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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In producing this thesis, the author would like to express thanks to Chris Peet
and Sandra Swords of Emirates, Jeff Morgan of Delta Air Lines, Jim Konz of
United Airlines and Ron Lindsay of British Airways, for their assistance and
support with acquiring information.
A special acknowledgement goes to Jacky Davies of British Airways for
providing the inspiration to undertake this study. Her help and support made a
great contribution in the preparation of this thesis.
Many thanks also to:
Tom Curran Aer Lingus
Paul Collins Air 2000
Henry Bommer Air Canada
Captain Gualtiero Ferraroni Alitalia
Captain Brian J. Bradley British Midland
Norm Dawkins Canadian
Steven Lau Cathay Pacific
Jan G.M. Meijer KLM
Jocelyn Guy Qantas
Douglas M. Aspinall Saudi Arabian Airlines
Pat Macfarlane South African Airways
Landra Greenhill US Airways
Roy Bouttell Virgin Atlantic Airways
The author would also like to take this opportunity to thank his supervisor Frank
A. Taylor for his guidance and assistance.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
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1.1 Background
The recent figures about aircraft accidents emphasise the fact that the air
transport industry cannot relax about its safety record. If the present situation
does not look that good, the future looks even more shocking. In fact, if we take
into account the firmly established global traffic growth-rate (about 7% per
annum) and if the industry cannot improve its safety record, by 2010 we might
face one major accident per month with a death toll averaging 2600 passengers
per year.
In a business that is based almost entirely on public confidence any major
accident will have a tremendous impact; it will inevitably shake the public
confidence in the industry as a whole, and the airline(s) involved are likely to
suffer the most. For these reasons, it is vital for any airline to have contingency
plans to deal and manage crisis effectively.
Nick Ricciuti of the US State Department said after Lockerbie:
"You're only going to have one chance to handle a disaster right. If you screw it
up, you will remember it for the rest of your life".
No matter how clear the safety record, no airline should be caught unawares.
Nowadays, different airlines operate according to different emergency response
procedures and past accidents have underlined that many airlines do not have
effective plans to manage post-accident crisis. In some cases, carriers might not
have the adequate resources; in others, they might lack the proper
organisational structures. Indeed, some airlines do not have plans at all.
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Air transport is changing fast, heading towards and ever-increasing
globalisation. Business alliances are booming in this industry, where
partnerships come in all size and shapes with hundreds of new agreements
formed every year, old ones cancelled and existing ones expanded.
If we critically analyse the likely impact of this high level of integration on airlines'
emergency planning and response, Ricciuti's statement sounds even more
threatening.
Airline partnerships are not just about "let's slap each others name on the
aircraft tail and off we go". There is more at stake.
For what concerns emergency planning and response, airlines need to make
sure - when they enter a partnership - that a standard level preparedness is
achieved at network level.
1.2 Objectives
The main objective of this study is to provide guidance for the production of a set
of practicable guidelines for emergency procedures’ manuals that could be
adapted and adopted by airlines world-wide, taking into account the many
challenges posed by globalisation and integration in the air transport industry.
In order to give indications for a workable, practical set of guidelines to put
together emergency procedures and subsequent emergency response, the
following are seen as key areas:
• An analysis of the emergency response procedures of a selection of airlines
located in different geographical areas, from the very small to the very large.
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• The problems that have arisen following some of the recent international
accidents.
• The likely impact of the new US legislation (The US Aviation Disaster Family
Assistance Act of 1996, The Foreign Air Carrier Support Act of 1997 and the
Enhanced Passenger Manifest Rule of 1998) on airlines’ emergency
planning and response.
1.3 Research Methodology
In order to achieve the above objectives, great emphasis has been placed on
different research techniques to optimise efficiency and quality of the data that
have been collected.
An extensive literature research and background study has been carried out
through the analysis of:
• Academic literature and industry journals (mainly to gather information on
past accidents);
• Various airlines' Emergency Procedures & Crisis Management Manuals (to
gather information on actual practices).
Several airlines' Emergency Response Managers have also been interviewed.
As an essential piece of research, the interview has been a crucial method of
obtaining primary information on airlines' practices with particular reference to
procedures, facilities, resources and manpower.
