The Democratic Deficit in the European Union and the June 1999 European Parliament Elections

• Chapter 4, the last part, is about the June 1999 European Parliament elections. 
During my analysis I will investigate the results from the last EP elections. In doing 
so, I will seek to discover if the Reif and Schmitt’s model on European elections 
replicated again, for then making some arguments on the linkage between the 
European elections and the democratic deficit. 
What can we say about the European Union? Is it still undemocratic? Why? What can 
be done? To all these questions I will try to give an answer. For honesty’s sake I have 
to advice the reader that he could test, more or less clearly, an emphasis on what is 
called ‘United States of Europe’. In other words, it could be found a fairly support for 
federalism, as the only way to eliminate the democratic concerns. Although I do 
believe it, I hope to be forgiven by those who do not share my views. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 1 
 
1.1 The European Union Democratic Deficit 
 
The Democratic deficit is the gap between the powers transferred to the Community 
level and the control of the elected Parliament over them, a gap filled by national 
civil servants operating as European experts or as members of regulation and 
management committees, and to some extent by organized lobbies, mainly 
representing business. One of the unforeseen consequences of the Community, 
therefore, beyond the transfer of sovereignty in specified areas, is the weakening of 
national parliaments vis a vis their own executives, even in those areas that lie 
outside Community competence at the present time. 
Williams, 1991 
 
 
The European Union is often regarded as suffering from a democratic deficit. The 
scope of the EC has developed widely since its birth and hence the democratic deficit 
is causing increasing anxiety among academics, politicians and citizens. 
Since there are many different political conceptions of democracy, agreement about 
the way in which the democratic deficit can be tackled cannot be arrived at easily. 
Furthermore, there is even an ongoing dispute over the exact nature and extent of 
such deficit. 
However, studying the problems of democracy within the European Union needs 
some pre-justifications; it is first of all a matter of introducing standards. 
Giandomenico Majone (Majone, 1998) highlights four different approaches that can 
help categorise the diverse features of the democratic deficit: 
• Standards based on analogy with national institutions 
• Majoritarian Standards 
• Standards based on the democratic legitimacy of the Member States 
• Social Standards 
 
The first group refers to comparison between supranational institutions and those in 
the national states, or rather the belief that EU bodies will evolve towards such 
models. According to this view, the European Parliament should be enhanced with 
the same functions of the national ones, so to be an independent power with 
legislative initiative. 
The second, instead, takes its roots from “an abstract model of democracy, the pure 
Majoritarian or Westmister model” (Majone, 1998). Since Parliaments are the real 
locus of legitimacy, hence an empowered and directly elected EP is an essential 
condition to reduce the democratic deficit. 
From a different perspective the third group is based. It asserts that the EU is not 
suffering from a problem of legitimacy. Rather, since the Community’s legitimacy 
proceeds from the democratic legitimacy of its Member States, an eventual shift to 
majoritarian voting would weaken national parliamentary control of the Council with 
no increased powers of the EP. 
Finally, the social standard’s perspective argues that the democratic deficit is not only 
a matter of re setting the institutional architecture, but rather it is caused by the failure 
of providing common rules for social justice and equality. 
However, Majone tends to assert that these common standards, though right in their 
conception, are not relevant in the study of European integration. Instead, all the 
possible analogies with state-like entities should be forsaken: the European Union 
would better overcome its illegitimacy by becoming a ‘Regulatory State’ in which 
“specialised agencies, staffed by neutral experts, can carry out policies with a level of 
efficiency and effectiveness that politicians cannot” (Majone, 1998) 
According to his view, delegation to specialised agencies reduces decision-making 
costs by allowing politicians to economise on their time while gaining efficiency. 
Indeed, an eventual delegated EU would eliminate blames to politicians since it 
allows legislators to avoid the time and trouble of making decisions and to 
eliminating their responsibility for the consequences of the decisions made. In any 
case, it seems quite clear how the democratic deficit is not only a matter of 
institutional re-arrangement but deals with many other features as well. 
In this chapter I will present some of the main democratic deficit features usually 
highlighted by scholars.  
 
