Minding the gap: the American Public Diplomacy in the engagement of China

Obama has relied on a heavy investment of personal reputational capital since the very beginning of his diplomatic path: especially in Europe, his figure has been a source of tremendous fascination for the public opinions so that in all the dates of his “tour” he has been greeted with great enthusiasm and his speeches were expected as spectacles by eager audiences striving to hear his “performance”. His personal diplomacy has been source of great fascination in the old continent that is historically been supportive of dovish and progressive American presidents while more reluctant to fall in love with the more assertive and commanding ones: one could say that after 8 years of the hated American cowboy, the European public opinion desperately needed a charming president to fall in love with. The only fact that Obama represented the antithesis of Bush, made him gain instant support in the eye of the common people. But what can be said about China? Is this strategy destined to pay the same dividends with Chinese people?
The matter is much more complicated. As it has already been said before when examining the communication dilemma, the first and obvious point that must be taken into account is the Chinese peculiar information system that prevents people from an indiscriminate and equal access to news and information. Starting from the official biased sources, going on with an allegedly free press that cannot afford to ignore the dictates of PRC intelligentsia, the ongoing censorship regime in China is still pervasive and affects all the means that public diplomacy traditionally uses to shed its messages. Therefore, the benevolent image of America that Obama is trying to radiate around the world must pass through the Chinese governmental filter. Beijing will not hesitate in thwarting the sources of American public diplomacy should the relationship with Washington chill down: after the brutal events of Tiananmen and the harsh measures that followed, Voice of America was vilified and also literally jammed (United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 1989), many academic exchanges (Fullbright in primis) were suspended and cultural initiatives was put on hold. In mid-90s, the government-funded Radio Free Asia tried to portrait itself as an unbiased alternative source of information besides the censored and state-controlled media: the overt challenge was followed by an outraged response by Beijing that jammed the broadcasters and even tried to destroy the some of its antennas (Barber, 1996).
Thus, before trying to win the heart and minds of Chinese public opinion, Washington now needs to win the total benevolence of Beijing’s leadership. Like Yiwei Wang notes, traditional Chinese diplomacy emphasizes high politics and neglects grassroots politics:
«Countries are understood through the prism of China’s own domestic experience. Chinese officials and citizens alike, for example, assume that if Sino-US relations go well at the highest level, then all the Americans will be sympathetic to China. They are puzzled when the White House sends goodwill gestures to China while the US Congress expresses hostility».
In China’s case, an effective public diplomacy still feeds upon high-level diplomacy more than vice versa; the road to billions of people still runs through few Beijing officials.
Second of all, to the contrary of the liberal oriented Europeans, one could say that Chinese leaders and people are inclined to embrace a realist approach in judging the American presidents and base their evaluations more on long term convenience than on ephemeral fascination. Unlike the most of foreign public policy, Chinese people tended to have a positive consideration for George W. Bush: the pragmatic and straightforward policy he adopted in dealing with China has been warmly welcomed by Chinese leaders and has lead to a tangible improvement in the bilateral relations. Bush’s diplomatic approach reflected the view that differences should be expressed frankly and that clear statements of US commitments (Taiwan in primis) reduce the likelihood of challenges to US interests.
In addition to that, he proved to be personally involved in building a bridge with Chinese leadership, having traveled to China with an unprecedented frequency (in 2007 he traveled twice to China and invited Hu Jintao in his ranch in Texas, meeting face-to-face Chinese leaders three times in less than 12 months). Even if the public response was not as positive (a 2008 Pew survey indicates that 30% of Chinese had confidence in Bush), after his eight years the relationship between the White House and Beijing are more mature and more solid.