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Abstract
L’opinione pubblica è un elemento che viene preso sempre più in considerazione nelle
analisi e nei dibattiti relativi al progetto di integrazione europea. Prima di capire come
l’atteggiamento dell’opinione pubblica verso l’Europa abbia subìto mutazioni nel tempo,
è necessario conoscere il percorso che ha portato alla nascita dell’Unione Europea,
evidenziando come si è passati da un progetto iniziale di tipo meramente economico alla
creazione di una vera e propria unione economica e politica. La chiave di lettura per
comprendere la diffusione dell’Euroscetticismo, infatti, è insita nel momento in cui, con
il Trattato di Maastricht del 1992, sono stati fissati i pilastri dell’Unione Europea.
L’aumento delle competenze attribuite all’Unione e l’obiettivo della creazione di un
Unione economica monetaria, con la fissazione dei cosiddetti parametri di convergenza,
hanno portato parte dell’opinione pubblica a compiere un passo indietro nel sostegno
all’integrazione comunitaria, passando da quello che è stato definito un “permissive
consensus” ad un “constraining dissensus”. Mentre fino al Trattato di Maastricht
l’opinione pubblica era fondamentalmente favorevole al processo di integrazione
europea, dagli anni ’90 si assiste all’aumento dell’opposizione pubblica e allo sviluppo e
consolidamento dell’Euroscetticismo. Questo fenomeno, che è stato definito dagli
studiosi in modi diversi, può essere analizzato da diversi punti di vista. In questa tesi,
basandomi sulle ricerche effettuate da alcuni politologi, cercherò di capire in cosa consiste
il fenomeno dell’Euroscetticismo, come viene definito e categorizzato dai vari autori e i
tentativi di misurazione effettuati. Mi concentrerò dunque sull’analisi di due tipologie di
euroscetticismo: quello popolare, che riguarda l’opinione pubblica dei cittadini, e quello
partitico, diffuso invece tra i partiti politici. Verranno poi individuati, in base all’oggetto,
due livelli di opposizione: quella nei confronti dell’attuale regime politico dell’UE e
quella verso il continuo processo d’integrazione europea. Nel lavoro verrà poi spiegata la
distinzione tra il tipo di sostegno diffuso e quello specifico adottata da vari studiosi come
Kopecký e Mudde. In riferimento al sostegno pubblico, è importante spiegare i tre
approcci principali utilizzati: l’approccio utilitario, quello identitario e, infine, l’approccio
cue-taking & benchmarking. Le analisi multidimensionali dei vari autori mostrano
caratteristiche e sfumature diverse dell’euroscetticismo e, talvolta, giungono a
conclusioni contrastanti. Anche per quanto riguarda le cause che hanno portato al declino
del sostegno dell’opinione pubblica, esse sono molto varie e sono state percepite in modo
differente dagli autori. Riguardo l’euroscetticismo partitico, i diversi studiosi hanno
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individuato diverse categorie; tra queste, di grande importanza è la distinzione tra
euroscetticismo “hard” e “soft” di Taggart e Szczerbiak. Diverse sono anche le cause che
hanno portato nel tempo all’aumento dei cosiddetti “challenger parties” in Europa e alla
presa di posizione sempre più euroscettica anche da parte dei partiti mainstream. Nella
tesi prenderò anche in considerazione come l’euroscetticismo si sia anche diffuso e sia
stato a sua volta alimentato nell’ambiente dei mezzi di comunicazione di massa con
particolare riferimento al cosiddetto “effetto Murdoch” e al ruolo delle fake news. Il ruolo
dei mass media, infatti, è di fondamentale importanza per completare la spiegazione del
circolo vizioso che ha portato alla propagazione dell’Euroscetticismo; nella tesi verranno
esaminati i tre attori politici – popolazione, partiti e media – e verranno illustrati i legami
che ci sono tra essi e che conducono alla diffusione di ideali antieuropei. Per concludere,
grazie all’analisi dei dati forniti da Eurobarometro 91 del Giugno 2019, sarà possibile
rilevare le percezioni dei cittadini europei relativamente all’UE e alle sue istituzioni e le
loro prospettive per il futuro politico ed economico all’interno dell’Unione.
