Moving the Pawns of the EU Administrative Law System, on the way to Sound Administration

The requisite of sound administration cannot be achieved outside the boundaries of due care. Ahead Article 41(1)(c) CFR injection of the administration’s obligation to give the reasons for its decision, the case-law evidently paved the way for such a recognition, outlining the beacon of Article 296 TFEU. The Sison case could not have provided for more limpid determination. Similarly to the requisite of timeliness, the Court emphasizes the need for a case-by-case evaluation that shall gravitate around three main hermeneutical criteria, in order to comply with the requirements of enabling the parties concerned by a decision to be aware in order to protect their rights, besides allowing the Community judicature to exercise the power of review⁵¹². Hence, the content of the measure, the nature of the reasons and the interests of the addresses in obtaining explanations are all ingredients to incorporate within the recipe. The Court stated plainly:
"the statement of reason required by Article 253 EC (Article 296 TFEU) must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community Court to exercise its power of review. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addresses of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 253 EC (Article 296 TFEU) must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question"⁵¹³.
Accordingly, providing the recipient of a decision with exhaustive information with the view to ascertain the reasons is out of doubt, then pretending that the reasoning is meticulously gauging each information or document underpinning the act at stake, results rather inadequate and not upholdable⁵¹⁴. Further considerations or explanations appended to legal acts, once weighed the overall context, may serve the same purpose of conveying a sufficient statement of reason⁵¹⁵, on the other hand the Court seems to reluctantly disregard the recourse to the mechanism of silence that may be practiced at domestic level. Last but not least, the Court recently in Air Canada v. Commission held that the judicial hermeneutics is more prone to assign priority to the operative part of the decisions of the Commission, in this case relative to findings of competition rules’ infringements, rather than the statement of reasons, since it is for that operative part the requisite of containing particularly clear and precise indications about the nature and extent of the infringements which it penalizes⁵¹⁶.
In summary, the good administration principle cannot be valued irrespective of the duty of care and diligence therein embedded. The recent case of 11 January 2024 Planistat Europe portrays the need to operate a qualitative esteem of the information or reason used as a base for a decision. Here the European Union Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), though acting accordingly with the powers and competences conferred by Regulation 1073/1999⁵¹⁷, failed to operate a rigorous assessment about the reasons justifying the measures formalized, leaving vague margins to demonstrate plausibility and credibility. Since is vested with powers of investigation, for which the information collected may serve as a basis for the initiation of civil and criminal judicial proceeding upon national authorities, a more considerable degree of caution is a fortiori required⁵¹⁸. What is more, the General Court should have verified whether OLAF had more than “a mere suspicion”, that is to say, sufficiently precise material evidence showing that there were plausible reasons to consider that the information forwarded to the national authorities concerned matters liable to be characterized as criminal⁵¹⁹. As a bottom line, the action of the European administration shall be permeated by due care and caution⁵²⁰.
Addressing the conclusions, other two elements should be highlighted. On the one hand the counterbalance mechanism, for which the seriousness of an unlawful conduct operated by the EU administrative authority will likely be justified, as far as not only genuine objectives of general interest recognized by the Union are at stake, as analyzed previously⁵²¹, but also in duly assessed cases strictly scrutinized of abnormal difficulties independent of the will of the person concerned and apparently inevitable, namely “force majeure”⁵²², then state of necessity and finally self-defense.
On the other, the actual violation of good administration and its corollaries, whereby, the remedies available will encompass judicial annulment and compensation for damage.
In any event, shedding light on the non-contractual liability of the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, it may be relied upon provided that three parameters are met, namely the actual damage, a sufficiently serious breach produced by an unlawful conduct, and the precise, solid, and not made of merely hypothetical connections, causal link between the two⁵²³.



_{512 Judgment of 18 November 1992, Rendo NV v. Commission, T-16/91, EU:T:1992:109, §124.
513 Judgment of 1 February 2007, Sison v. Council, C-266/05 P, EU:C:2007:75; §80; Judgment of 30 March 2022, Air Canada v. Commission, T-326/17, EU:T:2022:177, §157.
514 Ivi, §81.
515 Judgment of 18 November 1992, Rendo NV v. Commission, T-16/91, EU:T:1992:109, §125.
516 Judgment of 30 March 2022, Air Canada v. Commission, T-326/17, EU:T:2022:177, §§131-132.
517 Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).
518 Judgment of 11 January 2024, Planistat Europe case, C-363/22 P, EU:C:2024:20, §75.
519 Ivi, §78.
520 Ivi, §68.
521 Note 494.
522 Judgment of 12 July 1984, Valsabbia v. Commission, C-209/83, EU:C:1984:208, §21; Judgment of 30 May 1984, Vittoria v. Commission, C-224/83, EU:C:1984:208, §13.
523 Judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising v. Commission, C-8/15 to C-10/15, EU:C:2016:701, §§64-67.}