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A specially designed questionnaire (see appendix A) has been distributed to all
airlines members of the IATA Emergency Response Planning Work Group, in
order to gather a wide range of relevant information on the actual Emergency
Planning and Response Procedures and other key areas such as training and
exercise.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The research involved in this thesis is divided in seven chapters of which this
represents the first being the introduction to the area of research. Chapter two
offers an insight into the air transport industry and its high level of consolidation
and globalisation. Alliances, codesharing and franchising are analysed and the
impact of a disaster on the business is discussed. This chapter also introduces
the IATA Emergency Response Planning Work Group (ERPWG) underlining the
commitment of some IATA airlines to share ideas and work together to improve
emergency planning and response practices at industry level.
Chapter three discusses the actual practices in airlines' emergency response
and analyses the problems that have followed some of the recent international
accidents. The new US legislation on Family Assistance and the rule on
Enhanced Passenger Manifest are reviewed, and their impact on emergency
planning and response discussed.
Chapter four introduces the problems that might arise in managing a crisis with
an airline partner; underlines the practices that are being adopted by airlines in
this respect, and offers some indications for practical solutions. This chapter
also includes a list of guidelines for the production of Emergency Response
Manuals.
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Chapter five offers examples of good practices at a more general level, gathered
analysing different airlines emergency response procedures. These “good
practices” are seen as a complement to the indications given in the previous
chapters in order to produce a practical and workable set of guidelines.
Chapter six features a case study. In this chapter, a detailed analysis of the
Crisis Management procedures adopted by Emirates is carried out with
particular reference to the company's pro-active approach to Emergency
Planning and Response especially with its codeshare partners.
Finally chapter seven presents the conclusions of this research with regard to
which actions should the industry undertake in order improve practices and
eventually standardise the level of response to a major accident.
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CHAPTER 2
The airline industry and the impact of
disasters
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2.1 New airline philosophy
The airline industry is changing fast and it seems to be moving to the brink of a
consolidation wave, heading towards an ever-increasing globalisation.
Partnerships come in all sizes and shapes with hundreds of new agreements
formed every year, old one cancelled and existing ones expanded.
In 1998 there were an estimated 502 alliances in operation world wide,
compared to around 363 in 1997 and 280 in 1994. In 1998 Air France (28) and
American (26) topped the table for "most alliances" (Gallacher 1998).
Table 2.1 Alliance Summary 1998-94
Alliance summary 1998-94* 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994
Number of Alliances 502 363 390 324 280
With Equity Stakes 56 54 62 58 58
New Alliances 121 72 71 50 -
Number of Airlines 196 177 159 153 136
*Source: Airline Business, June 1988
Although the first alliances between airlines appeared more than thirty years
ago, it is only since the 1980s that this phenomenon has become prevalent in
the air transport industry. In the USA, deregulation was the driving force behind
the evolution of partnership agreements between carriers, and particularly in the
forging of alliances to secure feed traffic by smaller airlines into the hub
operations of the major carriers. This process of building hub and spoke
networks has spread rapidly in international aviation, originating an impetus
towards international alliances.
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Alliances have emerged in response to a number of features of the aviation
industry. Low profitability in the airline business has placed increasing pressure
on airlines to control and reduce their costs. Alliances have represented one
way for airlines to achieve these objectives. In addition, partnership agreements
between airlines have provided carriers with a means of overcoming to some
extent the restrictions on foreign ownership and capacity under bilateral air
service agreements and limited access to airport infrastructure in some markets.
Alliances can potentially lower operating costs, mainly reducing the variable and
fixed costs of servicing particular routes and the indirect costs associated with
operating the airline business. Unit costs may also fall as a result of economies
associated with greater traffic density.
2.2 The nature of alliances
Alliances in the airline business can be defined as agreements between carriers
to cooperate in the provision or operation of some of their airline services. This
kind of agreements can differ enormously. For example, they might incorporate
coordination of flight scheduling, baggage handling, catering, ground services,
maintenance, frequent flyer programmes and airport lounges. Sometimes
alliances include equity holding arrangements that may further strengthen the
partnership between the airlines. Increasingly, airlines have sought to engage in
the practice of codesharing whereby one airline sells seats on a flight operated
by another airline. In some cases, alliances have extended to joint pricing and
selling of capacity.
Alliances can also vary in their extent of coordination and geographical
coverage. They may be route-specific, involving the coordination of activities or
flights between specific city-pairs. More complex alliances have sought to
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closely coordinate cost sharing and marketing initiatives over a larger
geographical area such as between countries or regions. In some cases, the
networks of international carriers have been so closely interlinked as to provide
the appearance of a seemingly global network.