 
1.1.1 Democratic Deficit by analogy with National Institutions 
The assessment of the democratic deficit through the use of analogies with national 
institutions is probably the easiest and, in somehow, the most popular among 
scholars. No academic has addressed his studies toward European Union illegitimacy 
without noting a mismatch between the nation-state framework and the EU 
institutional architecture. 
The Union is not easy to define: rather I would rather say the contrary. Many studies 
tend to define it as a multi-level governance, in which every level is interconnected. 
However, here is important to define the problems concerning with the institutional 
shape of the European Union. As it is very well known, there are four main bodies of 
the Community: the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament 
(EP) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). By the analogy with national 
institutions, the most striking aspect is that decision-making powers have been 
transferred to the EC at the expense of national parliaments, without having been 
reinvested into a democratically elected EP. Instead, law-making powers are 
increasingly passed to largely unaccountable Council of Ministers which makes 
decision in secret. 
Moreover, the unelected executive of the European Union, the Commission has too 
much political power. Some scholars have argued that the unelected ECJ is of real 
concern: not only because it is not elected, but since its decisions are binding with 
immediate and supreme effect over national Laws too. Last but not least, some regard 
the increasing involvement of private interests (lobbies, pressure groups) as 
undermining the already fragile democracy in the EU. 
Hence, in order to resolve the pressing question of democracy, a general proposal 
advocates the empowerment of the European Parliament vis a vis a decline of 
competencies both of the Commission and the Council of Ministers. This strategy 
would enable the European Union to overcome many of the features of the 
democratic deficiency by taking on the characteristics of a bicameral federal state in 
which the EP would work as the real representative body of people. 
Although fascinating, the federal proposal is not immune from critics and problems: 
firstly, the absence of a political community with shared values would be difficult to 
grow out, at least in short-medium period; second, there is an ongoing disagreement 
among Member States as to the role the EP should play. Juliet Lodge (Lodge, 1999) 
identifies three groups in which Member States tend to fall: first, Italy, Germany and 
BENELUX support the idea of an enhanced role of the EP and saw the entire 
integration process in the light of federalist strategy. Second, the Scandinavian states 
and the UK oppose increased powers of the EP since it would stand for a decrease of 
the role of the national parliaments and hence national democracy. The third group 
refers to countries like France and Ireland which fear that an eventual empowered EP 
would ‘steal’ competencies from the Council, so that to dilute national governments 
powers. In point of fact, one of the aspects of the democratic deficit is caused by the 
different visions Member States have of the European Union framework and 
competencies. 
Lodge goes on asserting that one of the problems the Union is facing is the lack of 
representation, that is people are not as well represented as they are in the national 
arenas. This is true if we look at the European Parliament competencies compared 
with those of other non-elected bodies. However, the EP will be treated in a 
following chapter. 
James A. Caporaso (Caporaso, 2000) argues that the democratic deficit is not about 
the loss of national powers to supranational authorities, but rather it concerns the 
transfer of legislative powers to the executive at both the national and supranational 
levels. “National Parliaments lose because authority to make decisions is no longer 
within their purview. The EP does not pick up all of the corresponding national 
losses. Instead this authority gravitates toward both national and supranational 
executives” (Caporaso, 2000) 
In order to better figure out the EU undemocratic picture, however, a look to the other 
institutions appears worth noting. as well as a few other factors. First, Member States 
hold an impressive legislative power through the Council of Ministers, holding 
uncontrolled power to appoint and reappoint members of the Community’s executive 
and judiciary. That would not be a democratic concern if the EU had not such an 
important role in the daily citizens’ lives. Yet, since EC law possesses direct and 
supreme powers over national laws, many regard to the lack of accountability of 
supranational institutions towards Europeans as the principal constrain the EU has to 
face when accused to be undemocratic. In this view, shortcomings derive from the 
weakness of political parties at the European level: ties between national parties and 
transnational parties are weak in terms of organisation. Parties are not able to form 
powerful platforms and indeed do not mobilise people.  
Instead, pressure groups and lobbyists play an important role: interests groups are 
very strong, there are hundreds and hundreds of them, yet they only represent a small 
part of the entire population. “Business is strong, labour is relatively excluded and the 
dynamics of European Integration possibly even weaken the power of labour at the 
regional level” (Caporaso, 2000). 
Another noted feature concerns the ‘comitology’ system, which “refers to a 
labyrinthine network of committees usually composed of experts from the member 
states’ national administrations, that supervises the EC in the exercise of its delegated 
powers of implementation” (Caporaso, 2000). Worries on this system of affairs 
concern the working behind closed doors, that is, a lack of transparency (Lodge, 
1994). Caporaso noted that, though there has been an attempt to reduce the impact of 
comitology in the process, the incidence of such meetings remains fairly high. 
Philippe Schmitter (Schmitter, 1999) points out that the EU is doubtless a political 
regime, though not democratic: the caractheritics citizens are allowed direct access to 
EU institutions are not clearly defined and the absence of a Constitutional Chart 
stands for a lack of legitimacy. An important point highlighted by Schmitter concerns 
the relationship between EU governance and citizens, by asserting that rulers are only 
responsible en bloc towards the directly elected representatives of the citizens. More 
precisely, they cannot be swerved as individual responsibles for individual tasks. 
Eurobarometer data shows how citizens do not feel particularly obligated towards 
commands by the Euro governance. 
In conclusion, while the analogy with national institutions is an important tool of 
studying the democratic deficit, yet it is not the only possible way. In fact, if it were, 
it would be just a matter of reconstructing the institutional framework. That, albeit 
useful, would not alone resolve all of the problems. Other shortcomings may derive 
from the weak development of a common identity, the lack of clear representation as 
well as of an active role of political parties. The multi sided democratic deficit leads 
us to assess it by analogy with other standards. 
 
