The influence of civilian advisors on american nuclear policies, 1945-1963

INTRODUCTION Any military commander who's honest with himself will admit that he has 
made mistakes in the application of military power. He's killed people, 
unnecessarily; his own troops or other troops, through mistakes, through 
errors of judgment. A hundred, or a thousand, or tens of thousands, maybe 
even a hundred thousand, but he hasn't destroyed nations... and the 
conventional wisdom is 'don't make the same mistake twice, learn from your 
mistakes'. And we all do. Maybe we make the same mistake three times, but 
hopefully not four or five.
There will be no learning period with nuclear weapons. You make one 
mistake and you're gonna destroy nations.
Robert McNamara 1
The atomic bombs that the United States dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 
August 6 and August 9, 1945 had not the sole consequence of definitively ending World 
War II, but also propelled the world into a new era. In time, nuclear weapons 
dramatically changed the way great power confrontations would be handled. The first 
years of the Nuclear era witnessed a preponderance of the classic military techniques 
applied to nuclear weapons 2
. The Doctrine of strategic bombardment applied to nuclear 
weapons would quickly lead the United States to develop war plans envisioning a level 
of destructiveness without precedent.
3
 Soon enough, the political establishment and to 
some extent the military started to understand that nuclear weapons made military 
victory impossible. In a hypothetical nuclear confrontation, both adversaries could only 
1 Robert McNamara, “The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara”, 
documentary film directed by Errol Morris, Sony Pictures Classics
2 See Freedman, Lawrence (1981), The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2. ed. - Basingstoke ; London : 
MacMillan in association with the International institute for strategic studies (IISS), 22-33
3 See Rosenberg, David Alan (1983), The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American 
Strategy, 1945-1960, International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring, 1983), pp. 3-71
3
achieve limited political goals, allowing space only for political victory.
4
 By the early 
1960s, the Cold War confrontation reached a stage were both adversaries possessed 
immensely powerful weapons, but were mutually vulnerable to each other's attack. This 
stage of nuclear confrontation took the somehow unfortunate name of  MAD – Mutual 
Assured Destruction 5
.
The process leading from Hiroshima and Nagasaki to MAD embodies both the history 
of the Cold War – and therefore international relations – and the history of American 
policy-making on nuclear weapons. In this dissertation, I focus on the role of “civilian 
advisors” in shaping American nuclear policies. The term “civilian advisors” refers to 
all the people that offered their counsel or their services in correlation with nuclear 
weapons to the administration, but that were neither military professionals nor elected 
officials. This category includes, for example, scientists, businessmen, administrators 
and private citizens. The origins of their influence on nuclear policies can be traced 
back to the Wartime Manhattan Project, the massive American effort towards the 
development of a nuclear bomb. 
The three-year-long effort of the Manhattan Project that culminated in the delivery of a 
functional atomic bomb had mobilized an array of civilians, mostly scientists, to work 
on the construction of the bomb. These civilians soon became aware of the 
revolutionary nature of the work they were doing. They realized that atomic weapons 
would have an incredible destructive power and would carry revolutionary changes in a 
number of fields, not only in war-making. They therefore became engaged in a lobbying 
effort to try to advise and influence the Administration's actions regarding nuclear 
energy and atomic weapons. 
The actions of the Manhattan scientists represented the first effort by civilian advisors to 
influence the Government's policy on nuclear weapons. It is unsurprising that this effort 
came from them, as they were the only people outside the military and the highest 
echelons of the Administration to be aware of the atomic project. Slowly but steadily, 
information about nuclear power and its military and civilian applications became 
available. Therefore, a great number of civilians, not only scientists, became interested 
in nuclear issues and decided to offer their contribution to the Administration. Whether 
by informal advice or formal participation in governmental institutions, civilian advisors 
4 See Jervis, Robert (1989), The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, Ithaca and London : Cornell 
University Press,1-45
5 On MAD, see Jervis (1989), op. cit., 74-106
4
were at the forefront in the formulation of nuclear policies throughout the Nuclear era.