The following diagram illustrates the major links between airlines and alliance
groups considering the situation at June 1998.
Figure 2.1 The Big Four Alliances
Source Airline Business 1998
Swissair
Sabena
Turkish
TAP
Austrian
AOM
United
Lufthansa
SAS
Air Canada
Thai
Varig
Northwest
KLM
Alitalia
Braathens
Kenya
JAS
SIA
Air New Zealand
Ansett
Continental
America West
Aces
Aeromexico
AeroPeru
ANA
Mexicana
Air France
Delta
American
Canadian
Aerolinas
Avianca
Lan Chile
Taca
TAM
BA
Qantas
Finnair
LOT
Japan Airlines
Iberia
US Airways
Star Alliance
and close affiliates
American-British Airways
alliance
KLM-Northwest &
Continetal Group
Delta-Swissair Group
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The Star Alliance is the only genuine global multilateral alliance. In the other
alliance groups, all of the partners do not have alliances with all the others. Air
France is shown separately because it has alliances with both Delta and
Continental. The Delta-United alliance does not involve other partners for now,
so the Delta –Swissair Group remains separate from the Star Group.
This table only includes genuine strategic alliances; most carriers also have
route-specific alliances, which can involve carriers in competing strategic
alliances. For example, Malaysia Airlines codeshares with Swissair and with
KLM, while South African Airways codeshares with Lufthansa and American.
2.2.1 Codesharing
Codesharing is a key element of many international airline alliances. A
codeshare agreement allows airlines to coordinate their schedules to ser e
more destinations without having to add planes or staff. This involves airline "X"
(the codesharing partner) in placing its airline designator code on other airlines'
services (the operating carriers) and selling those services as though they are its
own. An example of this comes from British Airways. In 1996, BA decided to
withdraw its own services from New Zealand. However, in order to maintain a
presence in the market British Airways entered into a codesharing agreement
with Qantas, under which the BA designator code is carried on Qantas services
between Los Angeles and Auckland. Br tish Airways sells London-Auckland as
though it is an on-line connection.
It is worth noting that the British Airways-Qantas partnership goes far beyond a
simplistic codeshare agreement. BA has a commercial interest in the Australian
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carrier (it owns 25% of Qantas) and their marketing partnership involves a high
level of cooperation in many areas.
Codesharing can take many different forms and there are varying degrees of
intensity of cooperation. Unlike the British Airways/Qantas case, British Midland
provides an example of intense codesharing activity that is not always linked to
a high degree of cooperation in other areas. In fact, this airline has always
maintained a high degree of independence, notwithstanding the fact that it has
codeshare agreements with 19 international carriers on (mostly) UK domestic
routes.
2.2.2 Franchising
Franchising is a well-known concept in business, and to determine its success
as a powerful business tool, we only have to look at some of the best-known
“high street” examples, such as McDonald’s, Pizza Hut, etc. Franchising
together with codesharing, is also a well-known feature for the air transport
industry. The difference between codesharing and franchising is that a
franchisee takes on the full brand of the franchiser, rather than just the code.
This business practice allows small airlines to benefit from the brand image,
marketing and distribution experience of the franchiser (major carrier). On the
other hand, it enables services to operate on routes too thin to be attractive to
the major carriers.
Of course franchising, as a concept, depends very much on the perceived
success and marketability of the franchiser. If for any reason the franchiser
becomes unsuccessful, or is no longer acceptable, then the franchisee is likely
to suffer accordingly. On the other hand, if the franchisee cannot deliver a
service that matches the standards set by the franchiser, the latter is likely to
suffer a decline in image and reputation.
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2.3 The impact of a disaster on the business
Flying is still undeniably the safest way to travel. Ironically, we often hear that
driving to the airport is more dangerous than the flight itself. In addition,
considering the thousand upon thousand of airline passengers that travel every
day without incident, statistics are there to remind us that we have more
chances of winning the lottery jackpot than to be involved in an aviation
accident.
However, the recent figures about aircraft accidents emphasise the fact that the
air transport industry cannot relax about its safety record. Accident rates are
quite low; nevertheless, they are not going down as fast as the industry is
growing. In fact, if we take into account the firmly established global traffic
growth-rate of about 7%, and if the industry cannot improve its safety record, by
2010 we might face one major accident per month with a death toll averaging
2600 people per year. This shocking forecast for the future is clearly
unacceptable to the travelling public, politicians, and the air transport industry
itself.
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