The Nature of the Interactions between Local Authorities and the EU. A Case Study from the North East of England

 7
 Yet, liberal intergovernmentalism is not completely foolproof. Above all, it fails to 
fully grasp the complexity, both in terms of actors and dynamics, of the process that 
leads to the formation of domestic preferences. Arguably, this is where MLG has an 
edge over LI. Thus, it is perhaps not too daring to attempt to combine the two. This is 
what the second chapter sets out to do. Its first section challenges the widespread 
practice of presenting multi-level governance and liberal intergovernmentalism as 
mutually exclusive theories and highlights how the two can complement each other. 
Subsequently it tests this theoretical assumption by looking at the effect of EU regional 
policy on the mobilisation of sub-national actors in Britain. A clarification is required 
on this point, as students of multi-level governance often confuse two distinct 
phenomena. The mobilisation of local and regional governments is different from the 
mobilisation of non-governmental or quasi-governmental actors. As this second chapter 
shows, the latter could be even detrimental to the former.  
 The final chapter presents the results of a case study on local authorities in the North 
East of England. Again, the focus is on EU structural funds (SF). Firstly, the chapter 
looks at how involved local authorities are in the management of structural funds. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the distinction between programme drafting and 
implementation stages. In the light of the conclusions reached, it then proceeds to 
evaluate whether, and how, years of involvement in EU-funded initiatives have 
empowered sub-national authorities in the North East. The way they lobby in Brussels 
is also analysed, as it can provide evidence of effective sub-national mobilisation.  
 The case study on the North East is not intended to necessarily provide material for 
European- or country-wide generalisations. Rather, its purpose is to shed some light on 
the nature of the mobilisation of sub-national authorities in an area that has been largely 
ignored so far. Ultimately, the case study allows for a further testing of the theoretical 
hypothesis, laid out at the beginning, concerning the complementary nature of liberal 
intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance theory.  
 
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CHAPTER I 
THEORISING SUB-NATIONAL MOBILISATION IN EUROPE 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 In the early days of the study of the European polity it was possible to label most 
scholars of European integration as either neofunctionalist or intergovernmentalist. This 
would no longer be appropriate. The European Union (EU)
1
 has developed in ways that 
intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists alike find difficult to explain. A number of 
approaches have been suggested offering alternative accounts of how the Community 
works. Among them, liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) (Moravcsik, 1993 and 1995) 
and multi-level governance theory (MLG)
 
(first articulated by Marks, 1993) have been 
most influential.  
 The following paragraphs analyses both these approaches with the ultimate goal of 
casting some light on the nature of regional mobilisation at EU level. It will be 
concluded that, while both theories have much to say about the process of EU decision-
making, neither is invulnerable. LI does emerge as a more convincing approach. Yet, it 
too comes under criticisms. Most notably, it may owe some of its explanatory power to 
its refusal to engage in detailed analysis of day-to-day policy developments in the EU. 
In other words, it falls short of grasping the full complexity of the process. Multi-level 
governance is more successful in this respect. However, its capacity to thoroughly 
describe recent developments in EU policy-making is not matched by an equal potential 
to explain them.  
 A careful review of MLG and LI also suggests a slightly more tentative conclusion. 
Not only might the two be interpreted as aiming at different stages of the policy process, 
they might also show features that could allow them to supplement each other. This will 
be the dealt with in the next chapter.   
                                                           
1
 While there is a significant difference between the terms European Community and European Union, for 
the sake of simplicity, in this paper the two will be used interchangeably.  
 
