''Un país que no se vende'': Negotiations and Signing of the Torrijos-Carter Panama Canal Treaties

Within the Carter staff, the tension at the dawn of the May Round was extremely high. At the end of the month, the team would know if they could really reach an agreement before the end of the year, as Carter had confidently believed in January. Hence, the most recent poll showing that only 35 percent of the members of the House and 39 percent of the Senators supported the treaty was not encouraging.¹

Together with this piece of information, Carter received a letter from Senator Mike Gravel (D-AK) who believed that "the possibility of ratifying a Panama Canal treaty in the Senate either this year or next is very remote." He also attached a report that stressed the importance of the canal from an "energy perspective." In fact, the waterway allowed the United States to move the Alaskan oil from one coast to the other by ships.² Despite this emerging problem – that Carter would address only two months later – the U.S. team was determined to start the talks again.

On May 9, the U.S. political team together with Dolvin as a representative of the technical group met with Escobar, Royo and Fábrega at the Panamanian Embassy. Escobar immediately asked the U.S. negotiators to take a stand on the land and waters concessions, the issue he had raised in his long statement on March 13. According to Jorden, Bunker replied that "what you asked for concerning some of these land and waters questions will require the approval of our highest authority."

For this reason, he and his colleagues were not prepared to give a yes or no answer to any of Panama's territorial requests.³ This was unusual since Bunker, Linowitz and Jorden had planned to "make concessions to their priority goal" only five days before.⁴ However, the U.S. team took two huge steps forward towards the Panamanians. They promised a treaty in which canal operations and defense would expire on December 31, 1999, and also assured that there would be no post-treaty security pact or any U.S. military presence after the termination of the treaty. The "only" provision Panama had to agree with was an arrangement for the canal's permanent neutrality that eventually the OAS countries – rather than the larger and more complex group of U.N. members – would endorse.⁵

For the first time, the eventual neutrality was presented as the contents of a distinct pact rather than a clause in an all-in-one Panama Canal Treaty.⁶ From this moment on, the teams would continue to negotiate the two matters separately. Carter writes in his memories that "our negotiators proposed two treaties [as soon as March 13, i.e. the first session of the "secret round"]. One would set forth new arrangements for the joint operation of the Canal for the rest of this century […]. The other would guarantee the permanent neutrality of the Canal, and the right of the United States to defend it." Despite that, we have found no evidence that the date cited in this statement is reliable.⁷

This apparently "out of the blue" proposal pleased the Panamanians. However, Escobar – who was certainly not the kind of man who got excited easily – immediately raised significant reservations regarding the interpretation of the words "permanent neutrality." He emphasized that no internal event within Panama should be deemed a violation of neutrality, asserting that dealing with any threat to the canal's functioning arising from a domestic incident would be the exclusive responsibility of Panamanian authorities and the National Guard. Escobar vehemently opposed the introduction of U.S. military forces into Panama under the pretext of protecting the canal, even if Washington had promised to withdraw all its bases. The focus of the meeting then shifted towards the matter of Tierra y Aguas as the Panamanians urged the U.S. delegation to provide a concrete proposal, emphasizing its vital importance and requesting clarity comparable to the U.S. statement on neutrality. This marked a strategic move in the negotiations, with Escobar implying an exchange of concessions: Panama would consider granting more on neutrality if the United States reciprocated with favorable terms on lands and facilities.⁸

Escobar then posed specific questions concerning the transfer of ports, the railroad, Ancon Hill, and other details, hoping for a quick response from the U.S. side that eventually did not come as Bunker had previously anticipated. The first meeting ended with a question by Linowitz about U.S. employees' rights with Escobar expressly rejecting the extension of Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) rights to all canal workers as they were civilians and not, of course, military personnel. The Panamanians were concerned that if the canal-operating agency fell under the Defense Department, and if the SOFA rights were expanded, it could lead to the designation of all military bases and canal operating areas as "Defense Sites." This would resemble a new, albeit smaller, Canal Zone.⁹
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¹ "Confidential: RE: Congress and the New Canal Treaty" (AMREP \ Tratados,Acuerdos,Convenios de Panamá \ Negociaciones \ Negociaciones del Tratado del Canal Torrijos – Carter, May 2, 1077). 591 -005-14-6-6.8-6.8.06000294. Half of the Senators opposing the treaty were Democrats.
² Mike Gravel, "Letter to the President" (JCPL, White House Central Files, Subject File, Countries, box CO-48, CO-121 Executive 1/20/77-10/31/78, May 5, 1977).
³ Jorden, Panama Odyssey, 367-368.
⁴ Jorden, Panama Odyssey, 365.
⁵ "Memorandum from the Panama Canal Treaty Co-Negotiator (Linowitz) to Ambassador at Large (Bunker)," May 9, 1977, in FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. 29, Panama, 138-140.
⁶ Jorden, Panama Odyssey, 368.
⁷ Carter, Keeping Faith, 157.
⁸ Jorden, Panama Odyssey, 367-369.
⁹ "Memorandum from the Panama Canal Treaty Co-Negotiator (Linowitz) to Ambassador at Large (Bunker);" Jorden, Panama Odyssey, 369-370.