Investigating and Prosecuting Organised Crime in Great Britain

 2 
should have been pushed aside from terrorism. 
The Government thought that creating a specific agency with a 
specific mandate and specific rules of procedure to investigate and 
dismantle organised crime groups could have been the winning card.  
The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) has been established 
on the 1
st
 April 2006, by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 
2005 and is the acme of a profound reform that has reshaped the 
criminal justice system and in particular the investigation and 
prosecution stages.  
This research paper aims to demonstrate - through the analysis of the 
reforms occurred and mostly through the full understanding of what 
SOCA is and what it does – that substantial criminal law and 
procedural criminal justice in today’s Britain are indeed unbalanced 
and on different levels. The absence of a single offence in criminal 
law is, in fact, influencing the accessible outcomes in the criminal 
procedure, which, indeed, is almost fully equipped to guarantee more 
valid results than those achieved until now.  
*** 
In the first chapter it is shown that on one side a number of provisions 
have improved the criminal justice approach to organised crime, 
while, on the other side, it is difficult to effectively prosecute 
organised crime because of the lack of a single offence of association 
or belonging. Conspiracy law is in fact not equipped enough to face 
this kind of crimes, whose tentacles are usually beyond the mere 
agreement to commit a crime.  
Given Britain’s crime history, it will be shown how the previous 
approach to organised crime was fragmented and intermittent, with 
different public and police bodies carrying on investigation and 
 3 
prosecutions without collaboration or precise organisation, while, 
instead, the fight against organised crime requires coordinated efforts 
and effective organisation. 
SOCA has managed to bring together, coordination and precision, in 
the efforts made to detect such crimes. The peculiar accountability 
system, which should secure SOCA’s independence is, however, a 
perplexing feature of the agency and requires further reflections.  
*** 
In the second chapter a full presentation of SOCA’s legal basis is 
introduced and a thorough argumentation of the challenges, the aims, 
the difficulties and all the organisational matters is proposed.  
Given that SOCA is not a police body, it is necessary to understand 
first, the reasons for this big shift in criminal justice, and second, 
SOCA’s relations to the police and to the prosecutors.  
SOCA’s mandate is chiefly one of intelligence, but the agency is also 
the reference body both for Extradition Procedure, with or without 
European Arrest Warrants, and for Financial intelligence, taking over 
some of the powers of the former Asset Recovery Agency also in 
matters of money laundering.  
*** 
The third chapter focuses most of all on the prosecutorial stage of the 
fight against organised crime. Even though there are not specific 
requirements in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, 
after the enhancement of SOCA, the Crown Prosecution Service has 
established the Organised Crime Division, whose task is to advice the 
agency through full-time specialist prosecutors.  
These specialist prosecutors, working side by side with SOCA 
officers, have at their disposal old tools for the job, of course, and 
 4 
these include undercover operations, informants, surveillance and 
covert human sources, but also new tools provided by the 2005 act, 
which encompasses new powers of arrest for the police and the 
introduction of a compulsory disclosure method for everyone who is 
asked to help investigations. How SOCA, then, manages the 
information received is a matter of concern because of the secrecy and 
the huge amount of data collected and stored. The exchange of 
information between SOCA and the prosecutors happen at every stage 
and cannot be divided in impermeable environments. Intelligence is of 
use for prosecution, but prosecution always needs more intelligence 
and carries on investigation; therefore, the osmosis among 
prosecutors, SOCA and police officers is vibrant and persistent.  
Expectations upon the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 
were addressed to the reform of the use of intercept evidence in 
criminal trials. Britain is one of the last countries applying a ban on 
the use of intercepted material at trial, which means that whereas 
communications could be intercepted, the resulting materials cannot 
be used as evidence but only as intelligence, preventing the 
prosecution to go further. But, unfortunately, the Serious Organised 
Crime and Police Act 2005 did not proceed in amending the law of 
interception and therefore this huge obstruction in the law of evidence 
is still influencing organised crime cases, which elsewhere, instead, 
strongly rely on this kind of proofs.   
*** 
The fourth chapter deals with the passage from the prosecutorial phase 
to the trial and sentencing ones.  
In this transit what matters is the evidence collected and gathered that 
can be used in trial. Three specific issues arise in this field.  
 5 
First, the ongoing reform discussion, the Chilcot Review, regarding 
