2
process producing a massive geophysical impact on the planet. Mars, as far as we know,
harbours no life forms. Therefore we are unable to address the question of the ethics of
terraforming by appealing to its impact on living entities within the framework of those
ethical systems that concede that (at least some higher forms of) non-human life may have
moral standing. My intuition is that terraforming would, indeed, be prima facie morally
wrong. Either way, it raises the general question of what our moral responsibilities might
be to inanimate nature.
Traditional ethical systems, such as Kantian or contractualist frameworks, can
not adequately accommodate such a question. Or perhaps it would be fairer to say that
they do not regard the question as falling within their scope – they would not regard
terraforming as a moral question at all. A Kantian would dismiss the question on the
grounds that such things as inanimate objects are not the kinds of entities that can be the
recipients of respect, simply because respect is something to which only persons are
entitled. A contractualist regards ethics as underpinned by cooperative arrangements
between equals and this entails that contracting parties be persons human beings who
have the mental capacities, such as rational thought, intentionality, and the ability to
envisage consequences, necessary to establish and honour contracts. According to
contractualists, moral principles must be things upon which both agent and subject can
agree. Both of these orthodox ethical outlooks, in their standard forms, simply preclude
the possibility that any being other than a human person could be a moral subject.
A number of writers consider that terraforming has an ethical dimension - Briggs
(1986), Fogg (2000), Haynes (1990), Lee (1994, 1999), Marshall (1993), McKay (1990),
Rolston (1986), Sparrow (1999), Turner (1994, 1998), and Zubrin (1996), among others.
Zubrin (1996), Fogg (2000) and McKay (1990) examine the ethics of terraforming within
traditional frameworks but not surprisingly, given their pro-terraforming stance and
engineering viewpoint, conclude that it’s morally acceptable. Turner (1994, 1998) regards
terraforming as a moral imperative for the human race. Whilst Briggs (1986) seems to be
ambivalent on the matter, others such as Lee (1994, 1999), Marshall (1993), Sparrow
(1989), and Rolston (1986) have argued strongly against terraforming, but always more or
less within environmental ethical frameworks developed to deal with terrestrial matters.
Only Haynes argues that terraforming raises issues of a completely new character, calling
for “a new ‘cosmocentric’ ethics, and perhaps a revised theory of intrinsic worth”
(Haynes, 1990, p. 177). Such a “cosmocentric ethic would allow scope for human
creativity in science and engineering throughout the solar system … [and also recognize
3
that] the physical artefacts of humanity are as much a part of the universe as are [natural
objects, like] stars, planets, plants and animals” (Haynes, 1990, p. 177). I agree with
Haynes (1990) that a new approach is needed. There is clearly a need to examine these
questions - the issue of terraforming and what we owe to inanimate nature - in a
systematic and careful way, a way that does not seem possible within existing ethical
frameworks.
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop an ethical system that can properly
frame such questions. I call this system universal ethics. It diverges from traditional ethics
at a deep level, in particular with regard to the class of entities that are regarded as
morally considerable - that is, that have moral standing.
Universal ethics is an ethical framework whose scope is the entire world (that is,
the entire universe as commonly understood) and in which every concrete
3
material entity
is a potential moral subject. As such, its applicability is not confined to the Earth but can
be brought to bear on every situation that a moral agent could encounter in the universe at
large, both now and in the future. Universal ethics is also an integrated system, not being
split into separate moral domains, for instance human ethics and environmental ethics,
each with their own principles of action – it is a single coherent framework guiding
ethical action. Universal ethics answers the question of how we, as moral agents, should
behave toward the things that make up the world without any accompanying prejudice
that “the rest of the world” can only mean other persons. It is a radical position that
involves a major change in perspective. Perhaps the greatest change implicit in universal
ethics is a shift of focus to moral subjects conceived of as anything that may be harmed or
damaged by a moral agent. Universal ethics is an ethics of respect for the world as
opposed, say, to a respect for nature alone or humanity alone.
