5
Introduction
Down the centuries Georgia or its precursor kindred political units were always in vital
interests of the surrounding empires because of the country’s geopolitical situation. The
south Caucasian region is situated on the crossroad of Europe and Asia that was always
characterized by the network of trade routes and the aspirations of great empires to catch
and control them for their own interests. Hence, for Georgia it was often very difficult to
save its own independence and territorial integrity. In doing so the country had to have
political firmness and unanimity both in foreign affairs and in internal environment. But it
has always been a very sensitive question for Georgian statehood because the country in
most of times was too weak and undefended against the strong enemies and, on the other
hand, there was mostly a problem of orientation inside the country – Georgia is always
characterized by the diversity of fractions having absolutely different orientations
regarding foreign political course of the country. This is the case even today.
Political unification of Georgia began in the second half of the 10
th
century and its
summit was reached in 12
th
and in the first quarter of the 13
th
century. This period is
considered “The Golden Age” of Georgian history realized, in particular, by King David
IV the Builder (1089-1125) and King Tamar (1184-1213). From the middle of 13
th
century
in Georgia’s history the decadence began to dominate. The Mongol Empire invaded and
conquered Georgia for a century. In the next centuries the Ottoman and Persian empires
contested for possessing Georgian territories; in such circumstances country was divided in
small kingdoms and principalities. The worst was the fact that these kings and princes had
endless struggles with one another that made the country much weaker and attackable.
From the beginning of the 17
th
century Georgian kings and princes began to contact to
Russian tsars in order to overcome a heavy yoke of Muslim empires. In this case, one of
the most important connecting thread was religion – Orthodoxy – because the heads of
Georgian principalities thought that “the Third Rome” was interested in defeating and
banishing these Empires, especially the Ottomans, from the Caucasus. But the reality was
absolutely different. Maybe Russia wanted to do this, but it did not have the strength and
possibility to realize it. And in such a context, by the end of the 18
th
century, greater
Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti under King Erekle II signed the Treaty of Georgievsk
6
with Russia in 1783. The treaty provided Russian protectorate of Georgia that ensured
Georgia's territorial integrity and the continual reign of Bagrationi dynasty; this gave some
advantages to this kingdom in external relations. By this, Georgia has overcome every
form of subordination to Persia (which had been the suzerain of most of Georgia for
centuries) or any other state, and every new Georgian monarch would request for the
authorization by the Russian tsar of his own throne.
During the 19
th
century, various Georgian kingdoms and principalities progressively
found themselves under Russian domination that deteriorated over the time. For more than
a century, there have been many rebellions in these territories against Russian rule. The
greatest problems were efforts to eradicate every Georgian element and to spread
russification. By the end of the century this fight against Russian imperialism became far
acuter and in the beginning of the following century Georgia became one of the places
where revolutionary movements gathered power.
From the beginning of the 20
th
century, the situation of the Russian Tsarist Empire
deteriorated that was accompanied by revolutionary activities in its provinces. The First
World War was found collapsing for Russian Empire because the country had
backwardness because of agricultural economy and the expenses were huge. In 1917,
Russian Empire was obliged to withdraw from the War and to look after its internal
problems. This fact gave an opportunity to conquered nations and countries to fight for
their independence more actively because now this goal seemed much more realistic.
Thanks to these circumstances, in April 1918 the Federative Republic of Transcaucasia
was created and in May of the same year Georgia declared its independence.
It should be noted that Transcaucasia had been famous for its natural resources for
centuries. A considerable mining industry developed in Tbilisi and Batumi at the turn of
the century. Most important of all, however, was oil. Baku remained the richest single
oilfield in the world and was invaluable for the entire Russian economy. During the last
years before the First World War most of the eight million tons of oil produced in Baku
was consumed in Russia and only 15% was pumped through the pipeline to Batumi and
exported to Europe and Middle East.
In this way, after the collapse of the Tsarist Russian Empire and the revolutions in
Russia, on May 26, 1918, Georgia declared independence and began to put its place in
contemporary international system. This period – the ultimate phase of the First World
War, Russia’s withdrawal from the War and her complicated internal state, still raised
“Eastern Question”, and the beginning of formation of new international system – created
7
many obstacles and issued various challenges to new Democratic Republic of Georgia.
Hence, to analyze and rethink the three years of independence more profoundly will
promote to consider the mistakes made by Georgia and the actions or steps taken by Great
European countries and also by neighboring ones. In this respect, it is necessary to have a
look at Georgia’s relations with these European countries in 1918-1921 and, on the other
hand, at the Great Powers’ relations with each other regarding the South Caucasus and, in
particular, Georgia.
