China in Latin America: political and economic implications of Beijing's involvement in the region

1. SINO-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR 
The early years 1949-1960 
Ever since the birth of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Latin America has never been a top 
priority in Communist China's international relations; Beijing's policy towards the region was - and 
still is 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall – mainly a by-product of decisions that had more to 
do with its own internal issues and the global dynamics than with specific goals in the area south of 
the Rio Grande. 
In October 1949, after years of struggle against the nationalist Kuomintang, the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) under the leadership of Mao Zedong gained full control of the country's mainland, and 
founded the People's Republic of China. The CCP had to deal with a big set of problems: 
domestically, it had to won the political loyalty of part of the population (businessmen, landlords 
3
and intellectuals) and to lead the difficult process of economic recovery from the pains of WWII 
and the civil war. Internationally, a choice had to be made on which camp to join and some security 
problems had to be addressed; its sovereignty was contended by the Taiwan-based Republic of 
China (ROC), who occupied the Chinese seat at the United Nations. 
In Mao‘s view, the world after the 1939-‗45 conflict was headed towards a confrontation between 
the Soviet Union and the United States, with Washington scrambling for the control over an 
4
intermediate zone that had no say in it: in this scenario, China had to choose its stand and to ―lean 
5
to one side‖ in order to avoid international isolation. The PRC picked the side of the Soviets; this 
implied acceptance and imitation of their economic model and the severance of Kuomintang‘s 
diplomatic relations with Western states, who were also deemed responsible for the Century of 
3
Mann S. (2002), Discovery of a Terra Incognita: Five Decades of Chinese Foreign Policy towards Latin America, 
Universitat Mainz. 
4
Barmouin B., Changgen Y .(1998), Chinese foreign policy during the cultural revolution, New York, Kegan Paul. 
5
Mann, Discovery of a Terra Incognita, cit. 
10 
Shame, that started with the Opium War of 1840-‗42 and ended with the foundation of the PRC. 
6
In this first phase of the Maoist era, ideology was the main driving force of Chinese foreign policy, 
whose goal was two-fold: support for the anti-imperialist struggle all over the world, and, after the 
Sino-Soviet dispute of the late ‗50s, fight for supremacy within the communist camp. 
When dealing with Latin America, Chinese ideology faced a harsh reality: there really wasn‘t much 
room for the penetration of Marxism-Leninism in the area. The region as a whole was perceived, 
somehow correctly, as the backyard of the United States, that would hardly tolerate any departure 
from orthodox capitalist economic policy and western bloc loyalty in its own hemisphere. Bolivia‘s 
Paz Estenssoro was the very only political leader to carry out ―policies the Chinese considered 
7
generally progressive‖. As a matter of fact, until 1970 all Latin American countries, with the 
exception of Castro‘s Cuba, followed the U.S. non-recognition policy towards the PRC. 
Other factors were hindering the establishment of relevant ties between China and the region. 
Distance was a major impediment, to begin with: particularly in the first half of the decade, the 
Dragon had more compelling problems to solve both outside (the Korean War, worsening relations 
with the Soviet Union and India) and inside its borders (the consolidation of the Stalinist model and 
the dreadful Giant Leap Forward hazard). 
Neither there was an economic rationale for intensifying contacts with Central and South American 
countries: their economies were not complementary with the Chinese one, and there was also an 
8
official ban on some Chinese products for the fear of communist subversion. Nevertheless, even in 
the absence of formal ties, trade volume from 1950 to 1959 – especially primary goods with 
Uruguay, Argentina and Chile – quadrupled, and reached US$ 38.8 million, 37.5 of which were 
6
For Robinson and Shambaugh, ―an ideology may be roughly defined as a more or less coherent and systematic body of 
ideas that helps to explain the nature of social reality and provides a programme of action for changing that reality in 
order to achieve certain desired social goods and values. In this sense, Marxism-Leninism (and its Chinese variant of 
Mao Zedong Thought) is unquestionably the dominant ideology in shaping and informing the views, preferences, 
expectations, and assumptions of Chinese Communists who work in the foreign affairs arena.‖ Robinson T.W., 
Shambaugh D. (1994), Chinese foreign policy : theory and practice, Oxford, Clarendon press. 
7
Ratliff W.E. (1972), Communist China and Latin America, 1949-1972, "Asian Survey", V ol. 12, No. 10, pp. 846-863. 
8
Mann, Discovery of a Terra Incognita, cit. 
11 
9
China's imports. 
Under those circumstances, the main bond between the PRC and Latin America in the first phase of 
the Cold War was ―cultural diplomacy‖. Beijing‘s interest towards the area was spurred in time and 
scope by domestic and international considerations: in the second half of the decade, the party‘s 
grasp on the power was strong and consolidated, the Korean War was over and the Soviets had just 
scored a point in the competition with the West by launching the first earth satellite in 1957. The 
following year, U.S. Vice-President Richard Nixon was targeted with verbal protests (in Uruguay) 
and life-threatening hail of stones (in Peru and Venezuela) during his South American goodwill visit. 
