INTRODUCTION 
Energy security is a fundamental aspect of national security, given the 
essentiality of energy resources for a country’s socio-economic development, for the 
functioning of its industrial, technological, communications and transport sectors as 
well as for supporting its military defence apparatus, and for the provision of basic 
services to the population. Usually, energy security is intended as security of supply, 
that is, the availability of energy resources, whether domestically produced or securely 
supplied from abroad, at affordable prices. In fact, such a definition is far from 
complete: if accepted, it would entail that net energy exporters, which, indeed, hold and 
produce enough energy to meet both their domestic and foreign demand, do not benefit 
from energy security. For this reason, a comprehensive definition of energy security 
should also include the concept of security of demand, namely, the availability of 
energy markets on which to sell domestic energy resources at profitable prices, 
especially given that large energy producers and exporters usually heavily depend on 
the income from their energy exports. Indeed, both net energy importers and net energy 
exporters aim to achieve energy security by implementing appropriate energy policies in 
accordance with their national energy documents and goals, among which, enhancing 
energy efficiency and energy saving; investing in the development of alternative energy 
sources and renewables; fostering upstream activities in new reserves; and, above all, 
promoting the diversification of energy supply sources and of energy markets, 
depending on whether they buy foreign energy or sell domestic energy abroad, 
respectively. The latter point is particularly relevant as it shows the natural relationship 
of interdependence between, on the one hand, net energy importers heavily depending 
on energy resources supplied from abroad and, on the other hand, net energy exporters 
heavily depending on foreign energy markets on which to sell their energy products. 
Consequently, both sides will aim to improve their energy security either by importing 
energy resources from different and substitutable sources or by exporting their energy 
1
products on various and substitutable markets, respectively. The problem, however, 
arises when net energy importers depend on the energy supplies of one country in 
 By “substitutable” I intend that in the event of reduced or ceased energy supply from/to a given country, 
1
this may be replaced by increased energy supply from/to another one. Clearly, this is only possible if the 
amount of energy resources imported from/exported to a given country are not remarkable with respect to 
those imported from/exported to another one.
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particular, and when, conversely, net energy exporters depend on the sale of their energy 
products on one market in particular. Specifically, concerning the former case, a net 
energy exporter cutting off energy supplies to countries highly relying on them, puts the 
latter in a serious energy emergency situation. For this very reason, net energy exporters 
are deemed to have a strong bargaining power vis-à-vis net energy importers and are 
feared to use their own resources against the latter as incentives or penalties in order to 
achieve their own political goals.  
Indeed, this thesis analyses the peculiar case of the Russian Federation, which is 
one of the world’s largest oil and gas producers and exporters as well as one of the EU’s 
top oil and gas suppliers, and of Italy, which is one of the EU member states mostly 
depending on Russian energy supplies, especially of natural gas. Accordingly, Moscow 
has been accused on several occasions by the EU to use its energy resources, especially 
natural gas, as a political weapon, by cutting gas supplies to Ukraine upon gas pricing 
disputes with the latter, and discrediting it as a reliable transit country for Russian gas 
destined to Europe, thereby ultimately threatening European energy security. As it is 
known, tensions between Russia and the EU culminated in 2014 upon Western 
economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed on Moscow following the annexation of 
Crimea and the Ukrainian crisis. Consequently, both parties fostered even more their 
diversification goal in the energy field: on the one hand, the EU and its member states 
launched the “Southern Gas Corridor” project, supplying Caspian gas (primarily from 
Azerbaijan and potentially from Central Asian countries) to Europe via an accurately 
developed pipeline system bypassing the Russian Federation and landing in Italy, in 
order to reduce their dependence on Russian gas supplies and to enhance their own 
energy security; on the other hand, Russia strengthened its partnership with China 
through the conclusion, in 2014, of a landmark gas supply agreement, while proposing 
alternative gas export routes to Europe bypassing Ukraine, deemed by Moscow the 
main source of instability in its energy partnership with the EU, in order to foster its 
own energy security as well. In such a context, Italy is the EU’s second primary energy 
consumer and relies upon Russian gas for over 35% of its national demand, which 
makes it highly vulnerable to potential supply disruptions to Europe. Hence, it adopted 
the EU’s strategy of diversification of energy suppliers and transport routes, especially 
in the gas sector, with the final aim of reducing its heavy dependence on Russian gas 
imports, in fear of the latter’s disruption and consequent serious impact on Europe’s 
 11
and, specifically, Italy’s energy security. This, as said, materialised in the SGC initiative, 
of which the country is the direct European destination.  
