The Relationship between China and Japan after 1989

scenario that, if we take a close look, reveals strong 
differences between the actors
1
. 
 
One of the main features upon I will 
focus is the excessively reductionist attitude (generally 
dividing the subject between black and white due to 
what Federico Chabod defines as a typical European 
attitude since: “…[l’Europa nasce dalla] 
contrapposizione tra l’Europa e ciò che Europa non è… 
[ossia] l’Asia, destinata a rimanere… termine di 
paragone…
2
) that, on the methodological ground, is 
common especially among American literature: by 
sticking to approaches that are extremely used in the 
Western world (such as Realism
3
 and Institutional 
Liberalism) we are not able to comprehend why SE 
                                                 
1
 R. CAROLI, F. GATTI, Storia del Giappone, Roma - Bari 
2006 
2
 F. CHABOD, Storia dell’idea d’Europa, Roma-Bari 2005, p 
23 
3
 After 1989 “…a series of events appeared to call into 
question the value of relying on a realist or neo-realist 
approach to help under stand regional developments…” (A. 
ACHARYA, R. STUBBS, Theorizing Southeast Asian 
relations: an introduction (The Pacific Review), London 
2006, p 3) 
6 
Asia differs in so many ways from the typical evolution 
we’ve seen in Europe as well as in North America (i.e., 
why Japan, the second greatest power in the region, 
doesn’t challenge the United States? Why China, a 
former communist state and still a totalitarian one, has 
decided to push for a more integrated security approach 
and a common security agenda, giving away some 
corner stones of its former policy in order to create 
confidence among the other region’s states? If the US 
are to be considered the best choice as an ally, why 
Japan, considering its historical rivalries and 
miscomprehensions with China, has become PRC’s best 
trading partner? Why can’t be explain that “…in 1994 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
successfully launched the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) and a few years later ASEAN expanded its 
membership to include all ten Southeast Asian 
countries. For many analysts neither realism nor neo-
realism helped to explain these emerging cooperative 
arrangements…”
4
?). 
                                                 
4
 A. ACHARYA, R. STUBBS, Theorizing Southeast Asian 
relations: an introduction (The Pacific Review), London 
7 
 The period that I am going to analyze is 
limited to the lapse of time that goes from the beginning 
of the ‘90s to the present days: that is due to the 
(relatively) low bilateral activity we’ve seen during the 
Cold war, when the two Countries (Japan in primis) 
were under a super-power logic. I will, anyway, give a 
brief account of the historical background of those 
Nations starting from the end of the II World War. 
 
Last but not least, as a part of the 
analysis, I will give a small account of the local 
dynamics involving China and Japan for political 
reasons or as a part of institutions such as ARF and the 
Six Party Talks and towards countries such as North 
Korea and Taiwan. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                    
2006, p 3 
8 
Chapter 1: Historical introduction 
 
1.1 The aftermath of WWII 
 
As the war was ending, Japan’s 
situation was radically different from China’s: Tokyo 
was searching for a redefinition of its identity, a difficult 
task due to the cumulative frustrations deriving from the 
defeat, the two atomic bombs and the new constitutional 
reform imposed by the peace treaty (which meant that 
the Emperor, once a God on Earth, was reduced to the 
rank of a mere head of state). On the opposite field, 
China was struggling between Mao’s CCP and Jiang’s 
Guomindang (Nationalist Party): even if they fought 
together (at least formally) against Japan, winning the 
war, the United front was deeply divided. In the end, it 
was the Generalissimo’s side that lost the civil war 
because of the Communist’s strategy of minimal 
involvement (to minimize the chances of being caught 
in a fight with Japanese as well as against the GMT). 
Also, there’s a great fluidity in the international system: 
the war against Hitler is won, but deep fractures 
9 
between the USA and the USSR are becoming clearer, 
dividing the World in two radically opposed zones. 
Moscow doesn’t want to give away East Europe, even if 
it costs a political fight with democratic parties, while 
the US are defining their influence in the Pacific area 
and, even more blatantly, in Europe (see the Marshall 
Plan). 
 
If we take a close look at the 
interactions between China and Japan, they’re not less 
tense: first of all, we have two “Chinas”, each one of 
those (for different reasons) hates Tokyo and wants to 
reduce Japan’s influence in SE Asia. Jiang fought the 
Japanese since 1937, and that’s one of his main features; 
Mao, even if he was not one of the first fighters, gave 
his contribution in conquering back China’s soil. 
Anyway, it can’t be forget, the Emperor was dismissed 
form his symbolic function by the peace treaty and Mac 
Arthur’s military intervention: after Hiroshima, 
Nagasaki, and the defeat in September, Tokyo’s 
opposition to the American occupant (which pushes for 
a stabilization of SE Asia’s regional relations) is 
10 
unthinkable. In any case, Washington decided to launch 
an atomic attack on Japan in order to avoid a military 
landing that would cost the US some 5 million human 
lives. 
 
1.2 China splitting: DRC and PRC 
(1945/1950) 
 
When the Japanese army surrenders to 
the American and Soviet troops, China’s internal 
situation is very unstable: Mao and Jiang are divided, by 
ideology as well as by the complex alliance systems on 
which each one of them can count to win. If, on one 
side, the US are in favor of the Generalissimo’s 
government: FDR in first place gave to Stalin 
concessions- such as the naval base of Lushun and a 
predominance in Dalian- in Manchuria in return to the 
USSR’s war declaration against Japan in August; after 
Truman has been pushing for an éntente between the 
Soviets and the GMT (confirming the same concessions 
that the US gave in Yalta). The Soviets were trying not 
to get entangled in this local struggle by keeping an 
11 
attitude of neutrality towards CCP/GMT (i.e., Stalin 
didn’t let Mao have North Manchuria and Low 
Mongolia, which were rich in raw materials and, above 
all, the control of the Manchurian railway- which will 
be given back to the Chinese government in 1952
5
).   
 