Why is it important to develop a universal ethics? Essentially, to allow us to
frame and then address moral situations that biocentric environmental ethical perspectives
do not address convincingly. Obviously, such issues as the proposed terraforming of the
planet Mars or the mining of the Moon qualify, but there are also situations much closer
to home that biocentric environmental ethics does not adequately address. For example,
areas on Earth that are devoid of life, such as certain deserts and large areas of Antarctica,
have very little moral standing in biocentric environmental ethics, since there is very little
biota to speak of. Sometimes such entities are appreciated in aesthetic terms, but I believe
3
Note that by the term concrete, I don’t just mean solid. I mean it in the sense of “made of material”
whether liquid, solid, or gas – a substance, in other words. Concrete is to be contrasted with abstract.
4
that it is important to accord such entities an appropriate level of moral consideration –
that is, to regard them as moral subjects. Unless we develop an ethical framework in
which material entities are granted some moral considerability, we run the risk of
foreclosing on discussion of a wide range of ethical issues through a fundamental inability
to properly entertain the notion that inanimate aspects of our environment have moral
standing. As I conceive universal ethics, artificial objects are also to be regarded as
morally considerable and this will almost certainly change the way that we think about
our human creations and products.
To develop universal ethics I thought it appropriate, rather than start completely
from scratch, to find some suitable existing ethical framework that I could build upon.
Such a framework, I believe, is the environmental ethics developed by Paul W. Taylor,
and described by him in his 1986 book Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental
Ethics. My overall approach is to make use of much of the work done by Taylor, by
constructing universal ethics on the foundation of a modified and extended version of his
environmental ethics. Briefly, Taylor’s environmental ethics is based on an attitude of
respect for nature and he regards all living things in the natural environment as being
morally considerable. Although Taylor’s theory has a number of shortcomings, key
elements of the theory - especially his metaethical framework - are in keeping with the
approach I plan to take. Further, it is possible to eliminate the shortcomings of his theory
without compromising the metaethical framework.
This dissertation falls naturally into two parts. The first part, Chapters One
through Three, consists of a critical examination of Taylor’s environmental ethical theory,
showing how it can be modified and extended. The second part, Chapters Four through
Six, is concerned with developing universal ethics upon this foundation, and then
defending it and showing how it can be applied in practice. I shall now give a brief
overview of each of the chapters, outlining the contribution of each to the dissertation.
In Chapter One, I give an account of Taylor’s environmental ethics, centred on
the attitude of “respect for nature” – the notion that nature deserves to be considered as
somehow being important in its own right. I am very sympathetic to Taylor’s work for
two reasons: first, his core attitude of respect is precisely what I think is needed in a
universal ethics; and second, his tri-partite metaethical framework provides a good model
for an ethical system. This model consists of a fundamental outlook (in Taylor’s case, a
biocentric outlook), supporting a core attitude (in Taylor’s case, respect for nature), which
in turn grounds an appropriate ethical system of rules of conduct and standards of
5
character. According to Taylor (1986, pp. 59-60), there are two concepts central to
understanding the attitude of respect for nature: the good of a being, and the inherent
worth of a being. He claims that, for a being in nature to deserve our respect, it must have
both a good of its own and inherent worth. For Taylor, the class of morally considerable
beings is coextensive with the set of all living things. Taylor develops his environmental
ethics as a system quite separate from the system of human ethics, and conflicts
sometimes arise between the two systems. He therefore develops a set of priority
principles to resolve conflicts between the two ethical systems in a harmonious way.
In Chapter Two, I consider criticisms of Taylor’s theory in four areas where I
think it is either on the wrong track or is inadequate as it stands, and suggest some
modifications. First, Taylor has argued at length that all natural living organisms deserve
moral consideration
4
. I claim that the scope of environmental ethics ought to be much
wider, not only because of the difficulty of drawing clear distinctions between the natural
and the artificial and between nature and the bioculture, but also because of what I believe
is the need to combine into a single system (which I call universal ethics), both human
ethics and environmental ethics. I argue for a single ethical domain of application, as
opposed to a set of ethical domains or systems each of which is defined in terms of the
type of moral subject affected. Second, I am critical of his biocentric outlook, mainly on
the basis that it is unduly, and perhaps unconsciously, anthropocentric. Third, Taylor,
having argued that there is no basis for claiming that human beings are superior to other
living organisms, concludes that all living organisms have the same inherent worth, a
position that has been variously labelled as species egalitarianism or bioegalitarianism. I
discuss a number of criticisms of that position. Finally, I argue that had Taylor not chosen
to develop his environmental ethics as a discrete system, there would have been no need
for his priority principles – they are needed only to balance the competing claims of
environmental and human ethics. In a unified system, such as universal ethics, priority
principles are not required.