 
1.1.2 Democratic deficit by analogy with Majoritarian Standards 
The analogy with majoritarian and non majoritarian standards takes its origins from 
two assumptions: the first regards the debate on how to resolve the problem of over 
representation of small countries whilst the second concerns the efficiency of the 
decision making process, which is sometimes unusually slow. 
At any rate, many classical political theorists stated that the fairest way to reach a 
common good was to base democratic decisions on the general will of the community 
of citizens: here ‘general will’ is equivalent to ‘majority’. Those who support this 
type of decision making usually state that “any aggregation that allows minority 
views to challenge the general will of the majority attributes more value to a minority 
interest than to each interest which contributes to the majority rule.” (Boyce, 1993) 
Others argue that this strategy would better defend efficiency and would not risk 
giving too much power to minorities. Indeed, majority rule would not lead to some 
kinds of distortion of political equality. 
However, there are some good arguments against majority rule: for instance, 
majoritarianism tends to eradicate the political rights of minorities by disregarding 
them. Indeed, it can be also attacked by arguing ‘the majority’ is in reality often the 
largest minority and not the overall majority of the citizens. 
Those who propose non-majoritarian rules argue majority procedures emphasise 
efficiency too much as a tool for democracy: this is not always true. In regards to the 
European Union and its development, one of the most important criticisms is linked 
to the output legitimacy of the Community; that is, some scholars argue EU could 
tackle the democratic concerns only by basing its operations on terms of efficiency. 
That, if not wrong, cannot be taken as an exhaustive solution; in this respect 
democracy needs a good deal of representation and participation. 
 
 
1.1.3 Standards based on Member States legitimacy 
According to this view the legitimacy of the Union relies upon the democratic 
character of Member States. Treaties are ratified by national parliaments, which are 
democratically elected. The Union is legitimate by the Council of Ministers, 
composed of ministers of the national governments. 
This approach tends to view the EU according to the intergovernmentalist strategy: 
this entrenchment would better fit the needs of the Union since it would increase the 
legitimacy of the Community. In this respect the veto power of Member States is 
regarded as the best way to keep the states’ sovereignty over their national territories 
while maintaining a good degree of legitimacy. Consequently, majority rules could 
only aggravate the democratic deficit. 
Now, if the democratic character of the Member States is sufficient to legitimate the 
intergovernmental side of the Union, this indirect legitimisation cannot be sufficient 
to justify the foundation for the supranational character of the Community. Majone 
highlights it arguing that one of the most important tasks of the EU has always been 
to protect the rights and interests of citizens, even against the majoritarian decisions 
of a Member States. 
Yet, this analogy with states legitimacy, albeit right, is not exhaustive. In fact, it starts 
from the assumption EU is a legitimated polity since it has been founded according to 
legal principles, entailed by the legal legitimacy of its founders, namely the Member-
States. However, when speaking about the problem of legitimacy of the Community, 
at least other two variable have to be addressed: the first concerns with the popular 
consent, the second with the power exercise according to established rules (Beetham, 
1991). In this respect, the democratic deficit studied according to this analogy is right 
but not sufficient. 
 
 
1.1.4 Social Standards 
The analogy with social standards views the democratic deficit of the Union through 
the lack of common systems of welfare policy rather than an institutional architecture 
based on national institutional. In other words, concerns are not about the weak 
position the EP possess in comparison with the other bodies or the loss of control of 
Member States in the decision making process. Here the main point regards the fears 
that competition between different national welfare system might provoke diversity 
among European citizens, “social dumping and far reaching deregulation of labour 
markets” (Majone, 1998) Common rules and procedures on Social policy not only 
would prevent diversity and the democratic deficit but also, indeed, would cause a 
deep increase in legitimacy. 
However, this is a practical example of how theory and practice are as distant as not 
to be linked. First of all, Member States are very concerned on this issue: in fact, it is 
worth noting how the reluctance of national parliaments and Member States in 
general always played a key role in keeping this field as a mere national matter. That 
is due to the fear of loosing further competencies in the national arena and to the 
worry such an issue would better carried out by States since more efficient-oriented. 
As a matter of fact, except for few articles on European citizenship, free movement of 
workers and cross-national political rights, neither the Maastricht Treaty nor 
Amsterdam had provided true common legislative competencies in the social field. 
In this respect, it seems that only national government are contrary to the 
harmonisation of such a field; yet, it is to be said, citizens also oppose the eventuality 
on Union competencies on social policies. Some scholars seek to explain it by 
arguing citizens are worried to loose national traditions. Although right, I suppose 
this is fairly weak argument. Rather, what seems more plausible, is the fact that 
efficient welfare systems can better carried out only in fairly homogeneous polities. 
Indeed, the existence of different rooted welfare systems with consequent 
constellations of interests that sustain them is of prejudice to the formation of a 
European welfare system.