government; testifying before congressional committees; and formal legal action, such
as and interference with administrative proceedings and litigation;
2. methods by which groups lobby through their constituents; for this, the
professional staff act as intermediaries, stimulating lobbying by citizens toward their
government; they may ask all their members to write letters or to participate in protest
demonstrations; or they may ask individual, but highly influential, constituents or
members to contact a key policy maker;
3. groups may try to change governmental policy by influencing elections or altering
public opinion; techniques of this sort contribute money to political campaigns,
publishing voting records, releasing research results, and public relations campaigns2.
More recently, Guéguen divided lobbying strategies in three categories3, already
discussed in my former work on regulatory frameworks:
1. negative strategies consisting of a face-on opposition to Commission
proposals or by proposing untenable counter-proposals; the farming lobbies provide the
best illustration of these opposition strategies;
2. reactive strategies in which prudence prevails over action and initiatives:
monitoring, meetings and a small amount of public relations;
3. pro-active strategies consisting of working constructively with the Commission
in a spirit of partnership and credibility.
4. Pro-active strategies are relatively rare, which is regrettable because the pro-
active lobbyist also offers the legislator an authorised and competent technical opinion
and credible proposals. Credibility moreover involves companies’ and industries’
capacities to build European alliances with ecologists and consumers.
According to Coen4, successful lobbying requires firms to have established at least
four strategic capacities:
1. the ability to identify clear and focused policy goals;
2. develop relationships and credibility in the policy process;
3. understand the nature of the policy process and institutional access;
4. look for natural allies and alliances to develop profile and access.
2 Cited in McGrath, C. (2002), Comparative Lobbying Practices: Washington, London, Brussels, Draft paper, University of Ulster.
3
Daniel Guéguen (2007), European Lobbying, Europolitics, Brussels, p.51
4 Coen, D. (2002), Business Interests and European Integration, in: Balme, R., Chabanet, D. and Wright, V. (eds): L’action
collective en Europe, Sciences Po Press, Paris, p. 261-267.
Modern government implies and foresees close co-operation with stakeholders from
all sectors of society, normally aware of the actions and strategies they can use.
Therefore, civic and producer interests contribute to the perception, presentation and
definition of issues in European Union policy-making.
European Institutions recognise the benefits of being open to outside input and
consultation mechanisms form part of their activities throughout the whole legislative
process. There are already institutionalised advisory bodies established to assist the
European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, namely
the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) and the Committee of the Regions
(CoR). As the Commission stresses in one of its recent communications, “the role of
these advisory bodies does not exclude direct contact between the Commission and
interest groups. In fact, wide consultation is one of the Commission’s duties
according to the Treaties and helps to ensure that proposals put to the legislature are
sound”5. According to Protocol n° 7 annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty, on the
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, “the Commission
should [… ] consult widely before proposing legislation and, wherever appropriate,
publish consultation documents6”.
Interest groups can be national, European and international federations covering all
sectors of economic and social activity, law firms, public-affairs consultants, private
enterprises and representatives of local or regional authorities. No consensus has yet
emerged from the academic literature, which will be seen in details in 6.1, as to how
this work can best be labelled. Numerous terms are used in everyday language to
describe these organisations: interest groups, lobbies, pressure groups, promotion
groups and so on. Each of these terms refers to a particular aspect of interest
representation. If lobbying essentially describes the direct advocacy of a point of view
about a matter of public policy, it is less clear as a description of the actual work
undertaken by most people in the lobbying industry. Still, one advantage of using the
term “lobbyist” is that, even though it is often avoided in some countries or associated
with the United States "pork barrel" system, it is broadly understood and the functions
of the lobbyist are more clearly recognised than other terms such as "public affairs",
"government relations" or "special interest groups".
5
‘General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission’ COM(2002)704, 11
December 2002.
6
Available on the internet on: http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamprotocols.pdf
Such issues of definition are of more than academic interest. Indeed, as it will be
seen below, they were one of the major difficulties experienced during the laborious
process of developing a European Parliament strategy towards lobbyists. It should
also be mentioned that the term "lobbyist" still carries a rather negative meaning in a
number of other Community languages (e.g., in German or Italian).
Since Brussels has turned into the key-centre of decision-making power (80 % of
national legislation today is of European inspiration7), lobbies started to proliferate.