On such grounds, this work aims to question whether it is in fact possible and/or 
convenient for Italy to become partially or fully independent from Russian gas supplies 
and whether this will actually enhance its energy security, as originally expected, or lead 
to inverse results. Moreover, this dissertation seeks to outline Italy’s future energy 
perspectives and to investigate the feasibility of its ambition to become a major 
European energy hub, expected as well to improve the country’s energy security. 
Ultimately, this thesis aims to briefly investigate whether renewables may contribute to 
enhancing Italy’s energy security, in the framework of its energy diversification strategy. 
Correspondingly, the three case studies examined in this work, namely, Russia, 
Central Asia and Italy, were chosen in the light of their relevant roles in the 
aforementioned framework. As anticipated, Russia is the EU’s top gas supplier as well 
as the alleged cause of the latter’s energy diversification strategy; at the same time, the 
EU is Russia’s top energy export market. Within the EU, Italy is a top importer of 
Russian natural gas, on which it depends more than most EU member states, excluding 
Central-Eastern European countries formerly belonging to the Soviet bloc, and is 
thereby more vulnerable to potential Russian gas disruptions. Accordingly, Italy adopted 
the EU’s energy strategy diversification aimed at reducing Europe’s dependence on 
Russian energy supplies and at substituting them, at least partially, with energy sources 
coming from other suppliers. In particular, Azerbaijan emerged as the main “player of 
the game”, expected to supply, through the SGC initiative, its natural gas directly to 
Italy. The latter, upon completion of the Trans-Adriatic pipeline in 2020, should become 
an important European energy hub, thereby significantly improving its position in the 
European market and, thus, increasing its bargaining power within the EU itself, while 
enhancing its energy security to unprecedented levels. However, the SGC project was 
also open to participation from Central Asian net energy exporters, especially those 
overlooking the Caspian Sea, namely, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Indeed, the five 
Central Asian Republics have increasingly become the object of competition between 
the Russian Federation, which considers its Near Abroad of priority strategic interest 
especially for security reasons, and the EU, which over time increasingly attracted them 
into its orbit through development aid and growing trade inter-exchanges. 
Turkmenistan, in particular, is a typical example of a net energy exporter aiming to 
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diversify its export markets in order to enhance its national energy security, especially 
after ceased gas supplies to Moscow and Tehran in 2016 and 2017, respectively, which 
left the country with only the Chinese market on which to sell its natural gas and with 
the prospect of entering the EU market by supplying its gas to the SGC via the 
discussed Trans-Caspian pipeline. As for Kazakhstan, it managed to maintain friendly 
relations with both the EU, its top export market, and Russia, its historical political, 
trade and energy partner as well as the major transit country of its oil exports to Europe. 
In particular, Kazakhstan is one of Italy’s top oil suppliers. Hence, this shows the clear 
and relevant interdependence relationship among the three chosen case studies, 
subsequently examined through different schemes.  