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Introduction
This dissertation aims to investigate the processes and causes that have led to the spread
of Euroscepticism in the Member States of the European Union. The goal is to understand
the reasons of the decline in public support for the European project; in particular,
attention is paid to two sectors in which this most occurred, i.e. public opinion and
political parties. My analysis will review a number of studios carried out by several
scholars, who have identified various models of Euroscepticism and studied the
phenomenon from the point of view of its object, i.e. the ways in which it manifests itself
but also of the political actors who express it. Moreover, scholars have tried to search out
the sources of the Eurosceptic phenomenon to understand where it originated from and
why it has spread so widely. As I will show in the following pages, these connections
cannot be made without taking into consideration the process of birth, growth and
development of the European Union. Therefore, it will be illustrated how we came at the
current European political structure and how the institutions of the Union have come to
obtain the current, numerous competences in the various sectors. After analysing
Euroscepticism in the public opinion and among political parties, I will also examine the
phenomenon at the media level: indeed, the role of the mass media is fundamental for the
purpose of my thesis to understand the influence they have had on the population,
especially on less "politically refined" people, as we will see in the following chapters
and in the conclusions. Therefore, the vicious circle leads the three political actors - mass
media, population and political parties - to influence each other in feeding resentments
towards the European Union.
This thesis is divided into six chapters.
In the first chapter, entitled “The process of European integration”, I will make an
historical excursus on the stages that characterize the history of the EU. The chapter
begins with the explanation of the Twentieth-century traditions of thought relating to the
European project, which spread with more conviction after the end of the Second World
War. After illustrating the victory of the functionalist approach, the chapter continues
with the analysis of the first steps that were taken to create the European Community:
from the Schuman Declaration, to the birth of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel
Community) in 1951 with the Treaty of Paris between the six original states, until the
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failure of the creation of the EDC (European Defense Community). Then, the chapter
continues with the narration of the events that led to the creation of the European Atomic
Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) and the EEC (European Economic Community)
with the Treaty of Rome of 1957. The crucial point of this paper is the examination of the
innovations introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, which gave birth to the
European Union; as a consequence of the innovations of this treaty, in fact, there was the
widespread diffusion of the Eurosceptic phenomenon, for the reasons that will be
illustrated in the following chapters. Then, the changes introduced by the Treaty of
Amsterdam in 1996 and the Treaty of Nice in 2000 are explained. The narration of the
evolutionary events of European Union ends with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, that is
divided into TEU (Treaty on European Union) and TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union). These treaties have abolished the "Maastricht pillars" and created
a new division of competences between the European Union and the current 27 Member
States. The first chapter ends with a list of the most important European institutions and
a brief summary of their functions.
In the second chapter (“The emergence of Euroscepticism”), the birth of the Eurosceptic
phenomenon and some of the causes that led to its diffusion are studied. The chapter
begins with the analysis of different models of Euroscepticism found by some political
scientists. P. Taggart and A. Szczerbiak distinguish between "hard Euroscepticism" and
"soft Euroscepticism"; C. Schäfer and M. Gross identify three possible levels of analysis
of the phenomenon, based on subject, object and methods. About the subject, they analyse
the "popular Euroscepticism", widespread among citizens, and the "party-based
Euroscepticism", widespread among the political parties. The two scholars distinguish
between a form of Euroscepticism which is expressed towards the European Union and
its current political regime on the one hand and a form of Euroscepticism towards the
process of European integration in general on the other hand. Finally, in relation to the
methods, Schäfer and Gross consider the studies of P. Kopecký and C. Mudde and
identify two forms of support towards the European Union, namely "diffuse support" and
"specific support". The second chapter concludes with an interesting analysis of the link
between Euroscepticism and the Euro crisis, which is widespread in Europe from 2007-
2008. After explaining the mechanism that triggered this global economic and financial
crisis, the research conducted by Schäfer and Gross illustrates the consequences of the
event on support for the EU. Using four macro-level variables, the two political scientists
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observe the strong links between the 2008 crisis and the decrease of specific support for
the EU regime, especially in the southern countries most affected economically. The
chapter ends with the research of F. Serricchio, who uses Eurobarometer data to
demonstrate that Euroscepticism is increased after the Euro crisis; this happened more in
the Eurozone countries compared to the States members who have not adopted the euro
as their currency.
