EU decision-making and lobbying: a critical analysis of alternative regulatory frameworks

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Figure 1.2. The new pattern 
of influences at EU level. 
 
 
Lobbying can be broadly defined as “the specific effort to influence public decision-making 
either by pressing for change in policy or seeking to prevent such change. It consists of 
representations made to any public office holder on any aspect of the policy, or to any 
measure implementing that policy, or any matter being considered, or which is likely to be 
considered, by a public body”1. 
A lobbyist is a person designated by an interest group to facilitate the influencing of a public 
policy by performing one of the following:  
1. directly contacting public officials 
2. monitoring political and governmental activity 
3. advising on political strategies and tactics 
4. developing and orchestrating the group‟s lobbying efforts2 
Lobbying has always been an integral part of the EU decision-making process and provide a 
legally recognised counter-balance to its powers; this is evidenced by the creation of a 
considerable number of Advisory Groups (at least 400) composed of representatives of civil 
society (producers, consumers, trade unions, ecologists, …) who express their opinions on 
the relevant legislative proposals.  
In two words, lobbying in Brussels is, very simply, part of the life of the European Institutions; 
no decision is taken without recourse to the prior technical opinion and comments of the main 
affected parties. Thus, a “good lobbyist”, or more precisely a good lobbying organisation, can 
not only amend marginal texts, but from time to time can completely reorient their content or 
direction. 
For all these reasons, the Eu‟s legislative power, the recognition of lobbying as a necessary 
part of the process and the large scope for influence, Brussels is considered a “lobbying 
paradise”. That‟s, why the constant flow of power from the national to the European level (and 
just because of the particular nature of it) should encourage companies, unions, NGOs and 
professional associations to send their best staff in Brussels; and this should be the same for 
national administrations and political parties. 
Moreover the nature of the profession there or in a Member State has no common ground: 
national lobbying is essentially political, whereas European lobbying is largely technical. 
National lobbying is based on the concept of majority and opposition, an idea that doesn‟t 
exist in Brussels, neither in the European Parliament (where a culture of left/right dialogue is 
                                                 
1
 Institute of Public Relations and Public Relations Consultants Associations, Register of Professional Lobbyists, established 
on October 31st, 1994. 
2
 Phil Harris and Craig S. Fisher (2005) Handbook of public Affairs, Sage Publications Ltd., London. 
Figure 1.1. 
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prevalent), nor at the Commission whose legislative role is much more administrative than 
political. 
In Brussels, except for when the whole text of a legislative or regulatory proposal is 
questioned due to global opposition, the amendments to legislative proposals are technical in 
nature; it is necessary to convince the maximum number of Member States possible and the 
broadest group of MEPs, with a mixture of all political groups. In this context, lobbying is not a 
partisan action, but it transcends all national and political divisions. 
In addition the legislative power of the European Union coexists with a second circle of power 
(which we will take in consideration later on), less obvious and more hidden, composed of 
hundreds of Expert Groups and Committees assisting the Council in the adoption phase and 
the Commission in the execution phase (Comitology). These Committees, who have “quasi-
legislative” powers, are certainly part of the political process, but they work mainly on the 
basis of technical considerations. 
Finally, the networks of influence at the Community level are primarily technical networks; to 
be influential in France or Italy, it is strongly recommended that lobbyists have a political 
affiliation and know the top decision-makers personally: the President of the Republic, the 
Prime Minister, Ministers… In Brussels, affiliation to a political party would be more of a 
handicap, and to advance one‟s ideas it is better to know the draftsperson of the proposal, or 
the “rapporteur” in the Parliament rather than the President of the Commission. 
 
 
1.2. Why regulating? 
 
 
This all confirms that European lobbying is a complex and technical profession, requiring a 
sustainable immersion in EU circles. 
This being said, if the basic rules of effective lobbying are obvious (anticipation3, pro-
activeness4, communication…) and if the practicalities of a lobbying strategy are particularly 
sophisticated, we therefore must expect to shape all this system in a detailed, not 
straightforward and as well sophisticated regulatory framework. 
Lobbying regulation, then, is the answer to problems or matters that arise during the practice 
of an indiscriminate, not controlled and democracy-threatening lobbying activity. 
It is not just an instrument through which it is necessary to establish feasible rules of 
interaction among lobbyists themselves and lobbyists with respect to institutions; the main 
objectives are, not surprisingly, defining the limits of the lobbying legitimacy and put a clear 
threshold between lobbying and corruption; avoid practices which can result dangerous for 
the role and the work of EU institutions, grant equal access to the different interest groups 
and, broadly speaking, protect the democratism of the decision-making process, transforming 
lobbying from an interference to an element useful to multiply democracy framework. 
In the European Union the problem of transparency and legality of lobbying practices is very 
much present and European institutions have already taken steps towards a solution; but the 
relatively early age of the institutions themselves (and also of the lobbying phenomenon as an 
important item on the agenda of European decision-makers) - together with the very low 
                                                 