Accordingly, Russia and Central Asia will be analysed in their energy outlook, 
their national energy strategy and their foreign energy relations, the latter of which will 
be limited to the Eurasian space for several reasons. First, the contained length of this 
2
work, which does not aim to become encyclopaedic but to maintain a certain 
consistency throughout the dissertation. Second, the very fact that Russia’s and Central 
Asia’s foreign policy, including in the energy sector, naturally targets the Eurasian space 
for geographical, historical and cultural reasons, while the situation is far more complex 
for Italy, which, as will be seen, highly depends on energy supplies also coming from 
the MENA region, beside Russia. Hence, the analysis of Italy’s foreign energy relations 
will regard all its major current energy partners worldwide as well as its future potential 
energy suppliers; in addition, the country’s future energy perspectives will also be 
inquired. Overall, the study of Russia and Central Asia will be relatively more general 
and functional to a more in-depth analysis of the Italian case study, on which, as 
explained, this thesis ultimately focuses. It should also be noted that this work will be 
limited to examining the role of oil and gas held reserves, production and trade, with 
only some marginal reference to renewables. This choice lies in that oil and gas are the 
most important sources of countries’ socio-economic development; in addition, they are 
also the main source of global primary energy consumption and are expected to retain 
such role also in the long run upon growing global energy demand, which, conversely, 
renewables are not deemed able to meet. 
 By Eurasian space I intend the geographical area including both the European and the Asian continents 
2
as proposed in the 19
th
 century by C.G. Reuschle in his Handbuch der Geographie. 
http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/eurasia/ 
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Chapter 1 will accordingly be devoted to an analysis of the concept of energy 
security and of its evolution from the 70s oil crisis onwards; indeed, over time, new 
threats to national energy security, ranging from terrorism and pricing disputes to cyber-
attacks and natural disasters, as well as new targets, namely, not only oil, but also 
natural gas and LNG, emerged. Subsequently, some of the major challenges to energy 
security will be examined. One of these is growing global energy demand led by non-
OECD countries such as China and India, which entails that, on the one hand, oil and 
natural gas will not be abandoned in the long run to the benefit of renewable energy 
sources , and, on the other hand, that future conflicts could involve unexplored areas 
3
estimated to hold abundant energy reserves such as, for instance, the Arctic. Another 
issue is the complete reliance upon foreign energy supply for meeting domestic energy 
demand; this is especially serious when energy suppliers or transit countries are 
internally unstable and, thereby, do not ensure continued energy flows to net energy 
importers. Ultimately, climate change should also be mentioned in that countries are 
adopting decarbonisation policies for reducing the environmental impact of upstream 
activities. A special focus will be then put on energy used as a political weapon by net 
energy exporters, that is, in order to encourage or penalise certain behaviours on the part 
of actors heavily depending on the former’s energy supplies. This concept is in fact in 
accordance with the idea at the very basis of geopolitics, namely, the geographical 
features of a country (including its endowment of energy resources) shape its domestic 
and foreign policy. Chapters 2 to 4 will be devoted to an analysis of the three 
aforementioned case studies.  
In Chapter 2, after a preliminary study of Russia’s held reserves, the country’s 
energy policy will be examined. A particular reference will be made to Gazprom’s role 
in the Russian energy sector and to its strategy in Europe; subsequently, the main goals 
of the Russian official energy strategy will be listed. Finally, an analysis of Moscow’s 
relations with its main energy partners in the Eurasian region, namely, China, Turkey, 
Iran, India and Pakistan, and the EU, will be carried out.  
A similar scheme will be followed throughout the analysis of the five Central 
Asian Republics in Chapter 3, which will begin with an outline of their major oil and 
gas fields and transport infrastructure. As for this case study, two things should be 
 Which, to date, have not yet achieved the necessary development level and, according to analysts, are 
3
not expected to meet the forecasted growing demand for primary energy.
 14
noted. First, the Central Asian Republics should be split in two groups, one of which 
consists of net energy exporters, namely, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and, until 
recently, Uzbekistan, while the other is composed of net energy importers, namely, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Second, despite their historical and geographical proximity 
to the Russian Federation, over time, such countries have developed different attitudes 
towards Moscow, something which will particularly emerge during the study of their 
national energy strategy objectives and policies. Subsequently, the relationship with 
their top Eurasian energy partners will be investigated.   