This dissertation will try to analyze the role of these advisors during the first three 
Administrations of the Nuclear Era – namely the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy 
Administrations. This time-frame covers the events leading from the use of the first 
nuclear bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 to the signing of the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty in August 1963. There are four major reasons to justify the decision to limit the 
analysis to these 18 years. These reasons are inextricably linked to events and choices 
occurred during the Kennedy Administration:
1. Kennedy brought civilian advice from the sidelines of Government directly to 
the center of decision-making. The appointment of Robert McNamara and others 
to central positions of power within the administration took the relationship 
between policy-making and civilian advisors to a whole other level than his 
predecessors, and Kennedy's example will be followed by his successors;
2. The 1963 Test Ban Treaty was the first meaningful agreement between the 
superpowers on the limitation of the use of nuclear weapons. While some 
authors argue that the LTBT was a missed opportunity for détente 6
, I tend to 
consider this treaty as the first stepping stone into a new era of East-West 
relations;
3. The Cold War confrontation changed its focus from military power to 
ideological influence. Kennedy's “New Frontier” signaled that the United States 
had decided to respond to Soviet efforts in the third world by engaging in 
limited, local and delegate warfare to counter Soviet ideological expansion. 
American involvement in Laos and  Vietnam, and the Bay of Pigs fiasco are 
evidence of this new effort. The war was again to be fought on the battleground;
4.The Cuban missile crisis led the world to the brink of nuclear war and utter 
destruction. Consequently, both the United States and the Soviet Union became 
more conscious about the risks of nuclear warfare and about the need to avoid a 
nuclear escalation at any cost.
The analysis will revolve around some of the major turning points in the history of 
nuclear weapons. In dealing with the Truman Administration, we will describe the 
administration's efforts to gain international control of atomic energy and the role of the 
6 See Mastny, Vojtech (2008), The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: A Missed Opportunity for Dètente?, 
Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 10, Number 1, Winter 2008, 3-25
5
Manhattan scientists in proposing it. We will see how internal control of atomic energy 
was delegated to a civilian rather than military authority and how this affected policy-
making thereafter. We will then analyze the American reaction to the loss of their atomic 
monopoly in 1949 and the controversial decision to proceed with the development and 
testing of the thermonuclear bomb. During the Eisenhower administration, we will see 
how new efforts towards and international agreement on nuclear weapons originated 
from civilian advisors, but were sidetracked to suit the interests of some members of the 
Administration. We will then examine the infamous Oppenheimer hearing and its 
consequences on scientific advice. Finally, we will see how the technological evolution 
of the American nuclear arsenal was lead by civilian advisors. Regarding Kennedy, we 
will explore the origins of the new strategy of flexible response and investigate the 
process that led to the signing of the LTBT.
In all of these events, the analysis will focus first on the decision-making process that 
led to important policy choices, and then on the consequences of these choices on the 
international environment of the Cold War. I will make substantial use of primary 
sources, such as the documents collected in Foreign Relations of the United States, 
unclassified documents available on-line and personal accounts of the persons involved. 
Where possible, I will use quotations to convey the original sense of the words as they 
were intended by the authors. Lastly, I also referred to the works of qualified scholars to 
address interpretative issues. 
Obviously, the scope of this work required difficult choices on which issues should be 
included and which should not. My goal is not that of offering a complete and thorough 
analysis of the role of every civilian advisor, but to analyze single relevant episodes and 
highlight the influence civilian advisors have had. In the conclusions, I will offer a 
tentative categorization of the relationship of each President to civilian advice. I will 
also try to explain the nature and the reasons for the changes that incurred in the 
relationship between civilian advisors and policy-making in the 18 years I examined.
6
CHAPTER 1: 
THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION When Harry S. Truman succeeded Franklin Delano Roosevelt and became the 33
rd 
President of the United States of America, he had very limited knowledge of the 
existence of the atomic bomb project. After the first cabinet meeting, the new President 
was approached by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, who asked to speak with him 
urgently. Stimson felt he had to inform him of  “an immense project... looking to the 
development of a new explosive of almost unbelievable power”; Truman already knew 
that “something unusually important was brewing in our war plants”: when he was  the 
Chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, he 
was approached by Stimson and asked not to investigate certain plants were “the 
greatest project in the history of the world” was underway 1
. Nonetheless, Stimson's 
briefing, along with Byrnes' the next day, left the President puzzled.