4
Note that “moral consideration” is not Taylor’s term. One discussion of the term occurs in Goodpaster
(1998, p. 56) who defines moral considerability as follows: “for all A, X deserves moral consideration from
A, where A ranges over rational moral agents and moral ‘consideration’ is construed broadly to include the
most basic forms of practical respect”. Goodpaster’s definition of the term, therefore, would seem to be
quite an appropriate one in the context of a discussion of Taylor’s environmental ethics. Indeed, Goodpaster
in the same paper argues that being a living thing should be the criterion for moral considerability, a
position consistent with Taylor’s.
6
In Chapter Three, I propose two important extensions to Taylor’s theory, namely
an expansion of the scope of moral considerability to include all concrete material entities
and the introduction of the concept of moral significance. According to Taylor, for an
entity to be morally considerable it must have a good of its own, and he further claims that
an entity’s having a telos of its own is a hallmark of having its own good. However, I
argue that teleology is not an appropriate criterion, that it is meaningful to say that even
inanimate objects have a good of their own because it is possible, by our actions, to harm
them. I conclude that mere existence, in the concrete sense, is sufficient to justify moral
consideration
5
and to warrant the respect of moral agents. I then introduce the notion of a
ranking system such that different entities can have different levels of inherent worth (to
use Taylor’s terminology) and therefore different levels of moral significance. The
different levels of moral significance attributable to different classes of entities can be
used to balance their competing moral claims. This is very different from Taylor’s ethics
which does not consider inherent worth to be a scalar quantity. For Taylor, an entity either
has inherent worth or it does not, there is no middle ground. Ultimately, moral
significance captures the different levels of vulnerability and capability characteristic of
each class of entity, and I argue that this, in turn, is underpinned by something that I refer
to as “complexity”.
In Chapter Four, building on Taylor’s theory as modified to address these
criticisms and to include the proposed extensions, I develop my own universal ethics.
Even as modified, core aspects of Taylor’s theory remain very relevant for this purpose.
In particular, Taylor’s metaethical framework (an outlook or world view that supports the
core attitude of respect, which in turn grounds an appropriate ethical system of rules of
conduct and standards of character), figures prominently in my description of a universal
ethics. The most important features of universal ethics are the widening of the scope of
moral considerability to include all concrete entities, and the introduction of the notion of
variable moral significance. In universal ethics, the core attitude of respect for the world
grounds an ethical system based on the principle of minimal harm, and this attitude of
respect is in turn based on the adoption of the universal outlook on the world. Respect for
material entities arises naturally from the universal outlook which consists of two parts:
first, a conception of the world and its nature, and second, a set of three core beliefs about
the world. The outlook itself captures much of the normative framework of the universal
5
Cf. Hunt (1980).
7
ethical system - this normative element provides the motivational bridge between the non-
normative conception of the world and the attitude of respect that moral agents should
exhibit. The universal ethical system itself is made up of two principles of right action: the
principle of minimal harm and the moral imperative to knowledge. These principles
reflect the attitude of respect for the world. However, a degree of conditionality must
moderate our respect in practical situations. It is simply impossible for us to act
respectfully towards everything - to every grain of sand or every blade of grass. Therefore
I introduce the notion of thresholds of significance and attention below which we choose
not (or are simply unable) to translate respect into practical moral consideration. Finally, I
explore whether the concept of information might help with capturing and refining the
notion of complexity and how this might be used as a direct measure of inherent worth.
In Chapter Five, I defend universal ethics and argue that it meets all of the
obvious objections that can be directed toward it. At the same time, it is able to account
for our everyday intuitions as to why vandalism is wrong, the regard we have for very
large and impressive non-animate entities (such as Antarctica, Mars, and Uluru), and the
ethical character of many traditional communities’ deeply held attitudes towards the land.
