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Part I: Political Issues
Chapter 1
Containing Presidential Power
During the late 1960s and 1970s more and more historians, among which Arthur
Schlesinger, expressed concern about the existence of “imperial presidency” in
America.
1
Reacting to this widespread idea, Congress intensified its power in the
next decade. In the 1980s historians were also talking about “congressional
imperialism”.
Two cases of containment of the presidential power caught the public’s
eye: the 1973 War Powers Resolution and the Iran-Contra Scandal. Politicians
agree that the first did not reach its objectives. The second case is one that is still
debated as a demonstration of the importance of the separation of powers and of
the limits of the presidency and of Congress as separate branches of government.
The American president has the same formal power, but his practical
powers increased significantly during the 20
th
century. The development started
with President George Washington and was continued by Thomas Jefferson,
Andrew Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt
and Harry Truman.
2
In a book written in 1960 by Richard Neustadt called
“Presidential Power”, the writer stated that the main power of the president is “the
power to persuade”. Not lots of presidents succeed in getting the Washington
moved as Kennedy and Roosevelt did.
The years 1940s, 1950s and 1960s are the ones in which the pro-president
position regained supremacy. In the same periods books like “The American
Presidency by Clinton Rossiter or “Presidential Power” by Richard Neustadt were
1
Arthur Schlesinger, The Imperil Presidency, Boston MA, Houghton, Mifflin,1973
2
Norman Thomas, Joseph Pika and Richard Watson, The Politics of the Presidency, third edition
Washington DC, CQ Press, 1993, p. 4
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written, celebrating the above mentioned presidents. The authors of these books
were political liberals who saw the office as the only institution in the public
system that could understand the needs of all Americans including the
disadvantaged and that has a national wide constituency providing the political
support to meet the needs.
3
In the “Deadlock of Democracy”, Burns argues that the paradox of the
American democracy is that “we can choose bold and creative national leaders
without giving them the means to make their leadership effective.”
4
The containment observed by historians during D. Eisenhower’s
presidency due to the lack of an ambitious agenda and during John Kennedy due
to the compulsion of his own party, was going to change because of the Vietnam
and the Watergate scandals.
1.1. The “imperial presidency” thesis
In the 1960s and 1970s many began to complain that the president had too
much power especially in the foreign policy. Arthur Schlesinger, a well known
historian, wrote several books discussing the issue and stated that the power must
be shared by Congress and presidency.
The U.S Constitution is vague in question of foreign policy. Article 1, s.8
gives Congress the power to declare war and raise an army to fight it. Clause 1 of
Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution grants the president power as Commander-
in-Chief over the armed forces of the United States, upon their entrance into
service. This solitary sentence, like the rest of the U.S. Constitution, allows for
broad interpretation in a number of situations. It does not clearly define the duties
of the commander-in-chief with respect to the limits of his power during wartime
or peacetime. Despite its vagueness, it appears that this clause was not hotly
debated but rather strongly favored by the Continental Congress and subsequent
state legislatures during ratification. It seemed favorable to grant this power to a
3
Norman Thomas, Joseph Pika and Richard Watson, The Politics of the Presidency, third edition
Washington DC, CQ Press, 1993, p.6
4
James McGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-party Politics in America,
Englewood Cliffs NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1963, p. 325
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single person, who was politically dependent on the nation, who would be more
expedient and efficient in decision-making, than to a group of statesmen. Due to
these “gaps” in the Constitution, the two branches have long been in rivalry and
conflict.
After the Second World War, the president decided to act without
involving the legislative. This culminated in the disaster of Vietnam, an intensely
destructive conflict waged on his own by the president, who decided not to get a
declaration of war. Lyndon Johnson involved the American society into a war
without telling Congress what he was doing.
The imperial presidency expanded into domestic policy, when Richard
Nixon came in power. The fact that he took the liberty to impound funds that had
been appropriated by Congress, that he authorized covert surveillance of his
enemies including tapping the phones of his opponents and harassing the liberal
Brookings Institutions, led to the Watergate scandal, which led to a President
cover-up and the resignation of Nixon in 1974, before he could be impeached.
