by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate
conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic
collaboration between any or all of them”.
This Article identifies the opportunity for NATO to use “political” means to achieve its
security objectives.
The North Atlantic Council had its first meeting in July 1990, in London
2
, where the
organization turned to those who were considered enemies, or better opponents, no more than
a few months before: the countries of Eastern Europe. To them was stretched out a helping
hand as a demonstration of a new role of the Alliance
3
. This was the occasion to a diplomatic
1
B.J. Collins, NATO: A Guide to the Issues: A Guide to the Issues, February 2011, pp. 89-93.
2
M. Assenova, The Debate on Nato's Evolution: A Guide, 2003, pp. 1-4.
3
M. Smith, NATO in the First Decade After the Cold War, November 2000, pp. 100-110.
3
opening that was the beginning of a long process of opening to the Eastern countries. The
Council approved the so-called “London Declaration”
4
in which the desire was affirmed, to
transform the NATO
5
. The Heads of State and Government announced great steps for the
transformation of the Alliance so that it could adapt itself to the new security context. As can
be read it in chapter 2 of the “London Declaration on a transformed Atlantic Alliance”:
«The North Atlantic Alliance has been the most successful defensive alliance in
history. As our Alliance enters its fifth decade and looks ahead to a new century, it
must continue to provide for the common defence. This Alliance has done much to
bring about the new Europe. No-one, however, can be certain of the future. We need
to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four
decades. Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the
structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the
strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the
peaceful resolution of disputes. We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely
in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our
Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty».
In the Declaration, the new context of freedom was stressed, due to the gradual collapse of the
walls that had divided the world in the past fifty years, who have chosen economic freedom,
peace and a united Europe. NATO is said to be the defence Alliance that got the most success
in history, and its role has been crucial in getting this new climate. However, there were
plenty of doubts about the future and no one could really feel safe about the future, this is the
reason why, at paragraph 5 we read as follows:
«We will remain a defensive alliance and will continue to defend all the territory of
all our members. We have no aggressive intentions and we commit ourselves to the
peaceful resolution of all disputes. We will never in any circumstance be the first to
use force».
4
The complete text of the Declaration is available at: http://smsjm.vse.cz/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/nato3.pdf.
5
A. Behnke, NATO’s Security Discourse After the Cold War: Representing the West, August 2012, pp. 370-372.
4
The Alliance’s defence task is so reaffirmed, although under any circumstances, the Alliance
will be the first to use force.
In the following Paragraph, an agreement with the countries of the Warsaw Pact is proposed,
to underline that they are no longer adversaries. After stating the willingness to revise the
plans for defence and arms control, it states its intention to prepare a new military strategy
that reflects the less importance of Nuclear Weapons in the Alliance (paragraph 20
6
). In
addition, it calls for greater importance of the CSCE as a forum where Europeans and
Americans can more easily discuss and make decisions (paragraph 21
7
). Their will was to
create an enduring peace in the continent, but with all the necessary tools to protect
themselves against anyone. Another important fact was that the London Declaration became
the base of the declaration of the soviet president Gorbaciov, who claimed to accept the
participation of a unified Germany in the Atlantic Alliance in July 1990
8
.
NATO has served its purpose of defending the Western countries from a possible Soviet
aggression in a preventive manner, through deterrence. It was not in the Alliance's purposes,
the removal of the USSR and subsequently, it became the symbolic instrument of maintaining
the obtained peace in the West. This led to a rethinking of the functions of the Alliance, while
maintaining the Articles of the Atlantic Treaty
9
unchanged. If NATO had remained
exclusively an organization for the defence against the Soviet threat, that entity would soon
have become obsolete, probably replaced by an organization better able in adapting to the
changing international context. A valuable example in this sense could be the CSCE in the
role of «structure to obtain the reforms and stability» in Europe
10
.
According to the opinion of Federico Romero, NATO has been covering for forty years the
role of containment and deterrence of the Soviet, however, in the United State’s view it had
6
“In the context of these revised plans for defence and arms control, and with the advice of NATO Military
Authorities and all member states concerned, NATO will prepare a new Allied military strategy moving away
from “forward defence” where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence and modifying “flexible
response” to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. In that connection NATO will elaborate new force
plans consistent with the revolutionary changes in Europe. NATO will also provide a forum for Allied
consultation on the upcoming negotiations on short-range nuclear forces”.
7
“The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) should become more prominent in Europe's
future, bringing together the countries of Europe and North America […]”
8
G. Mink, L’impero sovietico. Dalla seconda guerra mondiale al dopo Gorbaciov, 1999, p.155.
9
M. Clementi, La Nato, Bologna, 2002, pp. 86-87.
10
L. S. Kaplan, NATO DIVIDED NATO UNITED, The evolution of an alliance,
Westport, 2004, p.110.