intercept materials, which considers all the implications and the values 
considered in the employment of this kind of materials.  
Second, in cases of organised crime, given its transnational dimension, 
it is necessary to enhance the international cooperation to obtain and 
share data from abroad. With the future foundation of the European 
Evidence Warrant, the mutual legal assistance agreements are surely 
going to be improved and made more effective and quick. 
Third, as far as concerned with criminals cooperating with the 
criminal justice system, the 2005 act has introduced the statutory basis 
for the evidence obtained through the collaboration of offenders who, 
not only plea guilty, but also provide information and revelations to 
investigators and prosecutors in order to obtain a discount in sentence 
or immunity from prosecution.  
Furthermore, both criminal offenders who turn to prosecutors to 
cooperate and witnesses in organised crime trials are particularly 
exposed to the peril of revengeful actions from other members 
belonging to criminally organised groups. A program to ensure 
protection of witnesses and their relatives, as well as a program for 
those who would not turn to the prosecutors unless they are granted 
anonymity, are at the basis of other reforms and legal provisions 
which followed the establishment of SOCA and the 2005 act. 
Finally, the chapter considers the sentencing phase in dealing with 
organised crime. Apart from two disposals, specifically thought for 
these cases, general sentencing provisions apply and this means that 
all the standards and all the issues related to sentencing guidelines in 
cases of serious crime need to be taken into accounts. But, the Serious 
Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 has also introduced a new 
 6 
measure, the Financial Reporting Order, which can be attached to 
sentences, in cases of money laundering involvement or similar 
offences. The Serious Crime Act 2007, moreover, has instituted the 
Serious Crime Prevention Order, which can be used both in criminal 
trials, attached to sentences, and as civil measure, issued by the High 
Court and not the Crown Court, and requested by the prosecutors 
independently from the criminal case.  
*** 
All the debates about these reformed aspects of the criminal justice 
system in relation to organised crime, are all pointing to a well-shaped 
framework. Nevertheless, this split between criminal law and criminal 
justice, underlined and characterized by the lack of a single offence 
for belonging to a criminal enterprise, is evident.  
Despite all the improvements and despite all the attempts to 
coordinate intelligence and prosecution, this refusal to introduce a 
unique offence for membership, or even to improve the law of 
conspiracy, is the missing link of the chain.  
 7 
Author’s Entry 
Every approach to criminal procedure in Great Britain requires, first 
of all, an understanding of the diversity of this criminal justice system. 
Strongly tied up with the legal thought, criminal law and criminal 
justice in Great Britain are not analysed through exegesis of texts, as 
the civil law countries usually do, but mostly, through sociological 
and criminological approaches and thesis, from which lots of the 
debates surrounding penal solutions arise.  
In searching and evaluating the materials for this research paper, I 
have noticed that a huge amount of the files available were documents 
issued by governmental departments and consultation papers by 
national bodies or similar.  
On the contrary, legal theorists and scholars propose not an exegetic 
analysis of the laws and the legal sources, but, rather, a 
comprehension of the sociological and criminological reasoning, 
which lie beneath the political penal choice.  
Albeit the interest for the criminal procedure per se, the analysis of 
processes and regulatory schemes provided by the law in the British 
environment requires exactly this socio-criminological element. This 
means that it is not the law always speaking and clarifying itself 
through the text, but most of all, men and their political choices do 
that, alongside judges applying the law and practical issues 
influencing this application.  
Therefore, the aim of this research paper, apart from being placed in 
the field of the British criminal procedure, is, after all, an 
understanding of the sociological and political changes occurring in 
criminal law and criminal justice in relation to the fight against 
organised crime in this country. Without this understanding, any 
 8 
analysis of the regulations and the legal framework is incomplete and 
insufficient, lacking the possibility to work on the text and the lexicon 
of the laws even because of the different mandatory character of the 
legal provisions.  
So, differently from what happens in civil law countries and legal 
systems, the focus in this paper is not on the text of the law and its 
various interpretations, but most of all, on the reasoning surrounding 
the law and on the consideration of the impact that law may have upon 
the society.  
 9 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
UNLOCKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE APPROACHES TO 
ORGANISED CRIME IN GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 
1.1 Introduction: Myth and Reality of Organised Crime in Britain 
 
