5
Introduction
The compatibility between Islamic movements, Islamic parties and democracy has been
one of the most controversial issues concerning Middle East and Arab states in the past years,
further discussed after the undisputed predominance of Hezbollah in Lebanon after 2006 and
the Hamas victory of January 2006 in Gaza. The debate regarding the participation of these
movements in the elections and in the institutional political life of the Arab states, and the
question about whether or not Islam is intrinsically compatible with democratic values and
human rights has been at the centre of a even harsher academic quarrel, related to the fact that
the Arab world after the collapse of the Soviet Union is the last region excluded from all the
democratisation waves.
1
Since its creation in 1946, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has been faced with the
presence of a strong Islamic movement which over the years carried a hegemonic and
ambitious social, cultural, economic and, in its last instance, political project. In fact, the
establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1945 by Abdelatif Abu Qura, following the
inspiration of the Egyptian movement created by Hassan el Banna in 1928 marked the starting
point of an organised Islamic discourse that contributed to shaping, creating and maintaining
the Jordanian Islamic identity. The relationship of this movement with the monarchy has been
for the most part collaborative, supporting the regime in exchange for a quite free possibility
of action, mainly in the social and educational fields, which represents the main goals of the
Muslim Brotherhood in the spread of the da'wa. This Jordanian regime-Muslim Brotherhood
relationship constituted a unique case in the regional history of the Arab regimes' relations
with the Islamic movements.
2
During the same years in which the monarchy built a
collaborative relation with the Ikhwan, based on the mutual recognition and legitimisation, the
other Arab regimes were characterised by a politics of harsh repression against the Islamic
movement. The golden age of the regime-Jordanian Brotherhoods' relation can be traced to
1
See Huntington S.P. (1991), Democracy's Third Wave, in “The Journal of Democracy”, Vol. 2 N.2.
2
Concerning the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Haschemite monarchy there is a broad
literature. For example, see Bar S.(June 1998), The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, Data and Analysis, Tel Aviv,
The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Boulby M. (1999), The Muslim Brotherhood
and the Kings of Jordan, 1945-1993, Florida, University of South Florida, Wiktorowicz Q. (2001), The
Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood and State Power in Jordan, Albany, State
University of New York Press and Abu Rumman M. (2007), The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian
Parliamentary Elections: A Passing „Political Setback‟ or Diminished Popularity?, Amman, Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, pp.18-22.
6
the 60's and the 70's, mainly after the Ikhwan's support for the regime in the Black September
internal war against the PLO which took place in the Jordanian Palestinian refugee camps; at
the same time that relations in Egypt and in the Baathist secular Syrian and Iraqi regimes
deteriorated and ended up in repression and massacres. Jordan also became a refuge base for
the Syrian Brotherhood escaping from Syria‟s effort to get rid of the Islamic movement
through massacres, like the Aleppo massacre in 1979 and the Hama in 1982
3
In Jordan the
presence of a common ideological and political enemy, Arab nationalism, mainly from
Nasser‟s increasing influence after 1952, and the leftist, communist and Palestinian nationalist
(mainly PLO) movements, reinforced this alliance and transformed the Islamic movement
into one of the most seriously and truly committed to the regime‟s survival and security. The
Hashemite dynasty's use of the Islamic reference in building its legitimisation - it claims
descent from the Prophet - reinforced the Islamic and Arab identity of Jordan, entrenched in
the Constitution and strengthened by the Ikhwan action. This descent from the Prophet did not
permit the Monarchy to openly and directly repress the Muslim Brotherhoods; on the
contrary, this happened with Nasser‟s military regime and the Syrian Alawite after Hafez al
Hassad's coup d'état, which, for different reasons, did not have an Islamic mainstream source
of legitimacy. The religious source of legitimisation of the regime was reinforced by this
alliance with the Islamic movement, and it worked as a unifying factor in a society
characterised by a high level of fragmentation. In fact, primarily the rift between
Transjordanians and Palestinians, but also the presence of the Circassian and Christian
minorities were potential sources of tensions and divisions. Moreover, the Hashemite's
relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood was characterised by close interpersonal and
familial links between the regime and the most prominent members of the Ikhwan, helping
their cooptation, This process was related to the nature of the social base of the Muslim
Brotherhood, formed by businessmen and rich notables belonging to well known, respected
East Bank families.