Only two weeks later, on April 25, did the President receive a full briefing on the matter 
by Secretary of War Stimson and General Leslie R. Groves, the director of the 
Manhattan Project. The Secretary of War stated that “w ithin four months we shall in all 
probability have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in human history, one 
bomb of which could destroy a whole city.” Furthermore, he described a series of 
implications the development of the A-bomb would have on national and international 
politics. First of all, Stimson warned that the imminent possession of the atomic weapon 
had to be considered a momentary advantage, since other nations would sooner or later 
be willing and able to build one of their own – Russia above all. Second, he noted how 
“the question of sharing it [the A-bomb] with other nations and, if so shared, upon what 
terms, becomes a primary question of our foreign relations”; similarly, any approach to 
a world peace organization such as the United Nations could not disregard the role of 
1 Truman, Harry S. (1955), Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Vol. 1: Year of Decisions, Garden City : 
Doubleday & Company, p. 10
7
atomic weapons, their destructiveness and the need to control them in the interest of 
peace. Third, Stimson recognized that the development of the bomb by the United 
States “has placed a certain moral responsibility upon us” and that the way the US 
would handle it could either bring the world to disaster or save civilization.
2
The points made in Stimson's April 25
th  briefing to the President provided a very sound 
analysis of the situation the United States faced and described the conflicting issues that 
Truman would have to deal with throughout his two terms: the need felt by the scientific 
community to share information about atomic energy; the arms race that could develop 
with the Russians; the possibility to stop this arms race through an international 
arrangement of some sort and the implications that the President's choices would have 
not only on American people, but on civilization as a whole.
During Truman's eight years in office, the United States faced four fundamental  turning 
points that decisively shaped American policy towards the atomic bomb: 1) The quest 
for international control and the failure of the Baruch Plan; 2) The struggle for domestic 
legislation; 3) The H-Bomb decision and the policy review resulting in NSC-68 and 4) 
The decision to test the H-bomb. Each one of these turning points saw the intervention 
of civilian advisors as proponents of policy or as in opposition to it.
1.1  BIRTH AND DEMISE OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL The Struggle for international control started during the Roosevelt Administration and 
was tightly intertwined with the issue of the relationship of the United States with their 
allies. Roosevelt had decided early on to exclude the Russians from participation in – 
and even knowledge about – the whole Manhattan project. The relationship with them 
was already uneasy in 1941: the Soviet position in the war and their role as potential 
liberators of Europe from the Nazi regime clashed with the signing of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact two years earlier. Moreover, Stalin's voluble personality and the 
dictatorial nature of his government could not reassure Roosevelt about the future 
intentions of the Soviet dictator, especially if he could gain access to a weapon of mass 
2 Memorandum discussed with the President, April 25, 1945, from Stimson's Diary, accessed on 
http://www.doug-long.com/stim425.html
8
destruction. On the other hand, Roosevelt decided to keep a tighter relationship with 
Great Britain and Canada. The United States carried on a policy of complete 
interchange of information about nuclear research with Great Britain up until  December 
27, 1942, when word reached Roosevelt of a loosely framed agreement between Great 
Britain and the Soviet Union that called for the exchange of new weapons. This event 
embittered Anglo-American relations and also strengthened the position of two of 
Roosevelt's most important advisers on atomic matters: Vannevar Bush and James B. 
Conant.
Vannevar Bush, director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) 
and President of the Carnegie Foundation, had been the driving force responsible for the 
development of the atomic project. Bush had convinced Roosevelt to invest on atomic 
energy research and the potential military uses of it 3
; he was therefore considered “the 
leading administrator of science in the country” 4
, the liaison between the scientific 
community and the decision-making levels of government together with his close 
colleague James B. Conant, President of Harvard University and director of the National 
Defense Research Committee (NDRC). 
Bush and Conant “did not want British industry to benefit from American nuclear 
research and feared that Roosevelt might be exceeding his constitutional authority by 
sharing those secrets that the British could exploit only after the end of the war” 5
. 