Chapter 4 will instead focus on a comprehensive and detailed analysis of Italy, 
with some general reference to the EU. As anticipated, after a comprehensive 
description of Italy’s energy outlook (held energy reserves, produced resources and 
import routes) and of its major national energy strategy goals, consistent with those 
sanctioned by the EU, the country’s actual and potential relations with its top foreign 
energy partners worldwide will be tackled. A final paragraph will elaborate on Italy’s 
future energy prospects, with a special focus on Italy’s ambition to become a major 
European energy hub. Ultimately, conclusions will be drawn on whether Italy’s 
adoption of the EU’s energy diversification strategy will effectively enhance its national 
energy security. 
The sources chosen for carrying out this thesis ranged from books to research 
papers, journal articles, websites and official documents. In particular, several articles, 
papers and reports such as The concept of energy security: Beyond the four As, written 
by A. Cherp and J. Jewell; The Evolution of the Energy Security Concept and APEX 
Energy Cooperation written by I. Kazutomo;  Energy Security Issues, drafted by the 
World Bank Group; and, above all, Geopolitics of Energy and Energy Security, written 
by C. P. Fernandes and T. F. Rodrigues, provided for the basic concepts of energy 
security, of its evolution and of the notable idea of energy used as a political weapon. 
Moreover, bibliographic sources such as Geology of Gas and Oil under the Netherlands 
by D. A. J. Batjes, W. H. Nieuwenhuijs and H. E. Rondeel; Oil and Gas pipelines in the 
Black-Caspian Seas Region by A. G. Kostianoy, S. S. Zhiltsov and I. S. Zonn; and 
Export Pipelines from the CIS Region. Geopolitics, Securitization and Political 
Decision-Making by A. Heinrich and H. Pleines, proved essential for drafting the energy 
outlook of European and Eurasian top energy producers and exporters and for 
understanding the main export routes of Russia and Central Asian countries to Asia and 
 15
Europe. With this purpose, the updated information provided by the websites Offshore 
Technology and Hydrocarbons Technology on production levels and development 
projects of the oil and gas fields mentioned in this dissertation was also relevant. 
Official documents such as the Energy Strategy of Russia; Strategia energetica 
nazionale; and the Central Asian Republics’ Development Strategies made a crucial 
contribution to the analysis of the three case studies’ energy policies and energy strategy 
goals. Furthermore, several remarkable research papers such as The Relationship 
between China and Central Asia, written by S. Zhuangzhi; Iran’ s Relations with Central 
Asia-A strategic analysis, written by S. A. Khan; Russian-Chinese Relations, written by 
A. Lukin; and Italy and new Libya between continuity and change, written by A. 
Varvelli, as well as articles published on The Diplomat, Bloomberg, Reuters and 
Oil&Gas Journal served to give a clear idea of the three case studies’ foreign political, 
economic and energy relations. More information on the matter was provided by 
government and other official websites. In particular, the relationship between the EU, 
including Italy, and the Russian Federation was analysed on the European External 
Action Service website; in the book Energy Security, Trade and the EU: Regional and 
International Perspectives, which also discussed about EU-Central Asia relations, 
written by C. Grasso, R. Leal-Arcas and J. A. Ríos; in La Russia dopo la crisi: i 
rapporti economici con l’Italia, la cooperazione energetica e il mondo sindacale, 
written by C. Frappi, A. Marra and L. Petrone; and in the notable research paper 
Pipelines, Politics and Power. The future of EU-Russia energy relations, written by P. 