5
another function, which existed at the time of his birth. According to the author, the American
interest would correspond to the 'US National Security', which emerged between 1938 and
1941: «In geopolitical terms, the danger was given by the potential domination of the
resources in Eurasia by hostile powers», which translated into geopolitical language became
the «progressive suffocation of democracy». This meant the end of the «world in which
America sees its future incarnate: the world of interdependence, a shared international law,
freedom of access to resources and markets, the democratic sovereignty as a universal
principle»
11
. The role of the United States remains preeminent says Romero, for their
geopolitical and economic impressiveness, but above all because they want to be a “European
power” in order to be able to stabilize Europe and the areas around it, even the Trans-
Caucasian region
12
.
The idea of ending the experience of the Alliance was not felt by Western countries, which,
however, had the need of a radical reform, to manage a new international scenario
characterized by new challenges. Those were already well known in 1991, and emerged at the
NATO Summit in Rome in November.
1.2 The strategic review of 1991.
At the Rome Summit in November 1991
13
, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept
14
, which
expressed a broader view of security: first of all the intent of communicating with the Soviet
Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe appeared, as well as an increased
cooperation with all European states, based on the Charter of Paris
15
for a new Europe of the
CSCE
1617
, combined with the collective defence as the three pillars of the new NATO
11
F. Romero, Gli Stati Uniti e la Nato dopo il 1989, in Giovagnoli A. e Tosi L., curated by, Un
ponte sull’Atlantico, 2003, pp. 293-297.
12
F. Romero, Gli Stati Uniti e la Nato dopo il 1989, in Giovagnoli A. e Tosi L., curated by, Un
ponte sull’Atlantico, cit., pp. 298-299.
13
W. Johnsen, NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind?, 1995.
14
H. Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support Operations, 1991-1999: Policies and Doctrines, December 2004, pp.
61-67.
15
Z. Lachowski, Confidence and Security Building Measures in the New Europe, 2004, pp. 18-28.
16
A. Bloed, The Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-
1993, Parte 1, 1993, p. 11.
17
CSCE: in the 70s, was created the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was to
serve as a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between East and West. After more than two years of
meetings in Helsinki and Geneva, the CSCE reached agreement on the Helsinki Final Act, signed on 1 August
1975 by 35 states. The Final Act has established the basic principles which govern the behaviour of States
6
approach to European security
18
. Of more immediate importance to better understand the
evolution of the relationships between NATO and the CEEC (Central and Eastern European
Countries) is the fact that the Rome Summit prepared the working ground for the NACC
(North Atlantic Cooperation Council) designed specifically to act as a forum to involve the
Soviet Union (although in practice the former Soviet republics) and the other States of the
former Warsaw Pact, in a structured dialogue with the countries of NATO. The NACC held
its first meeting on December 20, 1991, the same day of the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
and came to include all the states constituting the former Soviet territory and all the countries
of the former Warsaw Pact. To these were added the Baltic countries, Albania and Slovenia
(the latter belonging to the former Republic of Yugoslavia), and Sweden and Finland as
observers. The NACC sponsored dialogue on topics such as peacekeeping, defence planning
and strategy, the conversion of the defence industry, the issues relating to information,
scientific and environmental affairs, the civil emergency planning and aerospace coordination,
just to name a few.
The Strategic Concept of 1991
19
was the first to be made public. The document represented
the highest level of Directive on political and military means, to be used for pursuit of the
Alliance’s objectives.
towards their citizens and among them. After the end of the Cold War, the CSCE has provided assistance to
States in the post-communist transition to democracy and the market economy, and subsequently contributed to
the efforts of all the participating States in meeting the new threats and new challenges to safety. Source:
www.osce.org/publications/sg/2006/04/18784_591_it.pdf.
18
On the basis of the considerations set out in the Declaration of London and the new Strategic Concept, NATO
began working to promote the development of peaceful and friendly international relations through the
mechanism of the partnership. This happened in the first place with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
that came out of the Soviet orbit, against which NATO set out in 1994 an initiative known as Partnership for
Peace (PfP), a program designed to assist partner countries in the reconstruction of their armed forces and which,
adapting to the individual needs of each country, provides opportunities for practical cooperation in many
different industries, allowing participants to choose among the activities offered to suit their own needs in terms
of security. Later, the partnership policy took on a wider geographical turning to the countries of the Southern
Mediterranean and the Middle East. In 1995, NATO established the program called Mediterranean Dialogue
with six countries - Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia - in the wider Mediterranean region.
In 1997, then, NATO and Russia, from a side, and NATO with Ukraine, on the other, gave birth to a partnership
starting from a more formal bilateral cooperation.
19
The Alliance's New Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in
the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Official texts, 8 November 1991,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm?
7
It was initially known as “The Strategic Concept for the defence of the North Atlantic”,
developed between the end of 1949 and April of 1950 and concerned strategies for large-scale
operations for the defence of the territory. In the mid-fifties was developed the so-called
strategy of “massive retaliation”
20
which lasted until 1967. There were discussions relating to
the possibility of replacing such a strategy, as eventually happened with the one called
“flexible response”
21
. These strategies made up classified documents, giving instructions and
points of reference to the military planning activities. The details were of course kept secret
from the public, although the main elements were known, indeed they were aimed at
governments, because their effectiveness depended on secrecy in the context of Cold War.