The third chapter is dedicated, as it can be understood from the title, to the topic
"Euroscepticism and public opinion" and focuses on the analysis of the Eurosceptic
phenomenon from a popular point of view. In order to understand the reasons that have
led to an increase of this feeling of non-trust towards the European Union, it is necessary
to contextualize the changes that have taken place in public opinion, taking into
consideration the historical period and the stages of the European integration process. The
chapter shows that initially there was a "permissive consensus", that was a substantial
consensus of citizens towards the European project that was taking shape. It’s after the
Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 - which marks the transition from the European
Communities to the European Union - that there is an increase in the competences
reserved at European level and the consequent spread of anti-European ideals in public
opinion, maturing the transition to "constraining dissensus". Then, the third chapter
analyses the three main approaches developed by political scientists to motivate the
change in the degree of support of the population towards the European Union. Firstly,
there is the utilitarian approach, based on the analysis of individual costs and benefits;
secondly, there is the identity approach, which focuses on the concept of "national
identity"; finally, the cue-taking & benchmarking approach is based on the idea that the
EU is a topic too far from the daily life of citizens and that they rely on other actors to
shape their thinking towards the European project, such as the mass media. Finally, the
results of some studies conducted by various political scientists on the link between
Euroscepticism and public opinion are examined. L. McLaren shows the sources behind
the development of the Eurosceptic phenomenon. S.B. Hobolt and C.F. De Vries
distinguish between "support for the regime" and "support for policy" and make an
interesting observation about the link between the economic crisis and Euroscepticism,
explaining how for the most affected countries in the South and East Europe, the EU in
some cases represents a "lifesaver". Lastly, C. Schäfer and M. Gross perform a multilevel
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analysis on the specific support of public opinion for the regime and on the widespread
support for the unification process.
In the fourth chapter of the thesis, entitled "Euroscepticism of political parties", the
Eurosceptic phenomenon is analysed at the party level. It starts with a series of definitions
and classifications made by some political scientists; the most classic is that of A.
Szczerbiak and P. Taggart, who distinguish between "party-based hard opposition" and
"party-based soft opposition". An alternative conceptualization is that of P. Kopecký and
C. Mudde, who identify a typology of four types: "euroenthusiasts", "europragmatists",
"eurosceptics" and "eurorejects". Finally, C. Floods identifies six categories of parties:
"rejectionist", "revisionist", "minimalist", "gradualist", "reformist" and "maximalist". The
chapter continues with a list of behaviours, created by Szczerbiak and Taggart, which, if
adopted by a political party, do not allow to classify it as a Eurosceptic. Then, the two
political scientists divide the parties into "goal-seeking", which have a precise ideological
set-up, and "office-seeking", which base their political program on the changing opinions
of supporters and voters. The two scholars conclude that it is not possible to identify the
position of a party basing on the ideological family to which it belongs, because
ideologies can be shaped to obtain the best possible results in electoral terms. The choice
to use or not to use the European issue results from the combination of electoral "strategic
elements" with coalition "tactical elements", which are analysed in detail. Then, the fourth
chapter takes up the theory of C. Schäfer and M. Gross – seen in the second chapter of
this thesis – on the link between the Euro crisis and Euroscepticism. They demonstrate
that the crisis of 2008 had a strong impact on competition between political parties,
leading to two consequences: the emergence of "challenger parties", that are political
parties with extremely Eurosceptic visions, and the strengthening of mainstream parties
critical positions towards the EU. Then, it is reported the proposal made by S. Usherwood
and N. Startin to divide the Eurosceptic parties into four categories – sovereign parties,
Radical Right Parties (RRP), more radical left-wing parties and mainstream parties – and
some examples for each of the four types are given. Finally, the Euroscepticism in the
European party system is analysed, basing on the work of L. Hooghe, G. Marks and C.J.
Wilson. The three political scientists investigate the relationship between the positioning
of a political party in the Right/Left dimension and the positions expressed by the same
on the EU, obtaining an inverted U-curve that can be explained in the different ways, that
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are illustrated. Lastly, the scholars also analyse the GAL/TAN dimension, underlining the
strong connection between the location of a party within this dimension and its position
towards the EU.