Baev. In addition, the relationship between the EU and Central Asia was discussed in 
The Implementation of the European Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia: 
an Overview, by F. Indeo. Information on Italy’s energy relations with its other major 
energy partners was retrieved on the aforementioned national energy strategy document; 
on several papers published by the Italian Foreign Policy Observatory ISPI; and on the 
website infoMercatiEsteri. Finally, the notable articles Terrorism and Oil & Gas 
Pipeline Infrastructure: Vulnerability and Potential Liability for Cybersecurity Attacks, 
written by J. R. Dancy and V . A. Dancy, and Terrorist Attacks on the Energy Sector: The 
Case of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, by J. Eichler and L. Tichý were critical for a 
comprehensive and detailed analysis of the physical and virtual threats to energy 
facilities and infrastructure, together with data retrieved from the Global Terrorism 
Database. Ultimately, it should be recalled that empirical data on trade inter-exchanges 
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among countries dealt with in this work as well as on their energy reserves and energy 
consumption, production, import an export was retrieved from the BP Statistical Review 
of World Energy 2017 report and from the following websites: Eni; OEC (Observatory 
of Economic Complexity); IEA; EuroStat; OPEC; CIA World Factbook; Trading 
Economics; and World’ s Top Exports. 
 One last remark should be made on the methodological approach followed 
throughout this thesis. Accordingly, this research is based on a qualitative comparison of 
the three case studies, aided by empirical data provided by the aforementioned websites 
and collected in comparative tables, as well as by several maps, showing the existing 
and proposed oil and gas import/export routes in the areas analysed in this dissertation. 
Indeed, the comparative research carried out in this work and involving Russia, Central 
Asia and Italy was possible first, due to their belonging to different yet contiguous 
geopolitical contexts, which, as said, enabled them to establish mutually strong trade 
and energy partnerships; second, due to punctually researched and widely available data 
on their energy policies and on the activities carried out in their energy sectors; and 
third, due to the fact that they are analysed in the same time span, that is, approximately 
the last two decades, which also entails that the same technological level and 
development prospects in the energy sector were potentially available to all of them . 
4
Ultimately, it should be stressed that part of this work is the result of an unstructured 
interview on energy security in general; on Russia’s and the EU’s energy aims in 
Central Asia; and, above all, on Italy’s dependence on Russian gas supplies and on its 
European energy hub ambition, with some Italian experts working in one of Europe’s 
largest oil and gas companies operating worldwide, that is, Italian Eni.  
 Clearly, with the exception of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which, as will be seen, are developing 
4
countries and are dealt with in Chapter 2 mainly for the sake of completeness. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Energy security 
Resources are, by economic definition, scarce, or, in other words, limited with 
respect to consumers’ assumed unlimited wants. Although this statement may seem 
trivial, it is already a hint of the possible issues that may challenge security in the 
economic, and, more specifically, energy field, especially considering that energy is a 
fundamental asset for the socio-economic development of a country, which will thereby 
aim to access it in all possible ways. Accordingly, as of 2015, world oil consumption 
accounted for 47.7% of total energy consumption, while natural gas and electricity 
5
accounted for 19.8% and 22.2% respectively. In addition, biofuels, coal and 
“other” (renewable resources) accounted for 5.4%, 3% and 1.9% respectively, according 
to the IEA . Such elements provide for an insight of the importance of energy security, a 
6
fundamental aspect of national security in broader terms.  
Indeed, energy security can be described in different ways: two of its most 
punctual definitions are the one provided by the IEA, for which energy security is the 
“Uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price” in the short and in 
the long run , and the one provided by Prof. Barton, who defines it as “A condition in 
7
which a nation […] has access to sufficient energy resources at reasonable prices for the 
foreseeable future, free from serious risks of major disruption of service” . Additional 
8
definitions of energy security include the “availability, affordability, accessibility and 
 In particular, as of 2015, world gross electricity production derived from coal, natural gas, hydropower, 
5
nuclear power, other renewable sources of energy, and oil, accounting for 39%, 23%, 16%, 11%, 7% and 
4%, respectively. 
 http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/ElectricityInformation2017Overview.pdf  
6
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/KeyWorld2017.pdf  
https://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/
 And it has two main aspects: “Long-term energy security mainly deals with timely investments to 
7
supply energy in line with economic developments and environmental needs. On the other hand, short-
term energy security focuses on the ability of the energy system to react promptly to sudden changes in 
the supply-demand balance.” 
 http://learn.luiss.it/pluginfile.php/400681/mod_resource/content/1/Energy%20%20security.pdf 
8
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acceptability” of energy supply as well as the “sustainability” of energy demand . 