1.2. The post-imperial presidency and the imperial Congress
Congress reassured its political and constitutional prerogatives in 1970s,
after a number of presidents proved “weak”. The presidents that followed the
Watergate and Vietnam scandals were part of the post-imperial presidency. This
period coincided with the relative economic decline and the growth of global
interdependence.
Due to the fact that towards the end of the Vietnam War, Congress became
a good deal less differential towards the President on many policy questions, a
new thesis was born: the Imperial Congress thesis. Congress used now more of
the powers reserved to the President by Constitution. In the late 1980s
congressional reassertion had gone too far. It started to intrude the problems and
the powers of the other branches (presidency and Supreme Court). One way
Congress did that was by beginning “micro-managing” what the executive branch
does, in domestic and foreign policy. The members of the Congress start going
abroad grandstanding and undercutting the residential prerogatives and the
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national interest as well. Instead of making the law, Congress started
administrating them, which is the executive’s function. Then it started refusing to
appoint the people the president nominated for the cabinet.
A rather worrying trend was initiated by the Congressmen who, unable to
win the debate with the President began launching criminal investigations against
the White House. In 1978 Congress passed the “Ethics in Government Act”,
which established the office of the independent counsel. The office’s function was
to correct executive wrong doing. The Act was passed in the wake of the
Watergate Scandal and set financial disclosure requirements for public officials
and restrictions on former government employees lobbying activities. The
document obliges even the President to file a report with the sources and the
amount of all earned income, any position or offices held in any business, labor or
non-profit organization. Under this Act, the Congress can petition the Attorney
General to appoint an independent prosecutor to investigate the suspicions of
executive criminality. Kenneth Starr for example was appointed to investigate the
Whitewater affairs during Clinton. The President was charged with perjury,
obstruction of justice, witness tampering and abuse of authority. The case was
closed in 1999 because of insufficient evidence against the president and his wife.
The following events, the 1973 War Power Resolution and the Iran-Contra
Scandal are examples of how Congress tried to contain presidential power. The
1973 War Power Resolution is an attempt to avoid another Vietnam; the Iran-
Contra Scandal involved a partial attempt to take control of American foreign
policy toward Nicaragua during the 1980s.
1.3. The 1973 War Power Resolution
From the first battles fought after the ratification of the Constitution to
modern wars fought halfway around the world, the war powers granted to
legislative and executive branches by the Constitution have been a topic of debate.
Over the last two centuries, presidents, lawmakers, and judges have all weighed in
with their opinions and views of these powers. Each definition of the war powers
by these statesmen differs to some degree, with the one common goal of
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protecting American sovereignty. For over 150 years, the war powers were
continuously examined and redefined according to the opinions and views of a
variety of political actors. One political scientist argued that the war powers were
a collective of responsibilities and duties stemming from Article 1, Section 8 of
the Constitution. Conversely, some argued that the War Powers were granted to
the U.S. as a sovereign nation, and depended on that sovereignty, not the
Constitution. Justice Marshall, however, stated: “The power to wage war is
implied from the power to declare it”
5
. These three differing views boil down to a
debate on whether the war power is inherent, due to national sovereignty or
granted by the Constitution.
The case for the war powers, as an inherent concept, found its greatest
defense in the 1936 case of the United States v. the Curtiss-Wright Corporation.
Judge Sutherland concluded this case by comparing the post-revolutionary
assemblage of colonies as a single agent. He stated that this agent adopted the
powers of external sovereignty from the crown as a unified actor, not as each
separate colony. He cites the actions of this assemblage of colonies, in such
matters as foreign affairs, as an example of the unity of the colonies as one state.
As a unified force, they are responsible for acting in the common defense of the
nation, and therefore accept the right to wage war as an inherent power.
In contrast, in Lichter v. the United States, the approach of the court seems
to be that the war powers are granted by the Constitution. In addition to the
obvious power granted to Congress “to raise and support an army,” the Court also
cited the legislative power, “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.”