3
 “The more you anticipate, the stronger your ability to influence, the less it costs”. 
4
 Ex of Pro-active strategies: “the chocolate dossier” 1997 or “The sugar regime and the Uruguay Round”, 1989-1990. The 
key common feature of pro-activeness is the pursuit of an acceptable solution through transparency, credibility and the 
construction of a transversal alliance. 
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interest of getting to a significant solution/conclusion of the issue -, have somehow prevented 
the regulation process to be, in 2007, at a mature phase. 
The two organs which has undertaken actions in this direction are the Commission and the 
Parliament; here, especially in recent times (also because of an increase in the power - in 
particular of the EP), lobbying seems to appear more fashionable and more effective. 
As for the regulation of lobbyists‟ behaviours and ethics, European Commission and 
Parliament has taken partially different routes, mainly because of their different position at the 
European level, their different functions and their different legitimization framework. 
 
 
 
2. Where and when to intervene? 
 
 
 
In the past, when the European Parliament only had consultative role, trade associations 
worked mainly with the Commission and the Council of Ministers. 
At presents, lobbyists tend to neglect the Council and privilege the other two, which is a 
serious mistake; in this respect it is astonishing to note to what extent the Secretariat of the 
Council, which is a key observatory for analysing the positions of the Member States and the 
room for manoeuvre and where 3000 officials work, is deserted by lobbyists. 
Anyway, the three Institutions are equally important, which shows the strong balance of the 
Community method. Hence, it is important to give them all the same level of attention, 
adapting actions to each stage of the procedure and respecting their specific nature. 
 
 
2.1. Interventions during the proposal phase. 
 
 
Upstream intervention poses the question of preliminary information. It is excellent to 
intervene at the earliest stage, but the pertinent information must then be gathered before “the 
first word of the first draft proposal is written”.  
The Commission writes the initial draft of the legislation. Approaching the Commission before 
or during the drafting of the proposal is a great way to make sure the proposal addresses your 
concern from the outset.  
Being quickly informed of the Commission‟s intention to draft a legislative proposal is possible 
for any trade association or European NGO via a professional monitoring system combined 
with regular contact with the specialised officials. 
As always in the European public affairs the problem is not obtaining information, but 
analysing and exploiting it. For lobbying, this is even more obvious: learning of a legislative 
project, analysing its impact and an initial reflection on your strategy should be the three 
quasi-simultaneous operations.  
Along the technical-political chain concerning the elaboration of a proposal by the European 
Commission, some aspects must be taken into consideration: 
 ξ In order to feel the real pulse of the dossier, a dual action is generally recommended: 
contact both the Unit in charge of the drafting as well as the Director General (or the 
Commissioner). 
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 ξ Adapt your arguments and strategy based on the first insights, and then set up a series 
of informal meetings to refine your analysis and assess the scope of influence. 
 ξ Entering the formal phase, you meet the officials and present your position outlining 
the internal situation: the eventual issues within your structure, your own room for 
manoeuvre… 
Depending on whether the Commission shares or opposes your views, the strategy 
may be more or less active, ranging from a simple silent monitoring (if favourable) to 
the development of a counter-position, leading the competent DG to soften or even 
modify its approach (this can take many different forms, from high-level political 
interventions, to organisations of coalitions, to influence of public opinion via press….) 
 ξ All stages of the procedure without exception must be used, notably the “inter-service 
consultation” by which the competent DG must submit its proposal to all the other DGs 
and the Legal Service. The inter-service consultation is a chance to play “catch-up”, 
where your lobbying must be very wide if your dossier is in trouble. 
 
 
2.2. Interventions at the co-decision procedure. 
 
 
Today, the legal process under which most directives are decided is the co-decision 
procedure: it means that the European Parliament takes decisions together with the Council 
of the European Union; thus the Parliament is not just consulted, as it has been the case 
before. 
 
Figure 1.3.5: The co-decision procedure. 
 
   
                                                 
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 Statistics tell us that agreement has been reached at first reading in the 25% of cases, at second reading in 50% of cases 
and only in 25% of the cases we have required conciliation. Since 1998 only one project has failed: the proposed directive on 
takeovers.