4
This multiple combination of factors – the social nature of the
movement, longstanding interpersonal relationships and common social base, common
ideological and political enemies, shared social and political conservatism and Islamic
understanding - made the Ikhwan the only movement allowed to work legally and almost
freely in the Jordanian political environment, and to build strong ties with the regime through
3
Abu Rumman M. (2007), The Muslim Brotherhood in the 2007 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections: A Passing
„Political Setback‟ or Diminished Popularity?, op. cit., p. 20, and Bar S.(June 1998), The Muslim Brotherhood in
Jordan, Data and Analysis, op. cit. p.37.
4
See, inter alia, Hourani H., supervised by (1997), Islamic Movements in Jordan, Amman, Al-Urdun Al-Jadid
Research Center, p. 264.
7
inclusiveness and participation. Prominent members of the Ikhwan were therefore able to
occupy key positions: Ishaq Farhan, for example, the main representative of this co-operative
and co-optative phenomenon, a key figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, was appointed as
Minister of Education in 1970 and Minister of Religious Affairs in 1972; he was President of
the University of Jordan in 1976-78, of the University of Yarmouk in 1978-79, Director of the
Royal Scientific Society in 1975-78 and Member of the National Consultative Council in
1978.
5
Moreover, when the parties were declared outlawed in 1957 after the short experience
of the 1956 freely elected socialist government of Nabulsi, the Muslim Brotherhood was the
only movement allowed to operate, and to extend its influence through the Islamic Charity
Centre, controlling universities, hospitals and charitable societies.
6
In the moments of crisis
that the monarchy faced, for example the 1967 war with Israel and the civil war causing the
expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1970, the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrated to be
strong allies, supportive of the regime. Of course these positive relationships were also
characterised also by some moments of tensions, for example during the 1964 Egyptian-
Jordanian rapprochement within the Arab Summit, in the 1973-74 peace process with Israel
and on the occasion of the rapprochement with Syria in the 80's.
7
Nevertheless, the overall
analysis of the interactions between the movement and the regime shows a close relationship
based on the Muslim Brotherhood's commitment to the building of the Jordanian identity and
to the Hashemite monarchy‟s stability and legitimacy. At the same time, the regime allowed
the Muslim Brotherhood to build a cultural and social hegemony without contrasting their
control over social activities.
Bearing in mind this general collaboration between the Islamic movement and the
Jordanian regime as a fundamental premise is crucial in analysis of the role that the Islamists
played in the political liberalisation process started by the Hashemite Monarchy in 1989. The
Muslim Brotherhood decided to enter into the new open political competition through a
political party, the Islamic Action Front, formally independent from the Jamia'a. The creation
of a political party thus represented the Islamists' willingness to participate in the new
Jordanian political system and in electoral competition. This political actor, created ad hoc as
political branch of the Islamic movement, is the subject of this thesis. The question behind
this research, a general analysis of the Islamic movements and democratisation processes
5
Hourani H.(September 1993), Islamic Action Front Party, Amman, Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center, p. 60.
6
See, inter alia, Bar S.(June 1998), The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, Data and Analysis, op. cit.
7
Wiktorowicz Q. (2001), The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood and State
Power in Jordan, p. 97.
8
involving some Arab states is: does the inclusion of these movements and their consequent
participation lead to their moderation and adherence to democratic rules? In other words, and
in the specific case hereby studied, is the Islamic Action Front as the main political Islamic
actor really committed to the process of political liberalisation?
Nevertheless, it is not possible to understand the interactions between the Islamic party
and the so-called democratisation process without looking at the specificity of the Jordanian
case. Essentialists‟ approaches claiming the inherent compatibility or incompatibility of
political Islam with democratic practices and values have dominated the field for many years.
8
This theoretical and methodological vision presupposes Islam as a monolith, naturally
constituted and unchanged, unhistorical and immutable. This approach does not consider the
existence of multiple interpretations of Islam and of the significant differences among them,
depending also on the different social, economical and cultural context in which they were
formulated, and on different epistemological influences. Moreover, the essentialist vision of
Islam and of Islamic movements, at the basis of the Orientalist discourse, neglects to analyse
this phenomenon as rooted in and shaped by an historical context, and influenced by
particular economical, social, political and cultural factors. At the same time, socio-economic
factors alone cannot explain the importance of ideologies, of identities and of religion in the
structure of mobilisation, in the formation and in the activities of these movements, bearing in
mind the double nature, both ideational and material of those phenomena. The Islamic
movements thus cannot be analysed without considering them as a social and political
construction, a continuous product of interactions between material objective factors and
ideas and identities. The integrated approach, a comparative historical and interpretative
understanding of these movements theorised by Salwa Ismail is the epistemological base of
the analysis of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front and of the role played in the Jordanian
political liberalisation.