I argue that universal ethics is coherent and consistent in practice. Where it is dealing with
moral situations beyond the everyday, such as terraforming, it has the power to frame and
make sense of them. When it is dealing with more familiar situations here on Earth it
yields results that are, in the main, consistent with traditional ethical frameworks - the
notion of respect for all concrete things actually resonates quite well with many of our
ordinary moral intuitions. Finally, I argue that it makes good sense to adopt universal
ethics by also pointing out some positive aspects: the fact that it can accommodate many
basic moral intuitions much better than rival theories can, and the advantages it has over
other ethical systems in terms of its generality, simplicity, and flexibility.
In Chapter Six, I demonstrate the practicality of universal ethics by showing how
it can be applied to both extraterrestrial and terrestrial moral situations. In the first part of
the chapter, I analyse proposals for the terraforming of the planet Mars, demonstrating
that universal ethics enables us to properly comprehend what is at stake in such proposals
and how to go about deciding on their morality. I conclude that it would be unethical to
terraform Mars. This judgment is based on three claims. First, Mars, as an individual
concrete entity, has a good of its own and inherent worth and so is entitled to be
respected. Second, as a very large, very complex object, it clearly has integrity and a very
high inherent worth, attracts a very high degree of respect, and therefore has a very strong
8
prima facie claim not to be significantly harmed. Third, because (as I demonstrate in this
chapter, by rebutting several pro-terraforming arguments) there is no pressing human
interest at stake with regard to terraforming - the respect to which Mars is entitled means
that its prima facie claim does indeed hold, and significant harm would be gravely wrong,
in keeping with the principle of minimal harm. I conclude the chapter with a short
discussion of the relevance of universal ethics to terrestrial ethical situations, applying it
to four cases: first, the Antarctic continent; second, inanimate natural entities; third,
restoration in environmental ethics; and fourth, artefacts
6
and their moral standing.
6
The discussion of artefacts and their moral standing will, in particular, be very brief. Whilst artefacts do
fall within the scope of universal ethics and are to be regarded as morally considerable, I recognize that my
position is controversial, to say the least. For example, Lee (1999) would not regard it as appropriate to
bracket together abiotic natural entities and abiotic artefactual entities – she claims they represent different
kinds of being. Perhaps Lee and I are operating at different “levels of abstraction” (Floridi, 2002) – her
notion that the natural and the artefactual represent different kinds of beings isn’t likely to be sustainable in
the context of my very physicalist conception of entities. Even so, my disagreement with Lee is not
primarily ontological, but axiological. I do not agree that the origin of a thing is relevant to an assessment of
its inherent worth.
Lee’s notion that the natural and the artefactual are different kinds of beings because they have different
origins demands closer examination. Whilst it is certainly a valid and useful way of distinguishing between
beings – at one level of abstraction – it does not follow that it is a morally relevant way of regarding them.
Lee’s arguments may be better interpreted as directed at the practice of transforming the natural into the
artefactual rather than at the artefactual, per se. Universal ethics is also opposed to this transformation, but
for clearer and more explicit reasons. It deplores the practice fundamentally because it expresses disrespect,
without in anyway denying the possibility of the instrumental disvalue of the encroachment of the artificial.
Nevertheless, this is an important issue to which lack of space does not permit me to give an adequate
treatment. I settle simply for pointing out that universal ethics does have implications for our treatment of
artefacts and make it clear that the issue will have to be explored elsewhere.
9
Chapter 1: Taylor’s Respect for Nature
1.1 Environmental Ethics and Human Ethics
1.1.1 Introduction
I plan in this dissertation to develop a theory of universal ethics. Rather than
starting from scratch, however, I intend to make use of much of the work done by Paul W.
Taylor in his environmental ethics, described by him in his 1986 book Respect for Nature:
A Theory of Environmental Ethics. Therefore, roughly the first half of this dissertation,
Chapters One through Three, will consist of an examination of Taylor’s ethics. Chapter
One will give a brief account of Taylor’s theory in terms of the attitude of respect for
nature, the biocentric outlook on nature, and his environmental ethical system, and will
include an account of how Taylor deals with conflict between environmental and human
ethics. Chapter Two will provide a constructive critique of Taylor’s theory, and Chapter
Three will develop two important extensions to it.
In this section, I set the scene for my account of Taylor’s theory of
environmental ethics. After considering what he regards as the purpose of such a theory, I
discuss the basic concepts of moral agent and moral subject, and outline the formal and
material conditions that, according to Taylor, must be satisfied for an ethical system to be
valid. I then describe how, through an analogy with human ethics, Taylor concludes that
his environmental ethics does indeed meet these formal conditions and that respect for
nature is the material condition which his environmental ethics must satisfy.