This, together with the overthrow of some dictators, convinced the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai that 
―the Latin American peoples are standing in the forefront of… [the] struggle against U.S. 
1011
imperialism‖. Beijing‘s contribution to this struggle would be chiefly ―moral‖ and ideological. 
The 1956 South American tour of a Chinese art group can be fairly considered the starting point of 
the Dragon‘s cultural diplomacy towards the region; in the following years, Radio Beijing‘s 
broadcasts in Spanish and Portuguese were increased, branch offices of the China News Agency 
were opened in Cuba, Chile, Brazil and Argentina. Pro-Chinese information in Spanish begun to 
12
circulate in the region, mainly via Cuba. 
Due to the non-existence of normal diplomatic channels and the shortage of economic resources, it 
was difficult for Beijing to send large delegations to Latin America periodically, but having Latin 
Americans visit China – under the supervision of the Chinese People‘s Association for Cultural 
Relations with Foreign Countries, established in 1950, the Sino-Latin American Friendship 
Association inaugurated in 1960, or sector-based federations - proved to be an efficient way to set 
up contacts. The common contempt for the materialistic U.S. society helped familiarize well 
educated Latin Americans (artists, intellectuals, trade union leaders, students, free lancers) with 
their Asiatic counterparts; Communists were present in all kinds of delegation, often not identified. 
By the end of the decade the number of Latin American visitors rose up to 500, coming from all 
9
He Li (1991), Sino-Latin American Economic Relations, Praeger, New York. 
10
Ratliff W.E. (1969), Chinese Communist Cultural Diplomacy toward Latin America, 1949-1960, in ―The Hispanic 
American Historical Review‖, V ol. 49, No.1, pp.53-79. 
11
Barmouin B., Changgen Y .(1998), Chinese foreign policy during the cultural revolution, New York, Kegan Paul. 
12
Garner W.R. (1968), The Sino-Soviet Ideological Struggle in Latin America, "Journal of Inter-American Studies", V ol. 
10, No. 2, pp. 244-255. 
12 
over the region; though bigger countries received more attention, the PRC welcomed broad 
13
delegations from small States as Uruguay and, for obvious reasons, Cuba. A decline in the number 
would come in the 1960s. 
The visits would usually take the form of a tour and follow a standard pattern: encounters with 
people of their own occupation, stops at a peasant village or commune, meetings with reformed 
businessmen, tours to the Great Wall and other attractions, possibility to attend services for those 
Protestant or Roman Catholic. An interview with Chairman Mao or some other top dignitary, in 
groups if that was the case, was almost the rule. The guests, especially journalists, were asked ―to 
14
make speeches and write articles about their countries and give their impression of new China‖, 
and their commentaries usually resembled an eulogy. ―A few of the visitors saw through many of 
the misleading Chinese propaganda claims, which were at an all-time high between 1958 and 1960 
during the Great Leap Forward. These individuals, however, did not write as much as the others on 
their return, or if they did speak out, their remarks were considered biased by the leftists who where 
15
their main audience‖. 
Beijing was thus able to achieve its 3 main goals: increasing anti-Americanism and weakening U.S. 
position at a regional and global stage; propagating the Chinese way to economic and social 
development and occasionally to the seizure of political power; improving the PRC‘s image and 
capitalising on that on major foreign policy issues like the contended China's U.N. seat. Visits and 
meetings were also a valuable means of providing training in Communist ideology and 
16
revolutionary techniques. 
Chinese cultural penetration in Latin America in the ‗50s was favoured by Soviet complacency: the 
events of 1959 would dramatically change the scenario. Not only the Cuban revolution would add 
on to the ongoing Sino-Soviet dispute, making of Beijing ―Russia‘s number two enemy in the 
17
hemisphere‖, but it would also bring about a Chinese reassessment of Latin America‘s anti-
imperialist capabilities. 
From the Cuban Revolution to the Strategic Triangle 
The rift within the communist camp had part of its roots in security issues, but ideology played a 
13
Ratliff, Chinese Communist Cultural Diplomacy, cit. 
14
Ibidem. 
15
Ibidem. 
16
Ibidem. 
17
Garner, The Sino-Soviet Ideological Struggle, cit. 
13 
role too, and different analyses of Castro‘s successful seizure of power increased tensions. For 
18
Moscow, not only it shattered ―the myth of an invulnerable Latin America under U.S. control‖, but 
it was also an injury to the Krushev doctrine of peaceful coexistence; the Chinese on the other hand 
19
saw it as a confirmation of Lenin‘s theory on the inevitability of war, provoked by imperialism. 
