The influence of civilian advisors on american nuclear policies, 1945-1963

On September 3, 1949, a weather reconnaissance plane of the U.S. Air Force's Long Range Detection System picked up unusually high levels of radiation over the North Pacific. Over the next few days, other measurements confirmed growing levels of radiation in expanding areas of the Pacific. William Webster, deputy for atomic energy to the Secretary of defense, decided to contact the AEC general manager, Carroll L. Wilson, to discuss the implications of these measurements. They decided to appoint a scientific committee, chaired by Vannevar Bush, to evaluate the evidence. Oppenheimer, Bacher and Parsons, members of the Panel, agreed that the most plausible explanation was that there had been a Soviet atomic test sometime around August 29, 1949. If this were to be true, it would have meant the end of the American Monopoly over nuclear weapons.
Lilienthal, Chairman of the AEC, was also convinced that there had been a Soviet test.
He immediately went to Washington to inform Truman, urging him to go public with the news. The President decided to delay the announcement, because other contingent world events – namely the British devaluation of the Pound that same day – had already upset public opinion and Truman did not want to cause an excessive media reaction.
The President decided to address the public in a statement on September 23, 1949, going to great lengths to stress three facts. First, he used the expression “atomic explosion” rather than “atomic test” to underline that the nature of the event was not clear, hence it might have simply been some kind of production accident rather than a completed bomb test. Second, he pointed out that “the eventual development of this new force by other nations was to be expected”, therefore the event didn't take the Administration off guard. Third, he stated that the Russian bomb emphasized “the necessity for that truly effective enforceable international control of atomic energy which this Government and the large majority of the members of the United Nations support”. All three of these points were to some extent false. First, all scientists that were consulted on the matter convened that it must have been a Russian atomic test and not an accidental release of radioactivity. The president's choice of words can be attributed to the need to play down the event for the Media rather than to true doubts about the nature of the explosion. As for the second and third point, the Administration was not as prepared and confident as the President wanted to show. The Soviet test was surely expected, but it came at least two years earlier than even the most pessimistic scenarios had foreseen. David Lilienthal bluntly noted in his diary that “the Russian bomb has changed the situation drastically, and that the talk about our having anticipated everything and following the same program we had before is bunk”.
Moreover, the support for International Control was surely much lower than in 1945-46 and the Administration had already accepted as unavoidable the challenge of an enduring power struggle with the Soviets.
Proof of American unpreparedness was the sudden urge of the Administration and of all involved Agencies to come up with an appropriate response. Discussions within the Atomic Energy Commission brought up the need to speed up certain projects that were already underway and that would enhance American capabilities in production of fissionable materials. Commissioner Lewis L. Strauss thought that such action was necessary, but not sufficient. He thought that a new approach was needed, as the loss of the atomic monopoly could not be tolerated since the Russians would surely be catching up fast. He expressed his proposal in a memorandum to his fellow Commissioners, dated October 5, 1949:
It seems […] that the time has now come for a quantum jump in our planning – that is to say, that we should now make an intensive effort to get ahead with the super. By intensive effort, I am thinking of a commitment in talent and money comparable, if necessary, to that which produced the first atomic weapon. That is the way to stay ahead.

The idea of a Hydrogen-bomb or a “super” had circulated since the beginning of the Manhattan project. The technical difficulties inherent in the design of such bombs and the need to use most fissionable material on traditional A-bombs rather than experimental devices had delayed its development up to this point. The news of the Soviet explosion had preoccupied some scientists that were involved in nuclear research. Herbert O. Lawrence and Luis W. Alvarez decided to enquire on the progress of the project, as they believed the development of the super could have been the best response to the Russian challenge. They want to Los Alamos and talked to Edward Teller, first proponent of a hydrogen bomb, who told them that they were still a long way from a thermonuclear reaction, mainly because progress on the project had to await the results of extremely complex mathematical calculations and an eventual experimental explosion. Nonetheless, they managed to stir some attention in the AEC and decided to go to Washington to push for the “quantum jump” Strauss had asked for.
Strauss himself didn't lose time and reached out to admiral Souers, Executive Secretary to the National Security Council, to convey his proposal to the Administration. Souers seemed impressed by the proposal and urged Strauss to discuss it in the AEC and prepare a report for the President. As Strauss had recommended in his earlier memorandum, the General Advisory Committee (GAC), the Commission's scientific advisory body headed by J. Robert Oppenheimer, was summoned in order to get a scientific opinion on the matter.
The first meeting of the GAC took place on Friday, October 28, some days later than scheduled to allow everyone to informally exchange ideas and form an opinion.
Committee members Oppenheimer, Fermi, Rabi, Buckley, Smith and DuBridge were present, Conant and Rowe joined the next day, while Seaborg could not make it. The discussions during the Friday and Saturday meetings were centered essentially on the questions raised by Acting Chairman of the AEC Sumner T. Pike in a Letter to Oppenheimer, namely “whether the Commission is now doing things which might well be curtailed or stopped, and also what further things we ought to do to serve the paramount objective of the common defense and security”. To answer such questions, the GAC members would have to analyze not only technical problems, but also political and military ones. All of these aspects raised sharp discussions, which led the Committee to issue a tripartite report for the Commission, with a general report and two appended statements by two groups of members.