Reason for this was that it would have been easier to maintain secrecy if only the 
information strictly necessary for nuclear materials’ basic production were shared. All 
the information regarding the design of the bomb, then, would be kept secret 6
. 
The December 28, 1942 decision  to limit scientific interchange seemed to favor the 
Bush-Conant position. However,  the scientists were soon to be disappointed by the 
signing of the Quebec Agreement on August 19, 1943, that mandated yet again a policy 
of full interchange of technology between the three signatories, the U.S., Great Britain 
and Canada, and the continuation of the secrecy policy towards the Soviet Union. After 
3 On Bush's role, see Bundy, McGeorge (1990), Danger and survival : choices about the bomb in the 
first fifty years, New York : Vintage books, p. 38-45 and Hewlett, Richard G. and Oscar E. Anderson 
(1962), A History of the Atomic Energy Commission, Vol. 1: The New World: 1939/1946, University 
Park : Pennsylvania State university press, p. 24
4 Lilienthal, David E. (1964), The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol. II: The Atomic Energy Years, 
Harper & Rowe, 14
5 Bernstein, Barton J. (1974), The Quest for security: American Foreign Policy and International 
Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946, The Journal of American History, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Mar., 1974), 
1005
6 Hewlett and Anderson (1962), op. cit., 268
9
the signing of the agreement, Bush and Conant were excluded from the governmental 
decision-making process and were precluded direct access to the President. 
Consequently, no presidential advisor was left to push for a long-term approach to 
nuclear matters, while Roosevelt focused only on the war effort and on how to use the 
Bomb effectively.
The first person to bring Roosevelt's attention back to postwar planning was 
distinguished Nobel laureate in physics Niels Bohr, who approached Churchill and 
Roosevelt between May and August 1944 with a plan to  reveal the project of the bomb 
to Stalin and start negotiations on international control. Although Roosevelt expressed 
interest in the Plan in a meeting with the scientist, he actually moved towards a firmer 
Anglo-American nuclear monopoly.
7
 Bohr's plan was probably too ambitious to have 
any possibility of being accepted, but the rationale behind his idea was appealing to 
Bush and Conant, who were also thinking that an overture to the Russians was 
necessary. Since they had had no access to the President in the preceding year, they 
decided to change their approach strategy: instead of reaching out directly to the 
President, they would try to influence  Secretary of War Stimson by drafting 
memoranda for him, with the ultimate goal of convincing him to support their view in 
the highest echelons of government. 
The new Bush-Conant strategy bore the first fruits during Stimson's meeting with 
Roosevelt on March 15, 1945. During this meeting, which happened to be the last time 
Stimson ever saw the President, the Secretary of War had the chance to illustrate the 
timetable for the bomb and point out how a decision about the future of atomic energy 
had to be made as soon as possible. Stimson argued that there were two schools of 
thought on the matter. The first one favored continuation of secrecy and an attempt by 
the U.S. and Great Britain at retaining a monopoly on nuclear weapons; The other called 
for free interchange of scientific information based on the internationalization of nuclear 
weapons. Roosevelt agreed with Stimson's analysis, yet failed to respond to it 8
; it was a 
partial victory for Bush and Conant, but it was a short lived one: Roosevelt died few 
weeks later, on April 12, 1945, apparently leaving the two scientists at the starting point 
again.
7 Bernstein (1974), op. cit., 1006-1007
8 Hewlett and Anderson (1962), op. cit., 340 
10
Truman's installation as the new President did not, in fact, interrupt Bush and Conant's 
initiative. As recalled before, Stimson briefed the new President on April 25, 1945 
pointing out the key questions raised by atomic energy. Truman appreciated the analysis 
offered by the Secretary of War, but also appreciated the position held by another 
member of his cabinet, the soon to become secretary of state Byrnes, who thought that 
the bomb could “put us in a position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war” 9
. 