Cuba was the first Latin American country to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China, 
recognizing it in 1960; the PRC in turn would recognize the ―socialist nature‖ of the Cuban 
20
Revolution in 1962, before the Soviet Union. 
Castro‘s triumph caused the PRC to change its mind about Latin American unreadiness for 
21
revolution; the Cuban guerrilla was praised as an example and Mao‘s principles of armed struggle 
and united front led by the alliance between the working class and the peasantry were emphasized 
among Latin American opinion makers, journalists and intellectuals, that would now constitute the 
main target of the Dragon‘s cultural diplomacy. 
Pre-1949 China‘s semi-feudal and semi-colonial social structure was similar to that of Central and 
South America, dominated by U.S. imperialism and plagued by latifundium; therefore the Chinese 
way of a national democratic movement pivoting on the peasants belligerent against the local 
dictatorships could be the just recipe for revolution. Latin American Sino-Communism would then 
be in theory mostly rural and guerrillero, in opposition to the urban-based Soviet-style parties. 
Armed struggle, which in 1958-‘59 was invoked as the main form of conflict only against dictators 
22
and U.S. puppets, became to be considered the best option for a broader range of countries; the 
most important pro-Chinese organizations and parties were formed in South America, usually after 
years of internal conflict, and themselves split up in rival factions; though advocating the need for 
violence, they mostly abstained from implementing it, asserting that the masses weren‘t ready for 
people‘s war – thereby contradicting the PRC‘s analysis. The bulk of the ―pro-Chinese‖ youth 
showed little interest in Mao‘s theory or the Chinese experience, just associating the term to ―super-
23
revolutionary‖, in a non-pejorative sense. As Mora puts it, ―at the end of 1970, there were fifty-
 18
Ibidem. 
19
Mann, Discovery of a Terra Incognita, cit. 
20
Ratliff, Communist China and Latin America, cit. 
21
Lee J.J. (1964), Communist China's Latin American Policy, "Asian Survey", V ol. 4, No. 11, pp. 1123-1134. 
22
Ratliff, Communist China and Latin America, cit. 
23
Ibidem. 
14 
24
nine Communist parties in the region, of which only eight supported Beijing‖. The breach 
between what Beijing was championing and what alleged Latin American pro-Chinese groups were 
doing was apparent. 
International and domestic problems intertwined again in the 1960s: fearful of a U.S. encirclement 
and worried about the growing tensions with the Soviet Union (and its consequent shrinking 
financial and technical aid), Mao set the worldwide exportation of the Chinese revolutionary model, 
with its corollary of self-reliance, at the core of his foreign policy; the battle, in Latin America as 
elsewhere in the developing world, was double: against U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. 
By the end of the decade it was evident that Beijing was unable to win either, and that it had more 
pressing problems to solve at home; its efforts to initiate armed struggles in the region proved vain. 
Economic considerations and a changing global scenario determined the PRC‘s re-thinking of some 
of its traditional foreign policy assumptions and its new behaviour in the international arena. 
The party dignitaries realized that opening to the outside world was a key to achieve development, 
but the most radicals among them feared the birth of a technocrat elite that would transform itself 
into a new bourgeoisie. A compromise between these two different demands resulted in a new 
definition of economic self-reliance, which evolved into ―the ability to take advantage of external 
25
factors without becoming dependent on them‖; politically, the concept now implied that China 
would stop trying to export its experience and respect each country‘s political choice, while at the 
same time guaranteeing support for liberation and independence. 
Between 1968 and 1969 the split from the Soviet Union was a fact. Moscow‘s invasion of 
Czechoslovakia came as a threatening sign to Beijing, who, in accordance to the Breznev Doctrine, 
was breaking away from socialism and could have been object of ―reorientation‖ intervention just 
like the Czechs; the border conflict on the Usury River and the menace of a Soviet nuclear attack 
were the final straws and forced the PRC to break its isolation and approach the United States, who 
had their own stakes in containing the USSR and engaging with the Chinese. 
24
Mora F.O. (1997), The People's Republic of China and Latin America: From Indifference to Engagement, ―Asian 
Affairs‖, Spring: 24, p.35-58. 
25
Mann, Discovery of a Terra Incognita, cit. 
15 
Reconciliation with Washington brought tremendous benefits to Communist China, the election at 
the U.N. in replacement of the ROC as unique representative of China to begin with (October 1971). 
Along came the establishment of diplomatic relations with fifteen countries, Chile, Peru, Mexico 
and Argentina among them (from 1970 to 1972). In return for Latin American support for its entry 
in the U.N., the PRC backed the region in its claims relative to the Law of the Sea, hereby 
inaugurating a tit for tat policy that would be used again. 