According to Taylor (1986, p. 3), environmental ethics concerns itself with the
moral relations between humans and the natural world - relations which themselves are
governed by ethical principles which underpin our duties, obligations, and responsibilities
to nature. Further, he defines the natural world as the “natural ecosystems on our planet,
along with the populations of animals and plants that make up the biotic communities of
those ecosystems” (Taylor, 1986, p. 3). This definition implies that if something is not
part of an ecosystem, for example a desert devoid of life, then it is not part of the natural
world.
10
Perhaps there are very few completely natural ecosystems left on the planet.
Taylor points out that there is a continuous spectrum from natural to artificial ecosystems,
such as golf courses or farms. There are also environments, formerly exploited by human
beings, which have now been allowed to return to nature. By “natural”, Taylor means that
“the biological and environmental factors determining the structure of relationships
holding among their constituent species-populations [now] take place without human
intervention” (Taylor, 1986, p. 4). This definition would include former agricultural land
that is now no longer farmed and is being allowed to return to nature, but would not
include, say, functioning golf courses. He also excludes what he refers to as the bioculture
– animals and plants in agricultural, production, and domestic settings.
1.1.2 Moral Agent and Moral Subject
Moral behaviour involves a relation between a moral agent and a moral subject
7
,
in which the agent acts in some ethically relevant way toward another, the subject
8
. In
traditional (or person-centred) ethics, ethical relations are assumed to involve persons; a
typical ethical act may involve one person killing another or coming to another’s
assistance.
Of course, an ethical act need not involve another person directly – consider the
ethical act of entering the burning home next door to save, say, an antique table which is
known to be of great significance to the absent neighbour. A person-centred account of
ethical action would not consider the table to be the subject of the ethical act – the moral
agent is not acting for or on behalf of the table; if the rescue were considered to be a
morally good act, the neighbour would be regarded as the subject of the act. The intention
of the rescuer would be to save her friend from the pain of the loss of the table rather than
to save the table as such. In person-centred ethics, the subject of an ethical act need not be
an active player in the situation at all – the subject is the person toward whom the
intention of the ethical act is aimed or who is directly or indirectly affected by it.
There are several varieties of person-centred ethics, each providing a distinct
account of ethical effects and intentions. Classical utilitarian accounts focus on outcomes
7
Sometimes, in the literature, the moral subject is referred to as the moral patient.
8
On some accounts of ethical behaviour, the subject and the agent may coincide. For example, Kantians
recognize a range of ethical duties to oneself.
11
– ethically relevant actions are those which affect the happiness of persons, and the class
of moral subjects are all those persons whose happiness is capable of being affected by
the act. On the other hand, a Kantian account focuses on the intention of the moral agent –
ethically-relevant intentions involve such attitudes as respect or love. Although the two
accounts differ in significant respects, both confine the class of moral subjects to persons.
Ethical systems that go beyond person-centred ethics, such as Taylor’s, require
us to reconsider the class of moral subjects. To set the groundwork for this, it is important
to start with an adequate general conception of the moral agent and the moral subject.
Taylor’s conception of the moral agent emphasises certain capacities that underlie the
performance of ethical actions – capacities such as moral judgment, moral reasoning,
deliberation and decision-making, together with the resolution required to translate
decisions into action. Taylor (1986, p. 14) also introduces a reflective capacity in his
account of moral agency – he claims that moral agents must be able to hold themselves
accountable for their actions. All of these capacities are characteristic of persons, but are
more or less absent in non-persons. Thus person-centred ethical systems regard the class
of moral agents and moral subjects as co-extensive.
However, we should not conclude that the concept of a moral agent and a moral
subject are identical. Even in person-centred ethics, the identity is only approximate; a
moral subject is anything that can be the object of an ethical act – this could include, as
well as normal human beings, newly-born babies, those suffering dementia, or the insane,
whereas only normal human beings can be regarded as moral agents. Thus, in Taylor’s
environmental ethics, a moral subject is anything that can be affected by an ethical act or
ethical intentions - anything that can be treated rightly or wrongly (Taylor, 1986, p. 17);
moral subjects could include trees, animals, sea creatures or micro-organisms - none of
these would be regarded as moral agents.