As the war was ending, the Russians 
were rushing to occupy Manchuria, while the US were 
preparing a full power attack directed toward the 
Japanese (which ended with the deploying of the atomic 
bomb): since the CCP was trying to get some turf at the 
expenses of the GMT, Jiang decided to use the help of 
the Japanese army (now forced by the American to 
cooperate with the Nationalists, since the Japanese 
government maintained the sovereignty on every piece 
of land occupied before the surrender, such as 
Indonesia, Burma, Vietnam, Philippines and 
Manchuria
6
) deployed in China against Mao and his 
                                                 
5
 J. CHANG, J. HALLIDAY, Mao – the unknown story, 
London 2006 
6
 P. CORRADINI, Il Giappone e la sua storia, Roma 2003, p 
342 
12 
lackeys
7
. Jiang has not a solid position in Manchuria, 
thus he must ask Moscow’s help: the Russians are to 
stay in the region while the Generalissimo moves his 
best troops in the area (leaving the rest of the territory 
with a weaker defense and, in the long run, leading to 
the defeat). In November (1945) Truman sends Marshall 
on a diplomatic mission in order to create at least a 
common framework of cooperation and a ceasefire (if 
not a joint government coalition): the proposal is 
welcomed by both sides (CCP and GMT) because of its 
delaying of US’s support to Jiang and, on the 
Communist side, because it led to a period of standstill 
(needed desperately by Mao to reorganize his troops).  
 
This dialogue proposed by the 
Americans lasted for about two years (from the end of 
1945 to 1947), but only in the beginning of this process 
it showed a significant improvement of the situation: 
Marshall’s mission was flawed from the start, since he 
was an emissary of a nation which was Jiang’s first ally 
(that meant an underlying lack of impartiality). 
                                                 
7
 J.A.G. ROBERTS, Storia della Cina, Roma 2002 
13 
 This final moment of the civil war may 
be divided into three blocks: from July 1946 to June 
1947 the initiative is in Jiang’s hands, with a full scale 
offensive which took place in Manchuria and North 
China, reaching Harbin in its maximum expansion (and, 
notably, conquering Yan’an, Mao’s former HQ). During 
1946/47’s winter, Lin Biao’s army and what lasted of 
Zhang Xueliang’s (a former lord of war) managed to 
succeed in several attacks, getting their hands on a 
considerable amount of GMT’s equipment: however, in 
June, they halted in Siping while the Nationalists, pulled 
out of the Mainland by those performances, started to 
move their savings and a conspicuous part of their good 
in Canton and Hong Kong.  
 
The second phase thus starts in June 
1947, with a new mobile offensive led by the 
Communists: in trying to jeopardize Jiang’s grasp on the 
Nation, they isolated the GMT’s positions, cutting 
communication lines as well as supply ones. Between 
November and April (1947/1948) Lin reaches Siping, 
14 
Yan’an, Luoyang e Kaifeng, bringing the existing 
difference between Communists and Nationalists to a 
substantial parity condition. 
 
The third and final moment of the civil 
war starts with Jiang’s effort to move his troops in 
Northern China and Manchuria: however, Shenyan falls 
in seven weeks and the GMT loses more or less 400,000 
soldiers in this action. Lin then starts to move toward 
the Beijing/Tianjin region where in January wins the 
siege and Fu Zuoyi (Jiang’s army chief in the region) 
surrenders in order not to let his soldiers dye in futile 
actions. More or less in the same period (November 
’48/January ’49) Jiang commands his army in his last 
important action, between the Huai River and the 
Longhai rail line. The communist forces managed to 
reduce Jiang’s communications with the rest of his army 
and to bring the morale level to a minimum. When Jiang 
surrenders to the PRC, in January, the Communists 
offered a peace at the condition that Jiang was to be 
regarded as a war criminal: thus, the GMT refused those 
terms. However, Jiang had to resign from his office, 
15 
passing the command to Li Zhongren and the capital 
from Nanjing to Canton: Li was not in tip top 
conditions, and he lost between May and October both 
Shanghai and Canton. The Popular Republic of China 
was proclaimed on the 1
st
 of October 1949, while in 
December Jiang, taking back the position as President, 
decided to move his HQ and his capital to Taiwan: here, 
as I noted in my previous work
8
, starts the separated 
history of the two “Chinas”, with one side possessing an 
international status of great power at- least in the 
beginning- due to its chair as one of the five Great 
Powers, while the other one had an uncontested control 
of its internal turf (with the possible exception of the 
Tibetan area) and an international role as, from 1955, 
leader of the Non-Aligned movement (in opposition to 
the USSR and the US). During this final lapse of time 
the hatred toward Japan was “suspended” in order not to 
let the opposite party rule the mainland: Jiang used 
some Japanese equipment to stand against Mao (using 
also America’s help since “…les Américains mettent à 
sa disposition un pont aéreien pour lui permettre de 
                                                 
8
 L. BARELLA, Taiwan: scenari possibili, Roma 2006  
16