The fifth chapter of the thesis is entitled "Euroscepticism of the media"; it analyses the
role of the mass media in the diffusion of the Eurosceptic phenomenon at the popular
level and, consequently, at the party level. The chapter begins with the explanation of the
research carried out by C. H. De Vreese, who investigates the relationship between the
"framing" of the media and the cynicism of public opinion towards the European
integration process. The scholar shows that Euroscepticism is also a function of the
information that citizens of EU Member States receive from the mass media on European
issues and that the media coverage given to the European Union affects the level of
Euroscepticism. However, the degree of incisiveness of the media depends on two factors:
the pervasiveness of the strategically exposed news and the individual characteristics of
the people, including the level of political sophistication. Then, the effects of the media
on public opinion in a specific country, the United Kingdom, are taken into account, with
particular regard to the Murdoch effect. Indeed, the entrepreneur has used his media
empire to implement an anti-EU campaign; thanks to the strong media coverage offered
by the various newspapers and television broadcasters, he has changed the political debate
relating to the European project and thus has increased British citizens' euroscepticism,
contributing to the start of the Brexit procedure. Finally, the fifth chapter focuses on
Euroscepticism fuelled by the web through the spread of fake news and on the battle of
the European institutions to guarantee access to truthful information on the internet.
The sixth and final chapter of the thesis is entitled "Present and future: Standard
Eurobarometer 91 analysis". The introduction explains what the Eurobarometer survey –
carried out by the TNS on behalf of the European Commission – consists of and the
importance that it assumes in the process of defining European policies. Then, the chapter
continues by reporting the most important data obtained from Standard Eurobarometer
91, the edition of the survey carried out in June 2019. Moreover, the main events that
occurred between autumn 2018 – month in which the EB90 survey was carried out - and
spring 2019 are shown, so that we can consciously compare the data obtained in the two
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surveys. The chapter continues by examining three sections of EB91. The first section,
dedicated to life within the European Union, takes into consideration some questions
addressed by the researchers to the sample of respondents regarding the personal situation
of European citizens, the main concerns of Europeans and some political aspects. It is
clear that the majority of respondents are happy to live within the Union, even if the
percentage of dissatisfied people remains very high. It is also found that the three main
areas of concern for citizens are immigration, climate change and the economic situation.
Finally, there is a low interest of the population in European political issues – especially
if compared to the interest in national and local political issues – and a majority of
respondents who declare that they have no trust in the EU, although this figure is slightly
improving compared to the previous half year. The second section of EB91, dedicated to
the EU and its citizens, considers the questions posed by interviewers regarding citizens'
attachment to the EU, to the European institutions, to knowledge of the EU and the EU
between today and tomorrow. The paragraph highlights the slight strengthening of
positive associations towards the concept of the European Union by citizens, although the
13% of the interviewees continue to associate it to the idea of loss of national identity.
Furthermore, the majority of citizens (59%) believes its country would be better able to
face the future outside the EU. Regarding trust in the European institutions, the EB91 data
shows a slight increase compared to the autumn 2018 data; of the five institutions taken
into account, the European Parliament is the one that enjoys trust the most, while the
Council is the one that has obtained the least. Despite this, the general level of trust
remains low. In addition, data shows that 54% of respondents perceive the European
Union as distant, while only 36% do not agree with this vision. This second section of the
survey also tests the citizens’ level of knowledge about EU and the mechanisms that
govern it. The first part of the study is based on a self-evaluation that the interviewees
provided on what they believe to be their knowledge. In the second part, the interviewers
verified through a short test the real knowledge of individuals on European Union. What
emerges is a strong contrast between the first and the second part of the study, which
highlights the low knowledge of citizens on the European question. Finally, the third
section of the EB91 survey is dedicated to economic issues. It can be observed that the
majority of European citizens considers the economic situation of the EU to be positive,
but the countries belonging to the Eurozone and those of southern Europe most affected
by the 2007-2008 Euro crisis express more critical and Eurosceptic positions. A socio-
demographic analysis of the results of the survey shows that Eurosceptic opinions are
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more widespread among individuals +55 aged, among those who finished the education
before reaching the age of fifteen, among unemployed and retired people, among
individuals who find it difficult to pay taxes and among those who believe to belong to
the lower or middle-lower class.