The pragmatic 1970s 
The shift in Chinese foreign policy couldn‘t be greater: by re-approaching the United States and 
entering the strategic triangle with Washington and Moscow, Beijing had evolved from a 
revolutionary destabilising to a status quo power. A theoretical justification for its new preference 
for stability over support to uprisings was necessary, and came in two steps: in 1972 Deng 
announced the end of the socialist camp and categorized China as belonging to the Third World; 
two years later Mao elaborated the Three-Worlds Theory, according to which the industrialized 
allies of the U.S. and the USSR (the Second World) should tag along the less developed and non-
aligned countries (the Third World) in search for a more just and peaceful international order, 
against the two superpowers‘ (the First World) hegemonism. Though still pitting the U.S. (and the 
Soviet Union) against the poor and oppressed nations, and calling for action, the theory was 
remarkably less ideological than the past ones, and its implications were indeed very pragmatic: 
―cooperation with any government other than the superpowers could be justified as a means of 
26
promoting solidarity against hegemonism […] even with the fascist regimes in Greece and Spain‖. 
A natural corollary of this was a reduction in Chinese support for revolutionary movements in Latin 
America and the development of a government-to-government diplomacy: ―China was willing to 
maintain diplomatic relations with all nations and governments in Latin America and promised to 
27
respect the principle of non-interference in internal affairs‖. Ideology was giving way to politics 
and economics; at the cost of losing leverage and credibility within the communist camp, Beijing 
28
now focused on official and institutional bonds. This innovation - Cuban criticism notwithstanding 
26
Roy, D. (1998), China‟ s foreign relations, Basingstoke, London, MacMillan. 
27
Mann, Discovery of a Terra Incognita, cit. 
28
A thorough analysis of the topic is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but two considerations can be made about 
Sino-Cuban relations: 1) besides bilateral matters, they reflected Cold War dynamics, especially the conditions of 
Sino-Soviet ties and its implications on Cuba‘s economy and internal politics; 2) at times, they were ―particularly 
tense because Beijing and Havana both claimed Third World leadership‖. Mora F. (1999), Sino-Latin American 
16 
- came at the right time, because governments in the region were ready and willing to develop ties 
with States other than the U.S. and its Western allies. 
Chile is an obvious example of that: it‘s no surprise that the socialist president Salvador Allende 
was eager to establish relations with Communist China, and his country - the first in South America 
to do so - recognized the PRC in 1970, even before Beijing‘s admission to the United Nations. 
Interestingly, ties weren‘t cut in 1973, when a military coup overthrew Allende‘s government and 
installed the fascist dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet; common anti-Sovietism helps explaining this 
decision, but above all was the principle of non-interference: China was the only country in the U.N. 
not to condemn Chile‘s events. For another reason, 1973 was a milestone year in Sino-Latin 
American relations, as the first Head of State from the region visited Beijing: it was Mexican 
President Luis Echeverría, also the first to sign an agreement of scientific and technological 
cooperation with China two years later. 
Cooperation and trade were on the top of Chinese Latin American agenda in the ‗70s: commercial 
29
ties were established before the diplomatic ones, and ―irresistible‖financial and disaster relief aid 
came along. Beijing had made public in 1960 its desire for Latin America's "rich industrial raw 
30
materials and mineral products, particularly nitrate and copper from Chile"; in that decade, 
average annual two-way trade figures had reached US$ 200 million, and the main partners became 
Cuba, Argentina, Mexico and Chile. Chinese imports from the region were showing the usual 
pattern of extreme concentration: in 1965, just 3 goods made up 99% of Latin America's export to 
31
the Asian country: wheat (90%), maize (3.9%), cotton (5.4%). The trend continued in the 1970s. 
Economic benefit was just part of the picture: ―the ulterior motive was to use trade as a tool for 
32
attaining political objectives, such as diplomatic recognition‖, in order to eventually isolate 
Taiwan at the international level. 
Relations: Sources and Consequences, 1977-1997, "Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs", V ol. 41, 
No. 2, pp. vi-116. Cheng Y . (2007), Sino-Cuban Relations during the Early Years of the Castro Regime, 1959-1966, 
―Journal of Cold War Studies‖, V ol. 9, No.3, pp.78-114. 
29
Even though the region received the lowest amount of the overall Dragon‘s foreign aid, its conditions were 
particularly profitable, and better than the Soviet ones: ―loans generally have repayments delayed for ten years, are 
repayable in 20 to 30 years, and are interest free.‖ Ratliff, Communist China and Latin America, cit. Mann, 
Discovery of a Terra Incognita, cit. 
30
He Li (1991), Sino-Latin American Economic Relations, cit., p.23. 
31
Ibidem. 
32
Mora F. (1999), Sino-Latin American Relations, cit. 
17