The publication of the Harmel Report
22
attributed to defence and dialogue the role of pillars in
the strategy of the Alliance in matter of security. After the Cold War the political and military
situation changed, so the new Strategic Concept was born and completed in November 1991.
It was different from the previous and aimed at the cooperation with former adversaries,
instead of encounter. The basic purpose remained the safety of the members but looked to a
wider security in Europe. At paragraph 32 we read as follows:
«In these new circumstances there are increased opportunities for the successful
resolution of crises at an early stage. The success of Alliance policy will require a
coherent approach determined by the Alliance's political authorities choosing and co-
ordinating appropriate crisis management measures as required from a range of
political and other measures, including those in the military field. Close control by the
political authorities of the Alliance will be applied from the outset and at all stages.
Appropriate consultation and decision making procedures are essential to this end»
23
.
It therefore seems possible for NATO to assume a role in the resolution of disputes, not only
through the use of force, but also by peaceful means.
24
Concept stated, moreover, in the
previous paragraph, where is evident that the success of the policy of the alliance of
«preserving» peace, depends more than ever on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy, as
20
R. Battreall, Thesis: Massive Retaliation - Antithesis: Flexible Response Synthesis: The Nixon Doctrine,
Defence Technical Information Center, 1970.
21
D.P. Lackey, Moral Principles and Nuclear Weapons, 1984, pp. 111-119.
22
Complete text of the 1967 Report is available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_67927.htm
23
Ibidem.
24
M. Davis, International intervention in the post-Cold War world:moral responsibility and power politics,
2004, pp.201-2017.
8
well as a successful crisis management . The doctrine, among the measures NATO can take to
manage a crisis, complements the military response options, with «diplomatic, economic and
military preventive measures»
25
.
One of the most innovative aspects of the Alliance’s strategy is represented by the
establishment of multinational forces, characterized by high mobility and flexibility. This
quality improvement compensates for the reduction of the size of the forces
26
.
The new Strategic Concept approved in the occasion, rotated around two main sections, one
concerning new guidelines for defence and the other one on approach to security
27
. Regarding
the first aspect, a reduction and restructuring of the military apparatus of the allies were
outlined. These systematizations were required by the changing nature of the threats to their
security: more varied and threats, slender than those faced in the past, threats that materialized
especially in the increasingly evident political and institutional instability, in the countries of
the Central and Eastern Europe. If, therefore, the new Strategic Concept included the
strengthening of the conventional forces of rapid response to guarantee an efficient
management of local crises, on the other hand it could only give the Alliance a larger political
role in conflict prevention. For this reason is stated in Articles 24 and 25 as follows:
«But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the
opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater
than ever before. It is now possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that
security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as
well as the indispensable defence dimension. Managing the diversity of challenges
facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to security. This is reflected in three
mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy; dialogue, co-operation, and
the maintenance of a collective defence capability»
28
.
And continues by stating:
25
J. Kriendler , NATO crisis management and conflict prevention, in V. Kronenberger, J. Wouters (eds), The
European Union and Conflict Prevention, L’Aja, 2004, pp. 424-425.
26
NATO in Twenty - First century, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Bruxelles, 2004.
27
R. Moore, Nato's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World, Greenwood Publishing Group,
2007, pp. 19-21.
28
Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm?
9
«The Alliance's active pursuit of dialogue and co-operation, underpinned by its
commitment to an effective collective defence capability, seeks to reduce the risks of
conflict arising out of misunderstanding or design; to build increased mutual
understanding and confidence among all European states; to help manage crises
affecting the security of the Allies; and to expand the opportunities for a genuine
partnership among all European countries in dealing with common security
problems»
29
.
The background idea after which the NAC was created, was concretized from its very first
years of life: indeed, it began functioning as a forum for cooperation and consultation on a
wide range of political and military issues, on compliance, in particular, with NPT (nuclear
non-proliferation Treaties) and the START Treaties on nuclear arms reduction. This aspect is
developed in chapter 12, together with other key issues to the security of the alliance, such as
the supply of vital resources, terrorism and acts of sabotage:
«Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be
covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security
must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected
by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and
sabotage. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies
under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of
their efforts including their responses to such risks»
30
.
Equally important were also the boost given to the negotiation of the CFE treaty concerning
the reduction of conventional forces in Europe and the process of redefining the role of the
CSCE which culminated in the Helsinki Conference in July 1992
31
.
29
Ibidem.
30
Ibidem.
31
The shock given by the events at the end of the decade has not only reached NATO and the CSCE, but also the
WEU, even if it has not proved equal activism. The WEU was supposed to ensure the operational translation of
EU decisions which had military implications. It was, however, plagued by a kind of long operational
hibernation . A milestone in the slow attempt to revitalize the WEU is certainly the Petersberg Declaration of 19
June 1992, with which it enshrines formally missions out of area, or missions non art. 5. It stated that military
units of WEU Member States could be deployed under WEU command and control for a certain number of
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