The reasons that pushed me to deeply study this theme concern the fact that very often,
in real life as well as in virtual life, we hear about the European Union with a negative
meaning, representing it as an elite project created to steal sovereignty from Member
States. The purpose of this thesis is to understand if Euroscepticism has spread in an
environment in which individuals are aware of what the EU really is and what are the
mechanisms that govern its functioning, or if the phenomenon has taken root in the
societies of the Member States due to a lack of knowledge on the issue. This issue is
fundamental to be able to plan interventions, aimed to "sanitizing" society from false
information and common clichés, in order to allow the population to develop an
independent thought on the EU, based on truthful news. The three environments in which
Euroscepticism manifests itself – public opinion of citizens, political parties and the mass
media – are closely connected each other and it is the lack of knowledge of citizens
relating to the EU and the perception of the Union as a "distant project" that leads the
population to depend on the mass media to formulate opinions on the subject. The mass
media use a framing that gives greater media coverage to negative events related to the
EU and highlights their critical aspects, leading to increase feelings of public
dissatisfaction with European integration. Because of this, political parties adapt their
program to the opinions spread among citizens, so they can increase their compatibility
with the electorate and obtain electoral benefits. Therefore, there is a consequential spiral
that can be blocked only through correct information and education to the European
Union.
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CAPITOLO I - Il processo di integrazione europea
1.1 Le prime tappe fondamentali dell’integrazione
Esaminare la storia dell’integrazione europea può essere di grande aiuto per comprendere
il passato, conoscere il presente e riflettere sul futuro dell’Unione. Usando l’espressione
di R. Santaniello, essa rappresenta la “tela di fondo”
1
per poter analizzare le politiche e le
azioni europee. Nel mio lavoro, ripercorrerò i tratti essenziali che hanno portato alla
nascita e allo sviluppo della Comunità europea; conoscere questi passaggi è di
fondamentale importanza per poter esaminare il declino del sostegno da parte
dell’opinione pubblica, dei cittadini e dei partiti politici verso il progetto dell’Unione
Europea e per poter osservare, di conseguenza, l’espansione dell’Euroscetticismo.
L’idea europea era maturata già nei primi anni del Novecento grazie ad alcune iniziative
diplomatiche di illustri politici provenienti dai vari Stati del continente. In seguito alla
fine del primo conflitto mondiale, si iniziò a riflettere sul futuro dell’Europa e sulla
necessità di mutare i rapporti interstatali. Nel periodo tra le due guerre mondiali, nel 1930,
il ministro degli esteri francese Aristide Briand propose la creazione di un’unione federale
europea, costruita intorno alla Francia e alla Germania. È solo dopo la Seconda guerra
mondiale, però, che si delinearono delle correnti di pensiero più precise riguardanti al
progetto europeo. Queste tre correnti erano quelle confederalista, federalista e
funzionalista. La corrente confederalista suggeriva di dar vita ad una serie di accordi di
cooperazione tra gli Stati, lasciando però intatta la sovranità di quest’ultimi; favorevoli
alla forma della confederazione erano alcune personalità politiche dell’epoca come
Charles De Gaulle e Winston Churchill. La seconda corrente, quella federalista, invocava
al contrario la fine degli Stati nazionali, responsabili di aver trascinato i popoli europei in
due conflitti disastrosi, e proponeva di creare una federazione a cui affidare la sovranità
sottratta alle Nazioni. Tra i federalisti ricordiamo l’olandese Henri Brugmans, il francese
André Voisin e l’italiano Altiero Spinelli. La corrente funzionalista, infine, proponeva di
raggiungere l’unità europea mediante la creazione di integrazioni settoriali; solo in questo
modo, secondo i fautori di quest’ultima visione, sarebbe stato possibile porre le basi di
una diversa organizzazione dei poteri in Europa. Una maggiore integrazione in
1 Si veda al riguardo Santaniello R., Capire l’Unione europea, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2016.
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