scenario that, if we take a close look, reveals strong
differences between the actors
1
.
One of the main features upon I will
focus is the excessively reductionist attitude (generally
dividing the subject between black and white due to
what Federico Chabod defines as a typical European
attitude since: “…[l’Europa nasce dalla]
contrapposizione tra l’Europa e ciò che Europa non è…
[ossia] l’Asia, destinata a rimanere… termine di
paragone…
2
) that, on the methodological ground, is
common especially among American literature: by
sticking to approaches that are extremely used in the
Western world (such as Realism
3
and Institutional
Liberalism) we are not able to comprehend why SE
1
R. CAROLI, F. GATTI, Storia del Giappone, Roma - Bari
2006
2
F. CHABOD, Storia dell’idea d’Europa, Roma-Bari 2005, p
23
3
After 1989 “…a series of events appeared to call into
question the value of relying on a realist or neo-realist
approach to help under stand regional developments…” (A.
ACHARYA, R. STUBBS, Theorizing Southeast Asian
relations: an introduction (The Pacific Review), London
2006, p 3)
6
Asia differs in so many ways from the typical evolution
we’ve seen in Europe as well as in North America (i.e.,
why Japan, the second greatest power in the region,
doesn’t challenge the United States? Why China, a
former communist state and still a totalitarian one, has
decided to push for a more integrated security approach
and a common security agenda, giving away some
corner stones of its former policy in order to create
confidence among the other region’s states? If the US
are to be considered the best choice as an ally, why
Japan, considering its historical rivalries and
miscomprehensions with China, has become PRC’s best
trading partner? Why can’t be explain that “…in 1994
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
successfully launched the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) and a few years later ASEAN expanded its
membership to include all ten Southeast Asian
countries. For many analysts neither realism nor neo-
realism helped to explain these emerging cooperative
arrangements…”
4
?).
4
A. ACHARYA, R. STUBBS, Theorizing Southeast Asian
relations: an introduction (The Pacific Review), London
7
The period that I am going to analyze is
limited to the lapse of time that goes from the beginning
of the ‘90s to the present days: that is due to the
(relatively) low bilateral activity we’ve seen during the
Cold war, when the two Countries (Japan in primis)
were under a super-power logic. I will, anyway, give a
brief account of the historical background of those
Nations starting from the end of the II World War.
Last but not least, as a part of the
analysis, I will give a small account of the local
dynamics involving China and Japan for political
reasons or as a part of institutions such as ARF and the
Six Party Talks and towards countries such as North
Korea and Taiwan.
2006, p 3
8
Chapter 1: Historical introduction
1.1 The aftermath of WWII
As the war was ending, Japan’s
situation was radically different from China’s: Tokyo
was searching for a redefinition of its identity, a difficult
task due to the cumulative frustrations deriving from the
defeat, the two atomic bombs and the new constitutional
reform imposed by the peace treaty (which meant that
the Emperor, once a God on Earth, was reduced to the
rank of a mere head of state). On the opposite field,
China was struggling between Mao’s CCP and Jiang’s
Guomindang (Nationalist Party): even if they fought
together (at least formally) against Japan, winning the
war, the United front was deeply divided. In the end, it
was the Generalissimo’s side that lost the civil war
because of the Communist’s strategy of minimal
involvement (to minimize the chances of being caught
in a fight with Japanese as well as against the GMT).
Also, there’s a great fluidity in the international system:
the war against Hitler is won, but deep fractures
9
between the USA and the USSR are becoming clearer,
dividing the World in two radically opposed zones.
Moscow doesn’t want to give away East Europe, even if
it costs a political fight with democratic parties, while
the US are defining their influence in the Pacific area
and, even more blatantly, in Europe (see the Marshall
Plan).
If we take a close look at the
interactions between China and Japan, they’re not less
tense: first of all, we have two “Chinas”, each one of
those (for different reasons) hates Tokyo and wants to
reduce Japan’s influence in SE Asia. Jiang fought the
Japanese since 1937, and that’s one of his main features;
Mao, even if he was not one of the first fighters, gave
his contribution in conquering back China’s soil.
Anyway, it can’t be forget, the Emperor was dismissed
form his symbolic function by the peace treaty and Mac
Arthur’s military intervention: after Hiroshima,
Nagasaki, and the defeat in September, Tokyo’s
opposition to the American occupant (which pushes for
a stabilization of SE Asia’s regional relations) is
10
unthinkable. In any case, Washington decided to launch
an atomic attack on Japan in order to avoid a military
landing that would cost the US some 5 million human
lives.
1.2 China splitting: DRC and PRC
(1945/1950)
When the Japanese army surrenders to
the American and Soviet troops, China’s internal
situation is very unstable: Mao and Jiang are divided, by
ideology as well as by the complex alliance systems on
which each one of them can count to win. If, on one
side, the US are in favor of the Generalissimo’s
government: FDR in first place gave to Stalin
concessions- such as the naval base of Lushun and a
predominance in Dalian- in Manchuria in return to the
USSR’s war declaration against Japan in August; after
Truman has been pushing for an éntente between the
Soviets and the GMT (confirming the same concessions
that the US gave in Yalta). The Soviets were trying not
to get entangled in this local struggle by keeping an
11
attitude of neutrality towards CCP/GMT (i.e., Stalin
didn’t let Mao have North Manchuria and Low
Mongolia, which were rich in raw materials and, above
all, the control of the Manchurian railway- which will
be given back to the Chinese government in 1952
5
).