 9
1.1 Liberal intergovernmentalism 
 
The main reasons why Moravcsik’s work is often considered as belonging to the 
intergovernmentalist tradition is that it explains EU policy-making as a two-level game, 
taking a clear intergovernmentalist approach to State bargaining at EU-level. However, 
by adopting a liberal approach to domestic preference formation, Moravcsik detaches 
himself from traditional intergovernmentalist thinking (Rosamond, 2000). Indeed, one 
of the strengths of LI seems to be precisely its ability to integrate the two approaches. 
Moravcsik’s point of departure, namely a constructive critique of neofunctionalism and 
of recent attempts to revive it, further enhances the completeness of his work.  
Liberal intergovernmentalism is based on the assumption that the process leading to 
international co-operation starts within each State
2
. In the domestic arena, various 
groups express their preferences on specific issues. Because the primary aim of those in 
power is to remain in power, which, in a democratic State, implies winning general 
elections, national decision-makers are responsive to domestic preferences. Once 
aggregated by the national government, such preferences become the basis for inter-
State bargaining. The reason why independent States are compelled to engage in 
various forms of international co-operation is linked to the increasing importance of 
transborder flows of various kinds. ‘[G]overnments have an incentive to co-operate 
where policy co-ordination increases their control over domestic policy outcomes, 
permitting them to achieve goals that would not otherwise be possible’ (Moravcsik, 
1993: 485). This is especially the case where, due to increasing interdependence, 
domestic groups’ preferences transcend the limits of national jurisdictions.  
Thus, eventually, States may chose to delegate some of their sovereignty to an 
international agency in the attempt to achieve a particular aim. This choice and the 
width of such delegation depend on variables such as the uncertainty and risks 
surrounding a certain issue, the cost and benefit implied in co-operating and the extent 
to which non-compliance from other actors is likely. Of course, similar variables can be 
extremely difficult to quantify.  
                                                           