9
Indeed, it should be highlighted that energy security regards both the security of supply 
(whether national or foreign), based on “the reliability of supply, reasonable and 
competitive prices and access to affordable resources” and the security of demand, 
based on “the reliability of demand, competitive prices in the markets and safe energy 
flows across the supply chains” of fundamental energy resources . In fact, security of 
10
supply (for energy consumers) and security of demand (for energy producers) are highly 
intertwined within a relationship of energy interdependence, in which those who 
consume energy products need stable and reliable suppliers, while those who produce 
energy products need stable and reliable markets on which to sell them, especially if 
their economy and national budget is highly dependent on revenues arising from energy 
exports . On the basis of this relationship, energy-consuming countries wish to keep 
11
energy prices as low as possible, while energy-producing ones wish to keep them as 
high as possible, as long as these do not significantly reduce energy demand ; 
12
accordingly, energy prices are determined by the interaction of global energy demand 
and energy supply in the international market.  
This thesis will focus on oil and gas, deemed to be global commodities, as they 
are the two energy sources mostly consumed and produced by the majority of countries 
in the world. In fact, more than 90 million barrels of crude oil and 250 million tonnes 
13
 In particular, availability and affordability were included in the definition of energy security already in 
9
the 80s, while in the following years, accessibility and acceptability and, above all, sustainability 
(especially since the 2000s) were added to create a more comprehensive and multi-dimensional definition 
of the aforementioned concept.  
https://ac.els-cdn.com/S0301421514004960/1-s2.0-S0301421514004960-main.pdf?
_tid=10f26b27-3b31-403c-8f42-8ebabebbf7d0&acdnat=1526494485_419c042f570a1c8f6933379facf885
d1 
 https://www.idn.gov.pt/publicacoes/cadernos/idncadernos_24.pdf 
10
 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544213001886 
11
To be more precise, energy must be sufficiently supplied in order to satisfy domestic demand, maintain 
national security and economic development. In addition, it should be abundant and uninterrupted, since 
supply disruptions have serious political and economic implications for energy importing countries. 
Finally, energy prices should be reasonably convenient. As for energy exporting countries, demand for 
energy should be stable, with a preference for “long-term energy buyers” and energy prices should be 
reasonably profitable.
 http://www.globalization101.org/the-evolving-concept-of-energy-security/
12
 https://www.statista.com/statistics/265203/global-oil-production-since-in-barrels-per-day/
13
 19
of liquefied gas are globally traded every day . In particular, petroleum can be 
14
transported by rail cars, trucks, tanker vessels or via pipeline , while natural gas can 
15
only be supplied by pipeline . As for LNG, natural gas is liquefied in producing 
16
countries and transported overseas with appropriate tankers; it is then regasified either 
by consuming countries onshore or in so-called Floating storage and regasification units 
(which can either be offshore installations or upgraded LNG tankers ). The significance 
17
of these resources mainly derives from the fact that they represent a veritable asset for 
the socio-economic development of a country and its society, especially as they 
contribute to improving the population’s standards of living. Indeed, crude oil and its 
derivatives are mainly used to produce fuel, crucial for the functioning of the transport 
sector, and for petroleum, thermal power and electricity generation. In addition, they are 
also used in the plastics, synthetic and chemical industries. Natural gas is also 
increasingly being used in most of these sectors (albeit primarily to generate electricity), 
as it is considered a more “versatile, clean-burning and efficient fuel.” Apart from such 
uses, energy is also crucial for supporting a country’s military apparatus and for 
providing it with effective defence capacity. In other words, energy serves to build and 
strengthen the domestic military and security apparatus and to maintain internal order; 
thus, it is not by chance that countries holding abundant proved oil and gas reserves are 
monolithic states , namely, nominal democracies, autocracies or rentier states . 
