4
1. Identity and Globalisation
The theme of identity has been treated by a considerable number of
scholars adopting different approaches. It remains an open concept, increasingly
shaped by growing interdependencies in the international system and
globalisation processes taking place since the end of the Second World War. In
the thesis specific reference will be made, among others, to the Indian economist
Amartya Sen and to the German sociologist Ulrich Beck. Their contributions to
the ongoing debate are very useful to understand the complexity and the
dynamism of identity-building and offer a precious set of theoretical instruments
with which facing an ever changing reality. The focus within the context of the
thesis will be on the social and political dimensions of identity, the sense of
belonging to a collectivity and the policies related to identity-building, in particular
as far as the European Union is concerned.
The subject is very interesting and stimulating, as it lies at the base of
modern and contemporary politics: if radicalised, it has been cause of dramatic
wars during the 20
th
century (e.g. in former Kosovo and Rwanda); if handled
rightly, it has been a key for the political leaders to manage critical situations as
well as to consolidate their political power (e.g. De Gaulle’s “Politics of Grandeur”
during the 5
th
French Republic).
However, the way of thinking about identity has been gradually changing in
these last decades as a consequence of the increasing erosion of the power of
nation-states and the emergence of new international and transnational actors on
the world scene, such as the United Nations, The European Union, but also
multinational enterprises and NGOs. Phenomena like the globalisation of the
economy, mass migrations from the Third World Countries to Europe and North
America or the international communication technologies (e.g. Internet) have
made it more difficult for the individual to clearly define his own identity and
lifestyle while facing a growing set of new options and possibilities. The scientific
progress and the technological evolution have made communications and
transport much faster than in the past, reducing the relevance of national frontiers
5
not only in the commercial field but also as far as politics, culture, education,
sport are concerned.
As L. Bekemans well expresses, “the globalising world is characterised by
some asymmetry between the growing extra-territorial nature of much power and
the continuing territoriality of the ways in which people live their everyday lives”
1
.
Manuel Castells argues that what he calls “network society” provokes a
systematic disjunction between the local and the global level for most of the
individuals and social groups, exception made for the cosmopolitan Ølite who can
fully enjoy the huge range of options offered by the globalised world: the process
of identity-building in this condition of disorientation becomes problematic and the
search for a meaning often ends with a construction of “defensive identities
around communal principles”
2
. The empirical reality gives strength to this
argumentation: the age of globalisation is also the age of new forms of
nationalisms, regionalisms and localisms, to be interpreted as a reaction to the
emerging global forces undermining cultural traditions and proposing, through the
mass media, a standard and homogenising way of life. In the thesis reference will
be made mainly to nation-states and national identity, being though aware of the
existence of various forms of nationalism not necessarily linked with the concept
of a sovereign State (e.g. Catalonia, Quebec, Palestine etc.)
People’s mentality is difficult to change radically in a short period of time,
the classical paradigms of belongingness continue to have a determinant
influence on thoughts and actions; however the management of these ongoing
processes is becoming more and more challenging for today’s political leaders,
within and beyond the borders of a given territory. Bekemans underscores that
“with the process of globalisation the demands for the recognition of particular
identities and minority rights will strongly develop within national and regional
structures, while at the same time requests for more citizens’ participation at the
supranational or trans-national levels will become more evident”
3
.
1
L. Bekemans, A Cosmopolitan Perspective of Multi-level Governance in Europe, in Peace Human
Rights, 2010 (2), p. 46.
2
M. Castells, The Power of Identity, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1998.
3
L. Bekemans, A Cosmopolitan Perspective of Multi-level Governance in Europe, cit., p. 47.
6
2. The European Dimension
The European Union is an innovative, up to now unique, system of
governance with some supranational elements: after many centuries of tension,
rivalries and wars among the major nation-states, the end of the Second World
War paved the way for the European Integration. This process followed the “neo-
functionalist” approach adopted by the French politician Jean Monnet, starting
from key-sectors of the economy, creating then stronger incentives for further
integration in other fields. On the one hand, national governments wanted to
defend their own interests and not to lose any power; on the other, they were
aware that the establishment of a federal state was a premature step because
the European peoples, coming out from two World Wars, used to see each other
mainly as enemies:
“Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single plan. It will be
built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The
coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old
opposition of France and Germany. Any action which must be taken in the first
place must concern these two countries”
4
.