2
 The paragraph that follows, unless specified otherwise, draws on the already mentioned Moravcsik’s 
papers.  
 10
Already from this brief description of LI it is clear that this approach, if applied to 
the EU, carries enormous explanatory potential. This is not to say that criticisms cannot 
be directed towards it.  
Amongst the various critics, Wincott (1995) deserves particular attention. In one of 
his boldest assertions he challenges the ‘theoretical status’ of LI altogether. He argues 
that LI does not attempt to make deductions starting from clear assumptions. This has 
the effect of avoiding laying out ‘the circumstances in which it could be empirically 
refuted’ (Rosamund, 2000: 146). Furthermore, Wincott claims that LI is inconsistent. 
After having argued that States do not enjoy autonomy when negotiating in the 
international arena, Moravcsik is accused of concluding, a few pages later, that 
governments can indeed gain freedom from the society they represent. (Wincott, 1995: 
601). In both cases Moravcsik’s reply seems rather convincing. As far as the first aspect 
is concerned, he admits that ‘the basic tripartite structure of LI does not itself comprise 
a theory’, rather a framework aiming to ‘facilitate a theoretically explicit synthesis of 
model theories of political economy, negotiation and regimes’ (Moravcsik, 1995: 613). 
However, liberal intergovernmentalism does rest on a number of assumptions 
concerning, for example, the centrality of national governments in international 
bargains or the mechanism by which domestic preferences emerge and are aggregated. 
This allows Moravcsik to conclude that LI does posses a theoretical content 
(Moravcsik, 1995: 613). The second critique is perhaps easier to refute. While in 
international bargains governments’ negotiating positions normally reflect domestic 
preferences, where such preferences are weak or domestic groups are divided on a 
certain issue, national executives enjoy more freedom at the negotiating table. Rather, a 
much more salient observation is that LI does not offer much in terms of explaining 
how, in similar situations, negotiators define their positions (Wincott, 1995). 
The basic assumption that national governments act rationally is also criticised. 
However, in his 1993 paper, Moravcsik himself allows for a relaxation of the rational 
behaviour hypothesis that should not be overlooked: ‘[w]ith a few important exceptions, 
EU Institutions appear to be explicable as the result of conscious calculations by 
Member States to strike a balance between greater efficiency and domestic 
influence[…] and acceptable levels of political risk’ (Moravcsik, 1993: 507). In a more 
 11
recent work, Moravcsik clarifies his conception of rational behaviour. Three aspects are 
particularly relevant. First, States are understood as acting ‘as if’ they were rationally 
attempting to pursue a precise set of domestic preferences. Second, Moravcsik does not 
assume perfect information. Thirdly, his view of what constitutes rational behaviour is 
wide. Thus, States’ behaviours might be based not only on ‘material incentives’, but 
also on ideas and values without necessarily losing their rationality status (Moravcsik, 
1998: 19-24).   
Finally, some of the critique mirrors that traditionally raised against 
intergovernmentalist approaches. This includes the condemnation of the practice of not 
recognising the relevance, in the European arena, of actors other than the nation States 
and the inability to explain developments in the EC that seem to run against the logic of 
a Community under the firm grip of national governments (Hooghe, 1996). As for the 
first point, a careful reading of Moravcsik’s work reveals that it is a matter of degree 
rather than principles. As will be shown in more detail in the next chapter, LI does not 
necessarily deny the importance, in the European context, of supranational or sub-
national actors. The second aspect is more complex. At times, explanations based on the 
assumption of all-controlling national governments are debatable. The realm of 
European regional policy (ERP) does offer a few of these examples (amongst others, 
Hooghe, 1996). Here it is tempting to draw a parallel with Moravcsik’s own description 
of the mechanism of the formation of domestic preferences. As mentioned previously, 
where domestic groups do not express a strong preference or are deeply divided, 
national executives are likely to have more room for manoeuvre in intergovernmental 
negotiations. Similarly, it could be argued that, where the Council of Ministers is 
divided or where States do not seem to have strong preferences on a certain issue, the 
Commission might be allowed to play a more influential role. 
 Liberal intergovernmentalism has two fundamental strengths beyond criticism. 
Firstly it recognises its own limits. Moravcsik himself admits that his is not so much a 
theory of everyday policy-making as one able to explain the dynamics of grand bargains 
(Peterson, 2001: 293). Therefore, LI does not necessarily deny the existence and 
importance of decision-making structures and stages other than the latter. As a 
consequence, while restating the primacy of nation States in the European arena, LI 
 12
allows for much more space for manoeuvre than most other theoretical approaches. 
Without departing from traditionally intergovernmentalist accounts of international co-
operation, LI stretches both ends of the governance spectrum. By doing so, it creates 
room for acknowledging the role of supranational actors on one side, and the 
importance of domestic ones on the other.  Undoubtedly, the extent to which, according 
to Moravcsik, such actors are involved in EU-level decision making is limited. 
Domestic interests are, at best, mediated by the time they reach the international 
context. States are still by and large successful in their gate-keeping role. Yet, LI goes 
some way in overcoming the rigidity of traditional state-centred theories. It does so by 
accepting the seminal fact that, within the European decision-making process, actors 
other than national governments may perform considerable functions.  
This puts Moravcsik in the enviable position of being able to admit that ‘it would 
be absurd to assume, for example, that supranational officials do not matter in daily 
decisions’ (Moravcsik, 1995: 612) without sounding incoherent. Even if persuaded of 
the ‘international regime’ nature of the Community, Moravcsik does not rule out the 
possibility that its institutions could help intergovernmental negotiations even ‘by 
proposing potential agreements’ (Moravcsik, 1993: 497, emphasis added). At the lower 
end not only does Moravcsik espouse a liberal and pluralist approach to national 
preference formation, he also establishes a strong, direct link between the intensity of 
domestic preferences and the outcome of intergovernmental negotiations. Other 
variables (such as those traditionally mentioned in negotiation analysis) being the same, 
the vigour with which domestic groups promote a certain position is likely to have a 
decisive impact on the final result of an international negotiation. This is because the 
national negotiator will feel particularly constrained when bargaining with its 
counterparts. This, in turn, is likely to help push the bargain towards an outcome close 
to that desired by the domestic group that initially expressed the preference.