18 19
These, in fact, mostly or solely rely on the revenue from exports of national oil and gas 
 Indeed, half of the 10 largest world companies are energy societies (with two Chinese companies 
14
ranking 3
rd
 and 4
th
, as of 2017). 
 http://steer.com/the-four-primary-methods-of-oil-gas-transportation/
15
 https://www.studentenergy.org/topics/natural-gas-transport 
16
Pipelines can then belong to a “gathering pipeline system”, which means that they are small pipelines 
transporting raw natural gas to the processing plant; they can be intra-state or inter-state pipelines, 
transporting natural gas to the centres of its consumption whether national or foreign; and they can belong 
to a “distribution pipeline system”, which delivers gas to end consumers.
 https://www.marineinsight.com/types-of-ships/what-is-floating-storage-regasification-unit-fsru/
17
 In the case of proved oil reserves, Venezuela ranks first, while Saudi Arabia ranks second. The sole 
18
exception is Canada, ranking third, and followed by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Russia 
and Libya, while the US ranks tenth. As far as proved gas reserves are concerned, Russia ranks first and is 
followed by Iran, Qatar, the US (which is, indeed, a democratic system but has the strongest military 
apparatus in the world; namely, its budget expenditure in defence accounted for 601 billion dollars, as of 
2015), followed by Russia (with an 84.5-billion-dollar expenditure in the same year). Saudi Arabia, 
Turkmenistan, the UAE, Venezuela, Nigeria and Algeria follow. 
 Rentier -or distributive- states usually do not promote economic productivity in sectors other than the 
19
energy one and lack a system of taxation and of formal representation. 
 20
resources as the primary source of public income, within a system of state-controlled 
prices and economic subsidies provided to the primary sector of their economy (namely, 
involving the extraction and collection of natural resources). This shows that predictable 
and constant export and price levels of the aforementioned resources are essential for 
any country, whether a net energy importer or a net energy exporter and whether strictly 
democratic or not, while energy price volatility negatively affects both energy 
consumers and energy producers. In fact, as will be seen in the following chapters, 
while the 70s energy crisis hit hard on net energy importers, the collapse in oil prices 
which took place after 2014 due to excessive oil supply on the world market was 
20
particularly detrimental for top energy exporters, such as Venezuela, Russia, Angola, 
Algeria and even Gulf countries, and resulted in a drop in their income from oil exports, 
declining oil production and a fall in their GDP between 2015 and 2016.  
The evolution of energy security 
As anticipated, energy security has historically been perceived as stability of 
energy supply, in particular of oil, against inter-state and intra-state conflicts as well as 
embargoes and price manipulations by exporters: in other words, against the use of 
energy as a political weapon. Hence, within such a context, stability of supply refers to 
no energy flow interruption and no sudden price fluctuations resulting from mismatches 
between energy demand and supply . In fact, the concept of energy security originates 
21
from oil supply instability experienced in Europe during the 1956 Suez crisis and, even 
more, during the two 1973 and 1979 oil crises, triggered by the Yom Kippur war and the 
Iranian revolution, respectively. In fact, in order to make up for instability of energy 
supply and, thus, in order to improve their energy security, developed countries founded 
the International Energy Agency in 1974, thereby pledging to build oil stockpiles in 
order to countervail oil supply restrictions imposed by oil-producing countries and, 
thereafter, started diversifying their energy suppliers. Since the 21
st
 century, however, 
the concept of energy security was expanded to other types of threats as well as to other 
energy sources, especially following three major incidents sanctioning three watershed 
 Mainly caused by an almost two-fold increase in US oil production between 2008 and 2014, following 
20
the shale revolution which took place in the country and which will be discussed below.
 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544213001886 
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