Wrong politics, the bead has bursted and the crisis arrived

The divergence from competitive prices has kept on growing: the beads are destined to last for a long time but sooner or later burst provoking the crisis. Inadequate cultural conditions can explain the adoption of wrong politics when the crisis bursts: a first typology only assembles on brief period, avoiding to undertake with structural interventions that prevent new crisis, limiting to often collide with the wounds of the crisis with very expensive rescues for the public finance or cause of inflation, if financed with creation of coin. A second typology has the tendency to plaster the financial markets through rigid regulations: also in this case they are made rescues in the brief period but the saved will have more intrusive rules or they will replaced by a public administration of the finance. This second typology finds an obstacle in the globalization; economies haven't come back to protectionism. The customs introduced from United States for the Chinese tires are perfectly coherent with an accord stipulated at the moment of the entry of China in the Wto and interest only 0,3% of the Chinese exports. "With the crisis a cycle of unusual growth ended. The origin of the crisis is not to Wall Street but in countries as Florida, where an increasing number of individuals opened loans for the purchase of the first, second and sometimes third house, without worrying about the unbearable burdens in the time." The prudence is missed from the side of the receiver and from the side of the lender, the bank: traditionally what set a brake to the desire of the banks to increase the volume of loans to expenses of their quality was the cost that shouldered in case of missed reimbursement of loans. Today, however, after having been disbursed, loans come associated and sold in the form of titles on markets: so banks are not assumed the final risk, that is transferred to the financial market. The real bead was born because all, included the authorities of economic and financial politics,  have neglected the fundamental data of the sector, towards which have fed an absurd optimism. “To neglect the fundamental ones is not rational; only element of rationality is tracked in the way with which euphoria transmits her in collective psychology down: the single ones, put aside the information that have individually picked up and they rationally do it because it is impossible that all the others are wrong him”. "A world financially more transparency is also a less ignorant world". All have suffered the general Shiller’s euphoria of the market, but monetary politics were irresponsible and they fed the optimism: the rates of interest were negative for three years from 2002, as soon as with maxima prices' house. The bead has begun to have gone down since 2006 when prices had become so tall that who wanted purchase a house could not do it anymore. When the crisis has bursted, to the vertex of the Fed there was Bernanke that immediately decreased the federal rates of discount  from 5.25% to 1% provoking a reduction generalized of the rates of interest, the Fed furnished liquidity to banks, but the problem was that at the centre of the crisis there was the system banking shade. “The thing that worries more is ineffectiveness of  monetary politics: the 1981-1982 recession that has pushed the rate of unemployment above 10% has been heavy, but derived from a choice: to defuse the inflation and in the moment in which the Fed has established that the economy had suffered enough, the president Volcker has loosened the hold and the economy has returned to race. Now despite the repeated efforts oft monetary authorities, economy stagnates and we finds us in a typical economy of the depression, in fact the shortage of the question has become an obstacle to the comfort of the world”.