As the war was ending, the Russians
were rushing to occupy Manchuria, while the US were
preparing a full power attack directed toward the
Japanese (which ended with the deploying of the atomic
bomb): since the CCP was trying to get some turf at the
expenses of the GMT, Jiang decided to use the help of
the Japanese army (now forced by the American to
cooperate with the Nationalists, since the Japanese
government maintained the sovereignty on every piece
of land occupied before the surrender, such as
Indonesia, Burma, Vietnam, Philippines and
Manchuria
6
) deployed in China against Mao and his
5
J. CHANG, J. HALLIDAY, Mao – the unknown story,
London 2006
6
P. CORRADINI, Il Giappone e la sua storia, Roma 2003, p
342
12
lackeys
7
. Jiang has not a solid position in Manchuria,
thus he must ask Moscow’s help: the Russians are to
stay in the region while the Generalissimo moves his
best troops in the area (leaving the rest of the territory
with a weaker defense and, in the long run, leading to
the defeat). In November (1945) Truman sends Marshall
on a diplomatic mission in order to create at least a
common framework of cooperation and a ceasefire (if
not a joint government coalition): the proposal is
welcomed by both sides (CCP and GMT) because of its
delaying of US’s support to Jiang and, on the
Communist side, because it led to a period of standstill
(needed desperately by Mao to reorganize his troops).
This dialogue proposed by the
Americans lasted for about two years (from the end of
1945 to 1947), but only in the beginning of this process
it showed a significant improvement of the situation:
Marshall’s mission was flawed from the start, since he
was an emissary of a nation which was Jiang’s first ally
(that meant an underlying lack of impartiality).
7
J.A.G. ROBERTS, Storia della Cina, Roma 2002
13
This final moment of the civil war may
be divided into three blocks: from July 1946 to June
1947 the initiative is in Jiang’s hands, with a full scale
offensive which took place in Manchuria and North
China, reaching Harbin in its maximum expansion (and,
notably, conquering Yan’an, Mao’s former HQ). During
1946/47’s winter, Lin Biao’s army and what lasted of
Zhang Xueliang’s (a former lord of war) managed to
succeed in several attacks, getting their hands on a
considerable amount of GMT’s equipment: however, in
June, they halted in Siping while the Nationalists, pulled
out of the Mainland by those performances, started to
move their savings and a conspicuous part of their good
in Canton and Hong Kong.
The second phase thus starts in June
1947, with a new mobile offensive led by the
Communists: in trying to jeopardize Jiang’s grasp on the
Nation, they isolated the GMT’s positions, cutting
communication lines as well as supply ones. Between
November and April (1947/1948) Lin reaches Siping,
14
Yan’an, Luoyang e Kaifeng, bringing the existing
difference between Communists and Nationalists to a
substantial parity condition.
The third and final moment of the civil
war starts with Jiang’s effort to move his troops in
Northern China and Manchuria: however, Shenyan falls
in seven weeks and the GMT loses more or less 400,000
soldiers in this action. Lin then starts to move toward
the Beijing/Tianjin region where in January wins the
siege and Fu Zuoyi (Jiang’s army chief in the region)
surrenders in order not to let his soldiers dye in futile
actions. More or less in the same period (November
’48/January ’49) Jiang commands his army in his last
important action, between the Huai River and the
Longhai rail line. The communist forces managed to
reduce Jiang’s communications with the rest of his army
and to bring the morale level to a minimum. When Jiang
surrenders to the PRC, in January, the Communists
offered a peace at the condition that Jiang was to be
regarded as a war criminal: thus, the GMT refused those
terms. However, Jiang had to resign from his office,
15
passing the command to Li Zhongren and the capital
from Nanjing to Canton: Li was not in tip top
conditions, and he lost between May and October both
Shanghai and Canton. The Popular Republic of China
was proclaimed on the 1
st
of October 1949, while in
December Jiang, taking back the position as President,
decided to move his HQ and his capital to Taiwan: here,
as I noted in my previous work
8
, starts the separated
history of the two “Chinas”, with one side possessing an
international status of great power at- least in the
beginning- due to its chair as one of the five Great
Powers, while the other one had an uncontested control
of its internal turf (with the possible exception of the
Tibetan area) and an international role as, from 1955,
leader of the Non-Aligned movement (in opposition to
the USSR and the US). During this final lapse of time
the hatred toward Japan was “suspended” in order not to
let the opposite party rule the mainland: Jiang used
some Japanese equipment to stand against Mao (using
also America’s help since “…les Américains mettent à
sa disposition un pont aéreien pour lui permettre de
8
L. BARELLA, Taiwan: scenari possibili, Roma 2006
16
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