9
Therefore, an analysis of the specific Jordanian context in which this
process took place is necessary in order to understand the political and socio-economical
conditions in which the Islamic movement acted.
8
See for example the work of Bernard Lewis, or, concerning the analysis of political Islam, the unitary
understanding of the religion made by Esposito and V oll, Esposito J. (1984), Islam and politics, Syracuse,
Syracuse University Press and V oll J. (1994), Islam: continuity and change in the modern world, Syracuse,
Syracuse University Press.
9
Ismail S.(2006), Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism, New York, I.B. Tauris & Co.
9
On the basis of this fundamental premise, the first chapter is devoted to an historical
overview of the phases of the liberalisation process started in 1989, trying to underline the
causes of this transformation of the Jordanian political and institutional life and analysing the
different theories explaining its onset and its evolution. In the second chapter we will
successively focus on the Islamic Action Front as a political party, analysing the evolution of
its structure and of its ideology since its foundation in 1992, and outlining the main phases of
its political life, mainly through the examination of its electoral participation. The third
chapter will study the interaction between the party, the government and the political system
in general within the perspectives of the most important issues shaping this interrelation on
different, but not separated, levels. For example, we will consider the impact of the
international context and the changes in the United States' Middle Eastern policies, of regional
influence and in particular of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict issue, of the consequences of the
regime change from Hussein to Abdallah in 1999 at a national level; we will also focus on the
evolution of internal divisions and on the spread of currents within the IAF and, finally, on the
particular increasingly pivotal role of the Palestinian/Jordanian rift in Jordanian society and
on the related impact of Hamas within the movement. Finally, the last chapter will try to
clarify, on basis of the elements explained, the scope and the role of the IAF in the particular
case of the Jordanian liberalisation process, and how much the latter has influenced the first
and vice versa. The analysis will focus on a selected period of time: from 1989 when, through
the first free elections, the political liberalisation process was started, to 2003, in which
important new international influences played a role with the Iraqi war, and parliamentary
elections were held and saw the participation of the IAF after the 1997 boycott. The latter
temporal limit is due to the need for distance from the object studied, in awareness of the
continuous changes provoked by recent international, regional and internal evolutions.
The need to rethink the mainstream theoretical approaches in the study of the Islamic
parties is clear also in analysing the specificity of the Jordanian case and the need to
contextualise and to interpret the identity and the politics of the Islamic movement without
neglecting its interaction with national, regional and in international factors. The identity of
the party is the result of a constant negotiation of overlapping identities and relations,
continually shaped and transformed. As in the work of Jillian Schwedler, the
inclusion/moderation model is thus more complex and needs a strong analysis of the political,
socio-economic, cultural and ideational context, with the awareness of the impossibility of
10
giving absolute and universal answers.
10
In the Jordanian case, through this study we will see
how much the singularity of the liberalisation process and its incompleteness involve a deep
understanding of which idea of democracy both the main actors, the government and the IAF
are committed to, and how much the ideology is adapted to the political reality in a pragmatic
way, impeding absolute value judgements and accurate predictions.
10
Schwedler J. (2006), Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
11
Chapter One
Historical and Theoretical Analysis of the Jordanian Political Liberalisation Process:
1989-2003
In this chapter I will analyse the political liberalisation process begun in Jordan with the
Parliamentary elections of 1989, trying to understand its causes, its nature, and its
development and its theoretical explanation, in order to study the political context in which
the Islamic Action Front acted. The first two sections will give a brief overview of the
Jordanian history before 1989 and of the Jordanian political system in order to put the
liberalisation process in a historical and political context. The third section concerns a
historical description of the liberalisation process in itself, from its onset to 2003 elections.
The fourth part will analyse the main phases characterising this process through the internal
and external factors influencing its evolution, the democratisation experiment being a result of
“regime decisions - a calculation of costs and benefits made by leaders facing a myriad of
domestic, regional and international pressures in the political and economic realms.”