Hence a tension arose between two different approaches inside the administration: on 
one side, Stimson's ideas about international control and the moral responsibility of the 
United States; on the other, Byrnes' proposal to use atomic diplomacy to gain an 
advantage in postwar negotiations. Considering these different points of view, Truman 
decided to endorse Stimson's proposal to establish an Interim committee that would 
study “temporary war controls and... postwar research, development and controls” 10
.
The Committee, chaired by Stimson himself, also included George Harrison, an 
assistant to the Secretary of War; Conant; Bush; Karl Compton, president of MIT; Ralph 
Bard, undersecretary of the navy; William L. Clayton, undersecretary of state; and 
James F. Byrnes, special representative to the President and soon to become secretary of 
state. The Committee immediately decided to nominate an advisory scientific Panel 
composed of J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Los Alamos laboratory; Arthur 
Compton, director of the Chicago Metallurgic Laboratory; Ernest Lawrence; and Enrico 
Fermi.
The issues discussed by the Interim committee were essentially four
11
:
1. The possible use of the atomic bomb against Japan;
2. The decision to inform the Soviet Union;
3. Domestic legislation;
4.Possible measures of international control.
The advisability of informing the Soviet Union and the possibility of devising measures 
of International control were tightly related issues. They first surfaced during the May 
18 meeting, as the Committee discussed the Bush-Conant estimates on the time needed 
by the Soviet Union to catch up on the U.S. and build a bomb on their own. The 
scientists argued that three to four years would have been sufficient for the Soviets to 
9 Truman (1955), op. cit., 87
10 Stimson Diary, April 25, quoted in Bernstein (1974), op. cit., 1011
11 See Editorial Note, Foreign relations of the United States: diplomatic papers, 1945, Vol. II, General : 
political and economic matters, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967 (hereafter, FRUS with 
appropriate year, volume, and page numbers), 11-12
11
catch up, while General Groves considered twenty years a more realistic figure.
12
 If the 
Soviet Union was lagging far behind, as suggested by Groves, there would be no 
incentive to reveal any information to the Soviets; on the other hand, if Moscow was 
only a couple of years away from their own bomb, an effort towards Soviet-American 
cooperation had to be taken into consideration. The Committee's decision to trust 
General Groves' estimates, rather than Bush and Conant's, put a momentary halt to any 
proposal to approach the Russians.
13
The issue resurfaced on May 31, when the advisory scientific panel was invited to 
attend the Interim Committee meeting. The discussion initially focused on the 
consequences of the use of an atomic weapon during the war and the subsequent issue 
of maintaining secrecy about its development. Arthur Compton reported that “the 
members of the Scientific Panel were unanimous in the opinion that so many persons 
already knew about the wartime atomic studies that soon after the war it would be 
common knowledge that nuclear energy could be released and that it could not be long 
before an atomic explosion would somewhere be tried”.
14
Oppenheimer took the opportunity to propose once again  free interchange of 
information with other nations, in order to create a free and co-operative international 
community of scientists. He was convinced that the Americans were prejudging the 
Soviet attitude and that cooperation with the Russians was possible. Byrnes intervened 
resolutely at this point, arguing that the greatest risk for the U.S. was that if the Russians 
were informed, Stalin would ask to join the partnership. He insisted that the only 
possible strategy was to push research and production and make sure the U.S. stayed 
ahead.
15
  
The logical consequence of the Committee's discussions was the recommendation 
delivered June 6 to the President that no information should be disclosed to the Russians 
until the first bomb was dropped. Moreover, a scantily framed proposal for international 
control was presented, calling for an international control committee that would inspect 
nuclear plants all over the world and ensure transparency of each Country's research and 
facilities.
16
 The recommendation reflected Stimson's and Byrnes' persistent wariness 
12 Hewlett  and Anderson (1962), op. cit., 354 
13 Bernstein (1974), op. cit., 1011
14 Compton, Arthur H. (1956), Atomic Quest: a personal narrative, London : Oxford university press, 
237
15 Hewlett and Anderson (1962), op. cit., 357
16 Ibid., 360-361
12
about Stalin's intentions, while basically ignoring the scientists' point of view.
The Committee's decision was soon challenged by a report drafted by a group of 
scientists working at the Chicago Metallurgical Project known as the Franck Report. 