The objective of the present thesis is to show those principal political or diplomatic lines
along which the Great Powers made their decisions or took strategies to Democratic
Republic of Georgia in 1918-1921, and the theoretical-conceptual framework that will help
us understand better the character of Georgia’s foreign relations and the reasons why this
country acted in this way or did not in that period. Given these conditions, my final goal is
to show a general picture of the 1918-1921 politics made around the Caucasus (to
understand general context) and Georgia. This politics took its shape and significance in
accordance with Great Powers’ interaction and their political interests to the region. I will
try to offer considerable conclusions regarding activity and failure of Democratic Republic
of Georgia in 1918-1921.
Actuality of the case-study derives from the fact that after collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991 Georgia, in some respect, found herself almost in the same circumstances as she did
in 1918. In particular, to understand today’s problems and to solve them, it is very
important to study political conjuncture around Georgia in 1918-1921, that is, action
principles and interests of the Great Powers, implicit and explicit desires and intentions of
neighboring countries and administrative decision-making of Georgia. These are the issues
echoed from the period of Democratic Republic of Georgia and even in our days call us to
embrace them to face present situation in a better way.
The research methodology regarding our case-study is characterized by its systemic and
specific nature. Such a specific nature is caused by discussing the rich materials that give
us needed information about historical-political context in which Democratic Republic of
Georgia had relations with European countries in 1918-1921. In this spirit, in my present
work I employed very interesting and considerable archive documents as from electronic
base of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy (I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, Sesta
Serie: 1918-1922, Volume III (24 marzo-22 giugno 1919) as from the records of War
Cabinet and Foreign Office of Great Britain (War Cabinet Memoranda). Materials of
Georgian National Archive are very helpful and rich to formulate my points and
8
conclusions about the case-study. In fact, these documents are primary source or firsthand
information of official institutions of Great Powers that have paramount significance for
our studies.
Moreover, to understand Georgia’s political position in those years the memoirs and
personal records or considerations of Georgian statesmen are very useful, for example,
such as “Memoirs: my past” by Noe Zhordania, Chairman of Governmment of Democratic
Republic of Georgia or “Independence of Georgia in 1918-1921 International Politics” by
Zurab Avalishvili, famous Georgian scholar and diplomat; Georgian officials of that period
actively participated in negotiations of Paris Peace Conference and also in negotiations
with particular states. In my studies very helpful are the periodicals (journals, magazines,
newspapers) of 1918-1921 that lead us to understand how country’s foreign affairs were
perceived in Georgian reality. For deepening theoretical base of my studies I also used
various Georgian-speaking sources and works that specifically concern to this question. A
very important collection for our work is “Documents and Materials on Foreign Policy of
the Caucasus and Georgia” that was published in Russian in Tbilisi in 1919. In this
collection you could find various diplomatic acts and correspondences between Georgia
and Great Powers as well between Great European countries and other important ones such
as Russia or Ottoman Empire. Besides, I studied various books, works, magazine articles
and Phd or MA dissertations in English, Georgian and Russian that include very
considerable and interesting information about our case-study. Among these, in particular I
would distinguish the works of a famous researcher of Caucasian and Georgian problems,
Michael Reynolds such as Constellations of the Caucasus: Empires, Peoples, and Faiths
(2016), The Ottoman-Russian Struggle for Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus, 1908-1918,
(2003) etc. As for the last chapter regarding the Georgian Orthodox Church and her
relations I have got valuable suggestions from Simona Merlo’s book Russia e Georgia:
ortodossia, dinamiche imperiali e identità nazionale (1801-1991).
In thesis I will discuss 1918-1921 events consistently and try to show the political
essence of that age toward the Caucasus and Georgia in particular. The work includes six
parts: in chapter I that looks at the Democratic Republic of Georgia and Backing of
Germany in 1918, specifically I will discuss the conditions that led to declaring
independence of Georgia and the aspects of its relationship with Germany. This chapter
will show the importance of German position for the Democratic Republic of Georgia and
its survival. Chapter II regarding Transcaucasian Chessboard in 1919-mid 1920 talks
about the core period of Georgia’s independence and, in particular, its relations with Great
9
Britain. Here the position of the British to Transcaucasia is well illustrated. Chapter III
which looks at The End of the Game: In Political Storm of 1920-1921 makes us aware of
the developments that took place after the British had left Georgia and the latter found
itself alone against Russian forces. Great European Powers’ unfavorable positions to the
Democratic Republic of Georgia and their indifference to its fate led to Russian invasion of
Georgia and made the latter a part of the Soviet Union. Chapter IV is of specific character
and concerns to The Georgian Orthodox Church in the Years of Independence 1918-1921.
The Orthodox Church has always been an important factor in life of the country and in
enhancing national awareness of the Georgian people. Even in this period the Church tried
to be an influential actor in society but this was impossible because of policies by Social-
Democratic government of Georgia. And finally, there is a conclusion that reviews briefly
the Actual Situation and how the research of that period is connected to our present time.