11
The
fifth part will finally review the main theoretical explanations of the onset and evolution of
the process: the theory relying on rentier-state explanations and the analysis of the regime‟s
survival strategy explaining how Jordan experienced a so-called “defensive democratisation”.
1) The Historical Background of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
12
The Transjordanian British mandate established in 1921 was declared a fully independent
state, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in 1946, with King Abdallah - appointed by Great
Britain as the ruler of the mandate - as its King. After joining Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq
in the 1948 war against the establishment of Israel, in 1949 Jordan gained control over large
portions of the West Bank and Jordan River, leading to the annexation of the West Bank in
1950. Palestinian West Bankers became full Jordanian citizens with an equal representation in
the Chamber of Deputies, half of whose seats were specifically established for and reserved to
them. After the assassination of Abdallah in 1951, his son Talal came into power; in 1952 he
11
Gause III G.F., “Regional Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalisation in the Arab World”, in Brynen
R., Korany B.and Noble P. (eds.) (1995), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World,
Vol. 1, London, Lynne Rienner, p. 283.
12
For this paragraph I refer mainly to Brynen R., Korany B. and Noble P. (eds.) (1998), Political
Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World,:Volume 2, Comparative Experiences, London, Lynne
Rienner, Schwedler J. (2006), Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen, op. cit. and Rath
K. (July 1994), The Process of Democratisation in Jordan, in “Middle Eastern Studies”, Vol. 30, N. 3.
12
promulgated the Jordanian Constitution, currently still effective. However, Talal was removed
from the crown officially because he was afflicted with mental illness, and his son Hussein
therefore came to power in 1953. Following the growing influence all over the Arab world of
Arab nationalism as dominant ideology, 1956 elections produced a Chamber dominated by
opposition parties and brought to power a leftist-nationalist government coalition led by the
National Socialist Sulayman Nabulsi. This coalition did not last long for differences mainly
over the liberal reforms carried out by the cabinet and over foreign policy issues; Nabulsi thus
resigned in 1957. After the echec- from the regime point of view - of the Nabulsi liberal
experiment, the King banned the parties and declared martial law, fearing the possibility of
another opposition victory. The Muslim Brotherhood, having obtained legal status in 1953
13
,
was at this point the only movement allowed to participate informally in political life by co-
opting various governmental positions and through its social activity, on the basis of the
opposition, shared with the regime, to Arab nationalism and leftism.
14
As a consequence of the
1967 Six Days war, which led to the loss of the West Bank, the king suspended the
Constitution and the Parliament. The destabilising effect of the war and the consequent influx
of another 300.000 Palestinian refugees contributed to the escalation of the internal crisis and
to its apex in the 1970 “Black September” civil war, fought between the regime and the
Palestinian resistance dominating the refugees' camps.
15
The internal crisis and the consequent
authoritarianism produced by the fear of further instability augmented in 1974 with the Rabat
Arab Summit declaration, in which the PLO was recognised as the sole legitimate Palestinian
representative; as a consequence, the Parliament was suspended altogether and in 1978 an
appointed Consultative Council was established, with a purely consultative function.
16
The
80's economic crises due to the contraction of oil prices and the successive regional
developments, mainly the 1988 Intifada and the Algiers declaration, were the bases for the
King‟s decision to reactivate Parliament in 1984 and to start a process of political
liberalisation.
13
Hourani H. (1993), Islamic Action Front Party, op. cit. p. 10.
14
For the analysis of the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hascemite Monarchy, see, inter
alia, Bar S. (June 1998), The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, Data and Analysis, op. cit., Boulby M. (1999),
The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945-1993, op. cit. and Wiktorowicz Q. (2001), The
Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood and State Power in Jordan, op. cit.
15
Schwedler J. (2006), Faith in moderation: Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen, op. cit., p. 43.
16
Brynen R., Korany B. and Noble P. (1998), eds., Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab
World,:Volume 2, op. cit., p. 74.
13
2) The Characteristics of the Jordanian Political System
The basic framework: the 1952 Constitution and the 1991 National Charter.
The Constitution, approved the 1
st
January 1952 by King Talal and amended respectively
in 1974, 1976 and 1984,
17
is the main basis of the Jordanian political system. Article 1 of the
Constitution defines the nature of the Jordanian state and of its governmental system, stating
that “The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is an independent sovereign Arab State. It is
indivisible and inalienable and no part of it may be ceded. The people of Jordan are a part of
the Arab Nation, and its system of government is parliamentary with a hereditary
monarchy”.