As every country in the world, the history of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain boasts myths and realities regarding organised crime, 
most of all referring to gangs' activities.  
It is a fact, according to Morton
1
, that Britain was a stage for gangs' 
business already at the beginning of the twentieth century. London's 
underground was affected and ruled by the presence of the Sabini 
brothers in the early 1920s, but other cities as well, like Liverpool or 
Birmingham and Manchester, struggled with gangs. Detailed accounts 
are provided by scholars to explain the development of this gang-life 
through the decades. Wright
2
 maintains that, despite the evidence 
regarding the evolution of the gangs, the conflicts of power and the 
rise of new gangs, it is not legitimate to say that these gangs were 
organised in the way we think today. It is true nevertheless, that the 
                                                
1
 Morton J., 1992, Gangland Volume 1, London: Little Brown 
2
 Wright A., 2006, Organised Crime, Willan Publishing, Devon: United Kingdom 
 10 
1960s have been the zenith of the underworld gangs in Britain, an in 
London, most of all. These were the times of Frankie Fraser, and the 
Richardson brothers, Charles and Edward, whose activities concerned 
long-firm frauds and lord it over in the South of London. The Kray 
brothers, instead, the twins Ronnie and Reggie and the other brother 
Charlie, were active in the North-East London for protection rackets 
and are remembered in a very fictional way, as 'caricaturing the 
gangster image'
3
, much more than the Richardson.  The Kray brothers, 
always immaculately dressed and chased by bodyguards, are the one, 
and only perhaps, real example of Italian -American Mafioso model in 
Britain
4
.  
Morton describes in details the bizarre activities of the Kray gang in 
the mid-1960s, their rivalry with the Richardson brothers and the 
escalation of powers that they experienced, taking over, directly and 
indirectly the Richardsons' activities.  
A special squad, headed by John DuRose, was formed, specifically to 
track down the Kray brothers, once their crimes became too blatant. 
Sixty-eight men made raids in the East End of London on the 8
th
 May 
1968 arresting some of the members of the gang, including the 
brothers. The twins were charged with conspiracy to murder and fraud 
offences and received life prison. Charlie Krays, who received ten 
years for involvement in clearing up after a murder, was sentenced, 
after release, for drug trafficking. The three of them died in jail 
recently. 
                                                
3
 Ibid., p. 196 
4
 The web site www.thekrays.co.uk is the official site for the Kray brothers and 
provide readings and information about the gang activity, although in a quite 
flattering tone. 
 11 
Ronnie's funeral, in March 1995 has been probably the largest seen in 
London since the one of Winston Churchill in 1965. 
After the defeat of the Krays, other family groups - the Nashs, the 
Dixons, the Tibbs and the Adam family later on- tried to fill the power 
vacuum they had left. To what extent this has been done is 
controversial. The authors agree on maintaining that after the 1970s 
the underworld relationships in London, as elsewhere in Britain, were 
no more of the kind of the Richardsons and the Krays.  
As Wright points out, it is crucial to understand how 'organised' were 
these gangs. Were they 'formal-rational organisations'
5
? Wright 
concludes that they had some kind of rudimental strategy with specific 
roles and a basic hierarchy, but they are not to be considered rational 
organisations. They were oligarchies driven by charismatic leaders 
who conducted their business through emotion rather than calculation. 
The great distinction that can be drawn between this gangs and the 
Italian – American Mafia is that gangs never had rituals endorsing the 
membership to the organisations as the Mafia always had. And yet, 
they can still be considered forms of organised crime. 
*** 
Contemporary Britain is indeed very distant from the gang life of the 
1960s. According to Hobbs
6
 there has been a shift from the 
neighbourhood to the global market but this does not imply that the 
'family firms' are no more existent. Despite the fragmentation and the 
complexities of the current social network, there is evidence of both 
family and non-family organised groups in the UK, engaging most of 
                                                
5
 Ibid., page 173 
6
 Hobbs, D., 2001, The Firm: Organizational Logic and Criminal Culture on a 
Shifting Terrain, British Journal of Criminology, Issue 41, p. 540-560 
 12 
all in the global market of drug trafficking and people smuggling, 
mixing themselves with other national and transnational groups. The 
mosaic resulting is a prismatic one, made up by ethnic successions and 
frequent linkages with terrorist groups
7
. 'Demonisation' of different 
ethnic groups has been witnessed and policies to prevent rage in 
discriminatory activities of the police have come into play at various 
times.  
In conclusion, it is evident that Britain has had a singular criminal 
legacy since the eighteenth century. The lines of control today are all 
                                                