The European Integration proceeded with little pragmatic steps: anyway,
the ultimate aim was since the beginning the political unity.
As a consequence of the global economical and financial crisis, Europe has
made relevant steps ahead in this direction: while in the first decades of
integration there was no space for democracy outside national frontiers, with the
political system following Westphalian principles, from the Treaty of Maastricht
onwards an increasing political unification is taking place, starting for example by
the establishment of a common European citizenship. Anyway, many other
4
Extract from R. Schumann’s Declaration (1950).
7
questions are yet to be faced: the EU’s status of incomplete project leaves space
to debate about the institutional structure and the policies it will (or it “would
better”) adopt: what kind of political space will it be? None of the existing
international organisations has achieved EU’s level of integration, but at the
same time it would be impossible to classify it as a State in the modern sense.
One of the most important matters of discussion is the lack of democratic
legitimacy of its institutions: there is still a gap between Brussels and the
European citizens, due to the lack of a clear definition of competences, excessive
bureaucracy and absence of concrete participation
5
.
As far as political identity is concerned, the nation-state continues to be the
predominant reference for European citizens; the birth of national identities and
their main characteristics are described in the first chapter of the thesis. In the
current historical period the state form is experiencing a deep crisis, since new
(and different) political actors are emerging in the world scene. Debating about
Europe today means to consider the development of a new form of supranational
and multilevel governance: the crucial point, as far as the thesis is concerned, is
at what extent and how the EU will be able to build a common sense of belonging
that will be the base to overcome the “democratic deficit” and to reach a real and
efficient political unity. It is important to understand the necessity for European
identity to be inclusive and intrinsically plural, far from the modern national
patterns of purity, homogeneity and exclusion which lead to the outbreak of the
World Wars in XX century.
It would be impossible, and undesirable, for the EU to retrace the historical
path nation-states made in their period of formation: a European “demos” in the
modern sense has never existed, the continent has always been the house of
many different peoples and cultures, its borders are not fixed. That’s why, while
trying to build a new political structure, it is necessary to avoid any reference to
an allegedly common ethnic origin or to one single religious/cultural heritage
which would exclude some determined groups from being and feeling European.
5
InØs M. Gómez Chacón (ed.), European Identity. Individual, Group and Society, Bilbao, University
of Deusto, Ediw & Humanitariannet, 2003, p. 74.
8
The Treaty of Lisbon, art. 2, reads:
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance,
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”.
The only way of making people identify with Europe without trying to
replace national affiliations is by building a completely different kind of
community, basing the political project not on a “fictive ethnicity” or homogeneity,
but on a set of shared values and common principles. As Thomas Jansen
well
expresses, a consensus on a set of core values is needed in order to pursue
political unity, to give coherence to its actions and legitimacy to its institutions
6
.
6
T. Jansen (edited by), Reflections on European identity, European Commission, Forward Studies
Unit, Working Paper, 1999.
11
CHAPTER 1
IDENTITY AND OTHERNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In this first chapter the concept of identity is analysed in historical
perspective, a very important point of departure to better understand the present
situation and its possible evolutions. Starting from the Ancient Greece, where the
collective dimension of the polis was predominant over the Self, the discourse
then deals with the notion of citizenship adopted in the Roman Empire and the
new universalistic identity brought by Christianity in the Middle Ages, which faded
away in the period of the great geographic discoveries and the outbreak of
religious conflicts (XV-XVI century). The next step is Hobbes's conception of the
State, which marked the beginning of the Modern Age. With the cultural
symbolism linked to concept of People, the State becomes national and a new
form of collective identity is established, based on ethnicity, history, culture,
language and the awareness of sharing a common origin and a common destiny.
In conclusion of this historical path, the focus will be on today’s challenges to the
state form and to collective identities brought by globalisation, referring among
others to Amartya Sen’s work.