18
The source of power, according to Chapter 1, is the Nation, which means the
Jordanian people. This Chapter also applies the principle of separation of powers, although all
three powers, at the last instance, rely on the King
19
: the Legislative is vested in the National
Assembly (Senate and Chamber of Deputies) and in the King (Art 25); the Executive power is
vested in the King, who exercises it through his Ministers (Art. 26); the Judicial power is
exercised by the courts of law in their varying types and degrees. However, all judgements
shall be given in accordance with the law and pronounced in the name of the King (Art. 27).
20
The Second Chapter includes the proclamation and protection of several basic rights and
liberties enjoyed by the citizens; nevertheless, the exercise of these rights and liberties is
linked to the provisions of laws in force, which can overlook them completely.
21
The National Charter, approved in June 1991, does not have the same power or binding
commitment of the Constitutions and of the laws in force, but it establishes the founding
principle for the re-regulation of political life in Jordan. It defines the political life, on the
basis of pluralism. It defines, furthermore, the “cultural, ideological, social and political
principles and concepts of the Jordanian political system in a manner compatible with the
domestic democratic changes and the changing factors of the era”.
22
17
Baaklini A., Guilain D. and Springboard R. (1999), Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of
Democratic Institutions, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, p. 76.
18
Hourani H., Dabbas H., Power-Stevens M. (1995), Who's who in the Jordanian Parliament: 1993-1997,
Amman, Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center, p. 12.
19
Ibidem.
20
The Constitution of the Hascemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1
st
January 1952.
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html
21
Hourani H., Dabbas H., Power-Stevens M.(1995), Who's who in the Jordanian Parliament: 1993-1997, op.
cit., p. 17.
22
Ibidem, p. 18. See also The Jordanian National Charter, December 1990,
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/charter-national.html
14
The Role of Parliament and Relationship with the Executive
The National Assembly should determine the Jordanian system of government, because
Jordan, according to the Constitution, is a “Parliamentary, hereditary monarchy”. Following
the constitutional framework, the Parliament should perform two important functions:
legislative power and political control over the government.
23
Referring to the first, no bill
coming from the executive becomes law without being submitted to the Chamber, which has
the power to amend or reject it (Art. 91). The ultimate power to enforce the law belongs to the
King, who signs the laws and can veto legislation approved by the Chamber within six
months, referring it back to the House. Nevertheless, the Chamber can override this veto with
a two-thirds majority (Art 93). Concerning political control, the Prime Minister is chosen and
appointed by the King, but he/she and the cabinet need a confidence vote from the Lower
House before taking office within one month of government formation, after submitting its
program (Art 54). The Council of Ministers, or an individual Minister, must resign if two-
thirds of the Chamber of Deputies decides so through a no-confidence vote. According to the
Constitutions, the Lower House also detains some control of the traditional prerogatives of the
executive, for example foreign policy, through the power to ratify treaties.
24
However, in
political practice, the King holds - and effectively uses - the ultimate power to dissolve
Parliament, to appoint and dismiss Cabinet and Ministers, and to call elections.
25
The Party System
The right to form societies and political parties was established by the Constitution
through Articles 15 and 16.
26
The opposition parties animating Jordanian political life in the
50's were the National Socialist Party, the Baath and the Communist Party.
27
The Liberation
Party (Hizb al-Tahrir), created in 1952 with an Islamist inspiration was outlawed at its
formation because it did not recognise the Constitution and wanted to replace the monarchy
with an Islamic state.
28
However, after the suspension of the 1955 Party Law in 1957, the
suspension of elections in 1967 and the dissolution of the Parliament in 1974, Jordanian
political and party life was frozen and the political parties were banned. The parties were
23
Ibidem, p. 20.
24
Baaklini A., Guilain D. and Springboard R., 1999, op. cit., p. 139 and Brynen R.(Mar 1992), Economic Crisis
and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: the case of Jordan, “Canadian Journal of Political
Science”, V ol.25, n.1, p. 76.
25
Rath K., July 1994, op. cit. p. 532.
26
Ibidem.
27
Baaklini A., Guilain D. and Springboard R., 1999, ibidem.
28
Schwedler J., 2006, op. cit., p. 200.
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