Such an account of the moral subject is less than satisfactory, however, without
some further specification of the grounds on which an entity’s status as a moral subject
might be based. Since Taylor gives a substantial account of the capacities that underpin
moral agency, it seems appropriate that an equally substantial account be given of the
capacities or properties accounting for an entity’s status as a moral subject. What might
such an account be based on?
Taylor’s answer to this question involves the concept of an entity’s having a
good of its own (Taylor, 1986, p. 18). Certain kinds of entities exist in conditions that can
be more or less conducive to their good - some of these conditions will assist them to
12
flourish, whilst other conditions will promote their decline; because of this, it makes sense
to say that they can be harmed or benefited. To harm a thing is to treat it poorly, and to
benefit a thing is to treat it well. Animals and plants are plausible examples of entities that
have a good of their own, and which we can thus treat well or poorly.
Of course, this has not yet established their standing as moral subjects. To this
end, Taylor advances the substantial thesis that a capacity to be benefited or harmed and
thus to be treated well or poorly, is necessary (but not sufficient) for a thing’s standing as
a moral subject
9
and that, in addition, a candidate moral subject must also have inherent
worth. Taylor makes a further substantial claim that only animate entities – animals or
plants, but not rocks, for example – have a good of their own and thus are eligible to count
as moral subjects. I take issue with this claim in Chapter Two.
1.1.3 Formal and Material Conditions
What determines whether a set of rules, standards, or principles can be rightly
regarded as an ethical system? After all, not all rules that we may be required to follow in
daily life can be described as ethical. For example, in a soccer game a player is required
to follow the prescribed rules – if he does not, he risks being penalized by match officials.
However if a player does break such a rule, for example he is found to be off-side, this is
not considered to be a moral transgression. Ordinary life is replete with similar examples,
including table etiquette or documentation standards in the workplace, which represent
“required” behaviour, yet have no moral dimension. How does Taylor justify his claim
that his environmental ethics is truly an ethical system? He maintains that for a rule,
standard, or principle to be included in a valid normative ethical system, it must satisfy
two sets of conditions – formal conditions and material conditions (Taylor, 1986, p. 25).
By valid, he means that the rules, standards, or principles of the system are “in truth
binding upon (lay down moral requirements for) all moral agents” (Taylor, 1986, p. 25).
The formal conditions, which Taylor claims are now widely accepted in
contemporary ethics, define what it means to classify a rule, standard, or principle as a
moral one (Taylor, 1986, p. 25), as opposed, say, to principles of aesthetics or the rules of
9
Note that Taylor does not defend this thesis simply by equating treating a thing well with treating it
rightly. This would be the first step in a consequentialist account of our moral obligations to nature. Taylor
defends a complex deontological account of these obligations which I examine in the remainder of this
chapter.
13
a game. These formal conditions deal with the “shape” of the rule, standard, or principle
rather than its particular content. The formal conditions are: a) generality of form; b)
universal applicability; c) disinterested application; d) approval of universal adoption; and
e) overriding of all non-moral norms (Taylor, 1986, p. 27). Taylor, of course, claims that
his environmental ethics meets all five criteria. I will have more to say about these formal
conditions in Chapter Five.
Critically, these formal conditions must be supplemented by some material
condition or conditions that serve to determine the content of the rule, standard or
principle in that particular ethical system. Through a parallel with human ethics which,
Taylor claims, satisfies the material condition respect for persons, he argues that the
material condition which his environmental ethics has to satisfy is respect for nature
(Taylor, 1986, p. 26). This is discussed in more detail in the next section. However, it is
not enough to arbitrarily choose a material condition such as respect for persons or respect
for nature, and leave it at that; the chosen material condition must be justified in some
way as being validly binding on moral agents. If the material condition cannot be justified
through some transparent procedure such as logical deduction from some acceptable first
principles, then an account must be given as to why the adoption of the material condition
is plausible and reasonable. Taylor’s approach is to give an account of the biocentric
outlook on nature and argue that this outlook is what underpins and explains the choice of
the attitude of respect for nature as a material condition.