1.1. The First Conception of “We” and “the Others”
The concept of identity is always present throughout history, as part of
integral human development. As far as its social and political dimension is
concerned, it can basically be perceived in two ways, the two sides of the same
coin: a) recognising oneself as belonging to a group, because of some
characteristics or behaviours (identity); b) recognising oneself and one’s group as
different from other groups (otherness).
The Italian politologist Carlo Galli describes how this concept has changed
through the centuries, from the Classical Antiquity to the postmodern era of
12
globalisation
7
.
Identity in Ancient Greece had a strong definition, related to the belonging
to a polis: probably due to the mountainous territory, which made
communications quite difficult, each of them kept its specificity and the political
fragmentation sharpened the rivalries among different poleis. Despite this, there
was a rooted sense of belonging to the same civilisation, based on culture and
“ghenos”, particularly evident in wartime during military invasions. Barbarians,
that is to say “anyone who is not Greek”, were excluded twice, both from the
political and the cultural community; Barbarians par excellence were the
Persians, whose cultural inferiority was deduced merely from geographical
provenience. As Aristotle pointed out, a despotic regime would have been a bad
thing for the Greeks, but it was the best one for Barbarian peoples because of
their intrinsically servile mentality
8
.
In Ancient Rome ghenos was not the predominant element for the definition
of a political identity: the territorial extension reached by the Empire and the
mixture of peoples and cultures under the same authority made it impossible to
refer to a pure cultural or ethnic principle: the new institution created is called
“citizenship”. This is a legal status which at first provided particular privileges to
the inhabitants of the city of Rome (e.g. juridical subjectivity, tax cuts etc.) but
then, following a series of concessions to the conquered peoples ended with the
Edict of Caracalla in 212 A.D., became only a symbol of subjection to the
authority of the Emperor. Differently from the polites, whose identity was
established at birth and didn’t change, no one was a priori excluded from being a
civis: the political community followed the territorial expansion.
A different discourse has to be made regarding Middle Ages, a period of
European history that witnessed the spread of Christianity as the predominant
source of identity-building: this wasn’t of course a political but a cultural
belongingness, however capable of reducing the relevance of political bonds in
7
C. Galli, L'altro in prospettiva politica, in Griseldaonline, 2002-2003 (2).
8
Aristotle, Politics III, 1285th, 17-23.
13
the name of the universal brotherhood preached by the Church. The message of
Christ was potentially addressed to everyone, even to the people who at that
moment declared themselves as non-believers. In the universal Res Publica
Christiana the radical acceptation of otherness didn’t exist.
The power of identity-building attributed to Christianity faded away after the
outbreak of religious conflicts and the discovery of the New World in XV-XVI
century. The Native Americans represented a new form of otherness for
Europeans: they were human beings too, but with a totally different history and
culture. As Galli writes, two types of reaction could be found: on the one hand, a
hierarchical approach tending to underline the superiority of European culture
and way of life and the necessity to “civilise” Amerindian peoples, at the end
turned into their dramatic extermination; on the other hand the relativist
approach, not at all linked to the defence of a determined system of values,
putting in evidence the fact that European civilisation was full of contradictions
and crimes so any condemnation of other lifestyles was since the beginning a
sign of hypocrisy. Even the most violent and savage practices, like cannibalism,
were considered as only qualitative different from some common European
habits. The philosopher Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) wrote: “Three degrees of
latitude reverse all jurisprudence; a meridian decides the truth”
9
.
This last example on the discovery of the New World shows that the
perception of “the Other” in the Modern Age is progressively dissolving into a
mixture of irrelevant nuances. This takes us to a turning point in the history of
political identity: the vacuum left by Christian values needed to be refilled, and it
is in this very context that the modern political space called “state” began to take
shape. As Weber wrote, the threshold of modernity may be marked at the
moment when “the unquestioned legitimacy of a divinely preordained social order
began its decline”
10
.
9
B. Pascal, Thoughts (1672)
10
Eisenstadt Shmuel N. (edited by), “Multiple modernities”, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick
(U.S.A.), 2002
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