The
 Philosophy
 of
 9/11:
 A 
Critical 
Analysis 
of 
the 
Main 
Debates

Alberto
Di
Felice

The
Philosophy
of
9/11 Introduction Any
discussion
of
9/11
risks
being
futile
at
this
historical
juncture,
and
 must
probably
take
good
note
of
the
fact
that
nothing
new
or
especially
 noteworthy
can
be
said.
The
United
States
has
now
elected
a
new
presi‐ dent,
who
in
the
eyes
of
many
both
at
home
and
abroad
represents
a
 veritable
“new
hope.”
The
election
of
Barack
Obama
following
the
two
 George
 W.
 Bush
 mandates
 is
 arguably
 the
 clearest
 signal
 that
 most
 Americans
feel
their
country
can
no
longer
afford
to
hold
the
same
per‐ ception
 of
 itself
 as
 that
 which
 has
 gained
 primacy
 in
 the
 military aftermath
of
the
attacks.
The
judgment
that
the
2008
election
has
im‐ plicitly
passed
on
American
unilateralism
seems
to
me
to
be
so
self evident
as
to
call
for
no
particular
elaboration.
If
nothing
else,
the
cur‐ rent
economic
crisis,
with
the
unchangeable
force
of
material
facts,
has
 helped
Americans
refocus
their
priorities,
and
has
forced
them
to
think
 of
defending
their
own
freedom
and
wellbeing
in
more
moderate
and
 realistic
ways.
Whether,
and
to
what
extent,
this
initial
hope
and
good‐ will
will
be
fulfilled
is
of
course
a
matter
for
history
to
determine. That
nothing
new
can
be
said,
however,
is
reason
good
enough
to
 return
on
what
has
been
already
said.
It
will
be
thus
made
apparent,
 perhaps,
that
nothing
genuinely
new
had
really
been
advanced
in
the
 first
place,
and
that
the
wars
that
have
been
fought
in
response
to
the
 attacks
have
largely
been
supported
or
opposed
for
quite
irrelevant
rea‐ sons.
This,
in
a
way,
will
be
the
object
of
the
present
work.
I
regard
what
 follows
as
an
extension
of
my
early
interest
in
the
philosophy
of
law,
 though
it
does
not
much
rely
on
legal
doctrines
and
principles.
It
is,
 rather,
a
student’s
modest
attempt
to
capture
philosophically
what
I
 deem
to
be
the
basic
political
import
of
September
11,
2001,
by
touching
 upon
issues
of
rationality,
natural
versus
positive
rights,
and
the
like.
As
 both
law
and
politics
have
as
their
subject
matter
the
existence
of
com‐ munities
 in
 need
 of
 regulating
 themselves
 by
 means
 of
 law
 and
 government,
political
philosophy
and
the
philosophy
of
law
are
bound
 5 —





‐