1.1.4 The Structure of an Environmental Ethical System
An ethical system is not a homogeneous entity – it has an internal structure
consisting of a number of component parts and the relationships between them. What then
might be the appropriate structure for an environmental ethical system? Taylor sees
important parallels between everyday human ethics and his proposed environmental
ethics. So it is not surprising that, for the “shape” of his environmental ethics, he looks to
the broad structure of human ethics for inspiration. He claims there is a “symmetry or
isomorphism of structure” between a theory of human ethics based on respect for persons
and a theory of environmental ethics based on respect for nature (Taylor, 1986, p. 41). Of
course, what differentiates the two systems of ethics is their normative content as reflected
in their different material conditions.
14
Taylor (1986, pp. 41-2) regards the traditional theory of human ethics as having
three components: a system of belief within which each moral agent conceives of other
persons in a particular way; the attitude of respect for persons; and a system of rules and
standards. This is, very broadly, a deontological and Kantian form of ethical theory. The
belief system underpins and explains the attitude of respect which, in turn, determines the
practical content of the rules and standards. Taylor (1986, p. 38) concludes that “a valid
system of human ethics, therefore, is a set of moral rules and standards that embody the
principle of respect for all persons as persons” [italics his]. Thus, by analogy with human
ethics, Taylor arrives at “respect for nature” as the appropriate material condition for his
environmental ethics. His ethics is structured as follows: a biocentric outlook on nature is
the foundation which supports and makes intelligible an attitude of respect for nature,
which in turn is expressed or embodied by a set of moral rules and standards.
It is important to notice that Taylor’s overall ethical framework consists, in fact,
of two ethical sub-frameworks, the human and the environmental which, in the main,
operate separately and seldom clash. Both frameworks have a similar three-part structure.
For those situations where human ethics and environmental ethics do happen to be at
odds, with competing claims between human beings and natural non-human living
entities, Taylor believes that the conflicts can be resolved through a set of priority
principles. I will discuss this further in section 1.5. In the next section, I turn to a
consideration of the key element of Taylor’s environmental ethics – the attitude of respect
for nature.
1.2 The Attitude of Respect for Nature
1.2.1 Introduction
There are many possible attitudes one could take toward entities in the world
around us. In the case of nature, one could take at least three quite distinct attitudes. For
example, one could take the attitude that the natural world and all the entities it comprises,
both living and non-living, exist primarily for the benefit of human beings and are totally
at our disposal. Given this attitude, it would be appropriate and, indeed obligatory, to fell
trees for their timber, clear forests for agriculture, and mine the earth for metals and
petroleum. This attitude could be described as exploitative, and in its more extreme
15
manifestations can also be accompanied by a near-sighted lack of concern for the welfare
of future generations as, for example, in the rapid extraction and use of fossil fuels, even
to complete exhaustion.
Alternatively, one might take the view that the natural world, whilst at the
disposal of human beings to a significant extent, nevertheless deserves to be managed
over the longer term in such a way that its integrity and viability is permanently
maintained. This can be described as a prudential attitude and tends to result in human
behaviours that could be collectively characterized as stewardship. It yields benefits not
only for humanity in that a permanent source of raw materials, minerals and food
continues to be available, but also for the natural world itself inasmuch as this more
balanced approach means that portions, at least, of the natural world will continue to be
maintained in something like their natural form. Stewardship clearly has an eye to the
long-term and need not be completely focused on human concerns.
One might also adopt, as Taylor does, an attitude of respect for nature. This
attitude shifts the ethical centre of gravity even further away from human beings and
toward nature itself. There is a sense that nature deserves to be considered as somehow
being important in its own right. According to Taylor (1986, pp. 59-60), there are two
concepts central to understanding the attitude of respect for nature: the good of a being,
and the inherent worth of a being. Although the two concepts are to some extent logically
independent – an entity may have a good of its own but need not have inherent worth (the
reverse is not true, however) – the concept of respect draws them together. Taylor (1986,
p. 60) claims that if we have respect for a being with a good of its own, we will also
regard it as having inherent worth. A corollary of this would appear to be that, to deserve
respect, it is not enough for a being to have a good of its own – it must also have inherent
worth.
I will now examine each of these concepts – the good of a being and inherent
worth – as Taylor conceives of them and then further discuss the attitude of respect for
nature.
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