The scientists' argument rested on two propositions:
17
1. Maintaining secrecy about scientific information and controlling the supply of 
raw materials would not stop a nuclear arms race;
2. When such an arms race would occur – that is, as soon as the first nuclear bomb 
is used -  the United States would be at a disadvantage in comparison to other 
nations whose population and industry were less centralized.
The consequence of these propositions provided that the only hope to avoid an arms 
race lied in International control. To achieve this, though, the United States would have 
to renounce the direct military use of nuclear weapons:
the military advantages and the saving of American lives, achieved by the sudden 
use of atomic bombs against Japan, may be outweighed by the ensuing loss of 
confidence and wave of horror and repulsion, sweeping over the rest of the world, 
and perhaps dividing even the public opinion at home. From this point of view a 
demonstration of the new weapon may best be made before the eyes of 
representatives of all United Nations, on the desert or a barren island.
18
The Report was submitted to Arthur Compton on June 11 and was in turn discussed by 
the members of the scientific Panel. The Report never reached the Interim Committee 
directly and never received the careful consideration it required 19
. However, Compton 
got a chance to present its content to the Committee on June 21, but was met by 
skepticism. Regarding the proposal of a demonstrative strike, the scientific panel 
declared that they could “propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to 
the war” and could “see no acceptable alternative to direct military use” 20
; thus the 
Committee reaffirmed the need for a timely and effective strike without warning. 
 On the other hand, the recommendation to inform the allies before using the bomb 
found a more welcoming audience in the scientific Panel and especially in Bush and 
17 Ibid., 366
18 Report of the Committee on Political and Social Problems (Franck Report), June 11, 1945, accessed 
on http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/ManhattanProject/FranckReport.shtml
19 Steiner, Arthur (1975), Baptism of the Atomic scientists, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 
1975, 28
20 Recommendations on the immediate use of nuclear weapons, June 16, 1945, accessed on 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/19.pdf
13
Conant; after a lengthy discussion, the Committee agreed that informing Stalin about 
the A-bomb in the coming Big Three meeting would have been advantageous for the 
United States and might produce Soviet cooperation.
21
Stimson, who had not been present at the June 21 meeting, was readily briefed by 
Harrison on June 26. Stimson in turn briefed the President on the recommendations 
delivered by the Interim Committee, particularly stressing the need to tell Stalin that the 
United States were working on the bomb. 
On July 24 Truman approached Stalin during the Potsdam conference and “casually 
mentioned that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force”. The Russian 
dictator didn't show much interest, probably because he already knew about the bomb 
through his spies 22
, but said “he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make 'good use 
of it against the Japanese' ”.
23
 The exceptionally indirect way in which Truman decided 
to pass this fundamental piece of information to Stalin is puzzling. Scholars 
substantially agree that Truman decided to take the minimal step, revealing only enough 
information to avoid Soviet accusations of being non-collaborative after the bomb was 
dropped, but failed to take the chance and lay the ground for future cooperation;
24 
Truman's failure to follow Stimson's advice can be considered a missed opportunity to 
start an effort aimed at international control of atomic energy, but it is nonetheless 
doubtful that Stalin would have agreed with it.
August 6 and August 9, 1945 are two dates forever inscribed in human history. The only 
atomic bombs ever used in combat were dropped on the cities of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, causing hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilian casualties and forcing 
Japan to finally surrender. The successful completion and delivery of the atomic bomb 
meant the end of a bloody war that could have been even costlier if US troops were 
forced to invade the Japanese mainland, but it also meant that a wartime project now 
had to find its peacetime role. The future of the atomic bomb was now the present and 
the administration had no plan about peacetime control. Thus a new sense of urgency 
arose in the members of the Administration to develop a coherent strategy to deal with 
the issue.
21 Hewlett and Anderson (1962), op. cit., 369
22 Bundy (1990), op. cit., 124
23 Truman (1955),  op. cit., 416
24 Very similar evaluations are presented by Bundy (1990), op. cit., 123-124; Hewlett and Anderson 
(1962), op. cit., 394; and Bernstein (1974), op. cit., 1014
14