The present thesis is another effort to study and analyze a very turbulent period of
Georgian independence in 1918-1921 and its role and place in European diplomacy of that
time. The thesis does not have a claim of perfection and thereby it may include some
defects and shortcomings. I have tried to display essentially the aspects of country’s
foreign affairs and not those of internal policy. Therefore, I cannot maintain that this short
work is a comprehensive one of Georgia’s presence in those three years. I hope that this
work will make its small contribution to studying Georgian foreign policy or mode of
diplomacy (but very defected) that really lacks basic studies, researches or books and
monographies about this question.
10
Chapter I
The Democratic Republic of Georgia and Backing of Germany in 1918
To understand better all of further arguments and reasoning about foreign affairs and a
place of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in European Powers’ diplomacy of 1918-
1921, first of all I should note here that the Democratic Republic of Georgia was the first
modern creation of Georgian state, besides “it found itself as the first country in the world
where the Social-Democratic Party came to the power” (Keshelava 2000: 72). The fall of
the Russian Tsarist Empire, beginning with the October Revolution in 1917, promoted to
establishment of the Republic. In the same year, according to such a situation, the
Georgian Orthodox Church restored her own autocephaly.
As a rule, the destiny of small countries is related to their relationships with the Great
Powers. From the beginning of the 19
th
century, before Tsarist Russia’s collapse in 1917
the Russian Empire occupied the Caucasus, which found itself in hand of one of the
greatest empires in the world. In the middle of 1917, the Caucasian nations became
independent ones. In 1918 the Caucasus region included four countries: Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Armenia and The Republic of Mountaineers of the North Caucasus. After
declaring its independence, Georgia had to find a political “protector” or “elder brother”
which would support and defend its gained independence in a best way. By spring of 1918,
such a “protector” seemed to be Germany. The latter had serious interests in Near Eastern
and Caucasian regions and also Germany was in opposite camp of Russia (and in opinion
of Georgia, this point would much more reliable Germany to defend a new country against
Russian aggression).
In this chapter, I will basically review the year 1918 from April to December because in
this short part of time the Democratic Republic of Georgia was established, began its
active relations with Germany (in May-November), and this period also witnessed the
defeat and capitulation of Germany by the states of Entente. In fact, from the very
beginning there were many problems and challenges to be faced by new Georgian
government.
11
1.1. The End of Democratic Federation of Transcaucasia and Independence of
Georgia
“Only the Revolution of 1917 provided the means for raising the question of Georgia as
that of public law, but only Bolshevik coup and Great War’s political conjuncture,
following the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, made this question possible to be solved in base of
International Law, and to be declared full independence of Georgia” (Avalishvili 2011:
17)
1
. This is a very precise evaluation of the ongoing situation by Zurab Avalishvili,
famous Georgian scholar and diplomat, who became the chief counselor of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Georgia in 1918. His most important work is Independence of Georgia
in International Politics 1918-1921, first published in Paris, in 1924; it is a nice collection
of views and experiences of the witness in those turbulent years for Georgia. The Georgian
parliamentary chairman Noe Zhordania noticed at that time that “independence was both a
historical and a tragic act, it was occasioned not by a collective commitment to national
sovereignty but by the necessity of Georgia’s “self-preservation in the current historical
tempest” (Government of the Republic of Georgia 1919: 332-333). The preamble to the
Republic’s declaration of independence maintained “that the decision to join the Russian
Empire more than a century earlier had come about because of the strategic need to ensure
the country’s survival against foreign enemies. Leaving the Russian embrace was
prompted by a similar set of circumstances” (Government of the Republic of Georgia
1919: 336-338). According to this point of view, Georgia made its actions in accord with
national interests. And now it was time for the country to care for its own survival.
The danger from the other side for newly independent Transcaucasia was Turkey. This
country hoped that – because of retreat of Russian position in the region and probable
support by its allies in the West – it would take control of Transcaucasia (at least, some
part of it) in its hands and would incorporate some districts in Turkish lands. The Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk
2
, signed on 3 March 1918, gave diplomatic and sophisticated possibility to
Turkish troops to move forward in Transcaucasia. Despite their crashing defeats on Minor
Asian and European fronts, the Turkish delegation at Brest-Litovsk gained marked
advantages. Three principal districts - Ardahan, Kars and Batumi - would be segragated
from Russian
1
In this work, for the texts that are not translated in English we offer our translation.
2
At Brest-Litovsk, from 22 December 1917 to 10 February 1918. On 3 March 1918, following the
breakdown of the talks and a new German offensive, Lenin accepted the “dictated peace” that deprived
Russia of eighteen provinces and nearly 30 percent of its pre-war population.
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