Today the EU controls important policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy, the
negotiations in the World Trade Organisation, telecommunication, public health, food
safety, and transport. Over 1000 Committees and Expert Groups assist the European
Commission in the preparation, adoption and enforcement of regulations and
directives. With about 1000 accredited journalists, Brussels has also become one the
world's biggest press corps. In spite of media suspicion and criticism of lobbying, the
media themselves are becoming increasingly active in Brussels. The BBC, for
instance, in addition to its newsgathering team, has its own office to lobby the
European institutions. The print media have several representative bodies.
In parallel with the extension of the European Parliament's legislative powers, the
volume and intensity of efforts to lobby it have significantly, as I’ve previously
anticipated, increased in the 1980s and 1990s. The most often quoted – although
meanwhile somewhat outdated – source on the number of interest groups at the
European level is a Commission report published in 1992. In this report, the
Commission estimated that there were about 3000 interest groups (both national and
European) active in Brussels and Strasbourg, employing around 10.000 people,
among which there were about 500 European and/or international federations. In
addition, it is generally agreed that there are more than 300 individual companies
having direct representations or public affairs offices in Brussels. About 100
management consultancies and numerous law firms specialise in EU decision
making procedures and European law.
Although the Commission has recognised that its 1992 figures were probably
exaggerated and based on rough assumptions, the general idea the communication
has left is that there is a problem of "overcrowding" of the lobbying landscape and of
information overload of MEPs. On the other hand, former MEP Ken Collins, probably
7
Guéguen, D.(2002), Governance and the Role of Associations in Economic Management: A Response from an EU Public
Affairs Practitioner, in: Greenwood, J. (ed.). The Effectiveness of EU Business Associations , Palgrave, Basingstoke, p. 47.
speaking for many of his colleagues, has stated that the major problem with lobbyists
was quality and not quantity.
Indeed, unfocused and badly prepared efforts can be annoying, whereas competent
and useful information is often welcome to policy-makers. Particularly helpful are
comparative research and evidence that will enable decision makers to assess the
impact of their proposal on the law and practices in each of the Member States.
It is, for this reason, important to understand the different types of interest groups and
the characteristics of their collective action, their aim and their expectation, focusing
on business interests, especially the trade associations of the Information and
Communications Technology (ICT) sector, which has, for the past few years, been
the main object of EU industrial policy (we’ll see that in 2.4).
Actually, there are hundreds of thousands of NGOs and other more or less
supporting or influencing interest groups across Europe. European NGO networks
represent their national members and constituencies on a political level by lobbying
political actors on specific issues (for instance drafting policy, press releases and
position papers), by collecting information and channelling it between the national
and EU levels, and by building their network’s ability to participate in the European
process (e.g. training of national organisations on EU issues). That is, when there is
a shared subject to be defended or sustained, it is more likely to gather supporters,
information, resources at the national level(s) and converge all the efforts to a
supranational level, in all likelihood under an umbrella organisation or network which
speaks to the selected interlocutors with one voice.
That’s why, in order to maximise their effectiveness, many national actors have
organised themselves at a European level, establishing joint alliances.
These new alliances can take different forms8:
• platforms of stakeholders built around a common project as an alternative to
classical lobbying via a European association;
• transversal alliances going from producer to consumer to present to the
Commission a “ready-made consensus”.
In these two cases, the choice of partner is not necessarily related only to their
representative powers, but to their capacity to unite around a common project.
8
Cf. Guéguen, D., op.cit., p. 132
After this quick overview on the present lobbying scenery, in Chapter 3 I’ll go through
the current state of affairs in EU lobbying and interest representation at the
supranational level, addressing questions such as the number of organisations
involved, their main strategies and working methods; this part of the work is rooted
on an analysis of recent academic works on lobbying and special interest
representation.
Later on, I’ll give a comprehensive photography of the current rules and practices
concerning lobbying in the parliamentary institutions of the Member States; this part
of the thesis is based on a previous working document drawn up by the Directorate
General for Research (DG IV), updated with the help of the Parliamentary
Documentation Centre of the European Parliament and other sources.
But before moving to that part, I’ve decided to introduce now two case studies on
specific interest groups, to analyze in reality how a group works and which results it
can reach, in the short term or in the medium run. The first case is pretty
straightforward and concerns an interest group which is the sum of many national
voices speaking altogether the language of equality and non-discrimination. This
group is called ILGA Europe.
After that, I’ll go through a case study which is more complex and concerns the
Information Technology sector, a key EU-arena where lobbyists make converge huge
financial and political interests.