The American history has seen a common pattern when presidents acted in
defense of the nation. Many times throughout history, Presidents have committed
troops to war or hostility without consultation or proper declaration of war from
Congress. In a way, the actions of the president are a double standard. On the one
hand, the framers did not want declaration of war to fall solely on one branch of
government, and hence a concurrence of both Congress and the President to pass
5
Law Annotations, U. S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, The War Power
15
such a declaration was needed. However, many presidents feel that a quick
response is in the best interest of the nation. Consequently, we see up until the
Vietnam War, presidents acted according to their administration’s position and
hoped for congressional approval later.
The first case regarding this type of presidential prerogative was that of
Lincoln’s blockade of the south after the attack on Fort Sumter. In 1861, after the
Confederacy’s attack, Lincoln immediately ordered a naval blockade, without a
formal declaration of war from Congress. The legislature later ratified his action
and the court held, in a five to four decision, that the act was lawful under the
President’s prescribed powers. The majority opinion was that the attack on Fort
Sumter automatically threw the U.S. into a state of war, and to wait for Congress
to declare it was unnecessary.
During World War II, President Roosevelt used his duties as Commander-
in-Chief to steer not only troops abroad, but the economy at home. In 1942, he
addressed Congress with the intention of repealing the Emergency Price Control
Act. He claimed that as president, he had a duty to destroy any barriers that would
hinder American victory in the war. By repealing the price controls, he hoped to
stimulate the economy, which would in turn benefit the war effort. In the most
poignant statement of the speech, Roosevelt warned Congress, “In the event that
the Congress should fail to act, and act adequately, I shall accept the responsibility
and I will act.”
Perhaps no other armed conflict turned the spotlight on the War Powers
more than the Vietnam War. President Eisenhower was the first to send troops to
Vietnam in support of the anti-communist regime of South Vietnam. President
Kennedy furthered American participation by sending 4000 more troops to Saigon
in the early 1960’s. By 1964, 17,000 troops were stationed in South Vietnam to
advise and train the Vietnamese army. It was not until well into Lyndon Johnson’s
first elected term as president, that Congress was asked for its support of the
mission in Southeast Asia. President Johnson asked the Congress for a resolution
pledging American support of the anti-communist government. The legislature
responded with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which allowed the president to
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take “all necessary measures” to stop further aggression and attacks on U.S.
troops. The number of American troops grew through the 1960’s until it peaked at
543,000 troops in 1969.
6
The Vietnam War was a failure for the United States and their fight against
communism. The U.S. troops were under many restrictions when fighting the
Vietcong, including not being able to invade parts of North Vietnam, and
Vietcong shelters like Laos and Cambodia. Furthermore, the US troops were
unaccustomed to jungle warfare and lacked an intimate knowledge of the
landscape. It was for these reasons, and many more, that servicemen after
serviceman were either killed or captured. The outrage of the war began to
escalate in the US, and soon mothers were begging their member of Congress to
bring their boys home. It is at this point in time that many legislators started to
review the powers granted to the executive, and their own branch, to try and bring
an end to the deaths of Americans abroad. Unlike the Civil War or either of the
World Wars, Vietnam became the blemish on the record of the American military,
and so too, on the powers of the government. In response to the Vietnam War,
both Houses of Congress proposed legislation designed to incorporate a
congressional role in war making. Eventually, Congress proposed the War Powers
Resolution that more clearly defined both the roles of the legislative and executive
branches. After a struggle between the branches, this resolution did become law,
and has been in practice since 1973. The War Powers Resolution is a bill designed
to restore the powers of war powers of Congress as granted by the Constitution.
The hope was that Congress would become an active player in the war-making
process, whether it was a full-fledged war or even a routine military operation to
rescue Americans abroad.
The 1973 War Power Resolution is a document meant to clarify what is
wrong in the Constitution. It limits the power of the President of the United States
to wage war without the approval of Congress. Congress decided that it could
never again permit the president unitarily to command United State’s troops
abroad.
6
Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/vietnam.htm