7 Terrorism and organised crime share big portions of ground, sharing group 
linkages, the idea of networking, the concept of association and the use of 
violence to achieve their goals. Nevertheless, in the recent years, terrorism has 
presented itself as politically involved, questioning the legitimacy of the state 
and challenging it. This political commitment makes terrorist groups approach 
money and violence as means to an end, while organised criminals’ efforts are 
almost always towards financial profit and power control in a sort of shadow 
economy of which they want to set the rules.  
As Tupman says terrorism is organised, while organised crime is not terrorist; the 
political and ideological dimension of the terrorist group is not a feature of 
organised crime groups, as well as the terrorist structure usually is not a 
hierarchy as historically is the one of organised crime families. The essence of 
terrorism is propaganda, while organised crime still wants to keep a quiet and 
low profile. It is true that terrorism and Organised Crime share the need to turn 
to money laundering to gain funding and occasionally, they work together for 
this. Notwithstanding the fact that this two types of crime are often mixed and 
exchanging favours and information, it is still useful to keep their analysis 
separated, if nothing else because they are approached differently almost 
everywhere in policing assets and criminal policies (Tupman W.A., 1998, 
Violent Business? Networking, Terrorism and Organised Crime, in McKenzie I., 
1998, Law, Power and Justice in England and Wales, Greenwood Publishing 
Group, p. 33, chapter 3). 
 13 
mixed up, due to the penetration of different foreign groups, such as 
the Russian Mafia, or the Chinese Triads or the Japanese Yakuza. 
Britain is a transit area for a number of transnational criminal 
activities and contemporary professional criminals are also infiltrated 
in public sectors and in higher business. So to say, as it is almost all 
over the world.  
 
 
1.2 Organised Crime and the British society over the years 
 
Britain's approach to the fight against Organised Crime has not always 
been well timed and appropriate. Laws have been defective or quite 
missing most of the time, analysis of the phenomenon has been 
retarded and a concrete effort towards the full appreciation of the 
problems organised crime pose has been achieved only in the last 
fifteen years.  
In fact, it was 1994 when the House of Commons, willing to turn the 
screw on crime in general established a committee to assess the nature 
and extent specifically of the threat of organised crime in the United 
Kingdom, aiming to a reform of the criminal justice system in this 
field.  
Assessing the degree of infiltration of organised crime in the UK has 
proven a difficult task for the Home Affairs Committee, even because, 
it is quite easy to reduce the comprehension of Organised Crime to a 
collective symbolic imaginary of Italian and US Mafia or even British 
gangs as the Krays.  
But, times have changed, and the definition of organised crime is 
 14 
becoming more and more challenging and elusive. A number of 
viewpoints and perspectives have been requested to the British 
investigatory agencies on different aspects involving the fight of 
Organised Crime and the instruments used to face the threat. 
Moreover, opinions from foreign jurisdictions such as Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands have been taken into consideration to draw 
suggestions from comparison.  
The first demanding step required an analysis of the nature of 
organised crime, how it should be intended and how it should be 
assessed. For this level, the crucial memorandum has been the one 
submitted by the Organised Crime Unit of the National Criminal 
Intelligence Service (NCIS)
8
.  
In spite of the lack of a definition of organised crime in the British 
law, the NCIS attempts to dismantle the unbelievable theory alleging 
that organised crime per se does not exist and it is only a mere myth 
fed by confusion in law and people's gullibility. It is true that Great 
Britain's experience with organised crime in the past did not suffer 
directly from traditional organised crime groups in the scale seen in 
Italy or in the US, but, nevertheless, the nourishing growth of 
Transnational Organised Crime has affected Britain very seriously.  
The definition provided by the NCIS reflects the common shared ideas 
about Organised Crime: 'organised crime constitutes any enterprise, 
or group of persons, engaged in continuing illegal activities which has 
as its primary purpose the generation of profits, irrespective on 
national boundaries'.  
                                                
8
 NCIS memorandum in Home Affairs Committee, Organised Crime, 1994, Vol. 
II – Minutes of Evidence and Memoranda, page 140.